On 15 Jul 2011, at 19:54, Terren Suydam wrote:

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Hi Bruno, Roughly speaking, my main struggle with your wonderful arguments is making the leap from the domain of mathematical logic to the one and only domain we can be sure of as conscious, namely biological human consciousness, and this without rejecting comp. Unfortunately I am hindered by my lack of fluency in mathematical logic. See below for comments.On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:Hi Terren Apology for commenting your post with some delay.No worries about the delay. I play email chess and have had games over a year old, so I am used to being patient :-] <snip>To be sure, themathematical/logical framework you elucidate that captures aspectsof1st/3rd person distinctions is remarkable, and as far as I know, thefirst legitimate attempt to do so. But if we're talking TOE, thenanexplanation of consciousness is required.Right. But note that the notion of fist person experience alreadyinvolvedconsciousness, and that we are assuming comp, which at the startassume thatconsciousness makes sense. The "explanation" per se comes when wehaveunderstand that physics emerge from numbers, and this in the doublewayimposed by the logic of self-reference. All logics (well, not all,really)are splitted into two parts: the provable and the non provable (bythemachine into consideration).I think the explanation of how physics emerges from the "number theology" as you put it is a great contribution and certainly *part* of an explanation of consciousness, especially in that it reduces the mind/body problem to computer science, as you say. But it is not enough to "merely" deal with the mind/body problem. The hard problem of how qualia arise needs to be explained.

`I think that the original mind-body problem is, or at least includes`

`the "hard problem". The hard aspect has been intentionally dismissed`

`by the behaviorist and positivist schools (like with the Vienna circle).`

`In the frame of comp, that is what AUDA should explain, and what UDA`

`formulates.`

I know you have identified a logical framework that is capable of distinguishing qualia and quanta from the point of view of the lobian machine, but again, that strikes me as a description, not an explanation.

`The explanation comes from the fact that such a distinction is made`

`necessary. Machines encounters necessarily the "hard" mind body`

`problem, by the logic of self-reference. WE know, by having build a`

`simple correct machine that Bp and Bp & p are equivalent (proves the`

`same arithmetical propositions), but the machine cannot know that (by`

`the logic), and the two points of view are not conciliable.`

Another way to put it perhaps is that such a logical framework may well be a *necessary* condition of a machine that can experience qualia, but not a sufficient one.

`If it is not sufficient, I am not sure it makes sense to accept the`

`"doctor" proposition.`

An example of a hypothesis that takes this further towards an explanation is that an experiencing machine needs to be embodied (a closed system) in some context (even if in platonia) with a boundary that can be perturbed as a result of that embodiment (i.e. what we think of as a sensory apparatus);

`But this is automatically taken into account. You expect that the`

`doctor does not just copy your brain, but that it reconstitute it`

`relatively to your (most probable) environment. A brain has many`

`inputs (from eyes, and from the cerebral stem).`

`And the measure problem comes from the fact that the UD does also`

`reconstitute you in many environments.`

`Note also that the argument (both UDA and AUDA) does not necessitate`

`that consciousness supervenes only on the biological brain, the`

`"generalized brain" might include the environment, even the whole`

`physical reality. That appears at the step seven, where you can`

`eliminate the neurophysiological hypothesis (used only in steps 1-6`

`for pedagogical purpose).`

and that the machine synthesize these perturbations within the context of a recursively updated model of "the world", grounded in the patterns generated by those perturbations, and this model is the content of its experience. Once the machine develops a model its world sophisticated enough to include itself, it perhaps achieves Lobianity, although my grasp of mathematical logic is too limited to say, unfortunately.

`Löbianity is very cheap. Peano Arithmetic has an implicit "model" of`

`itself at the start. This is due to the fact that "provable" is an`

`arithmetical predicate.`

`Of course a complex and deep Löbian machine will have a far more`

`sophisticate self-representation, but this will not change the logic`

`of self-reference (as far as the machine is correct about that self-`

`representation).`

This hypothesis is what I happen to believe, but I'm not attempting to argue for it or defend it here (if I were, I'd include much more detail!) My point here is only that I think there's an explanatory gap that is possible to bridge, but that the self-references logics that give rise to incommunicable beliefs don't bridge that gap.... more on this later.

`The solution of the hard problem is that the machine makes the`

`experience of the gap, and can explain why the gap is not bridgeable.`

`The explanation is that there is necessarily, from the machine's`

`points of view, a real non bridgeable gap.`

Using the descriptor Bp to signify a machine M's ability to provep isfine. But it does not explain how it proves p.It proves p in the formal sense of the logician. "Bp" suppose atranslationof all p, of the modal language, in formula of arithmetic. Then Bpis thetranslation of beweisbar('p'), that is provable(gödel number of p).If themachine, for example, is a theorem prover for Peano Arithmetic,"provable'is a purely arithmetical predicate. It is define entirely in termof zero(0), the successor function (s), and addition + multiplication, togetherwith some part of classical logic. It is not obvious at all thiscan beendone, but it is "well known" by logicians, and indeed that is doneby Gödelin his fundamental incompleteness 1931 paper.When you say "if the machine is a theorem prover", are you referring to a trivial machine? Something you can assign to your students?

`Yes. I think that I did come back on this below. Now, the notion of`

`triviality is relative, and starting from a simple theory like PA, you`

`need to be Gödel to find it in the theory itself. That is a major`

`discovery in science. But if the student are familiar with the notion`

`of interpreter, and with a bit of logic programming, it becomes,`

`starting from a relatively high level programming language, a tedious`

`exercise.`

If yes, then I struggle to see how we can relate such a machine to the consciousness we have access to (our own), see below.

OK. It is not an easy point.

If no, then I struggle to see how invoking a 'theorem prover' is not a "and then the magic happens" leap of faith. <snip>Löbian machines are mere descriptions, absentexplanations of how a machine could be constructed that would havetheability to perform those operations.Those are very simple (for a computer scientist). I give this asexercise tothe most patient of my students.Then as above, I struggle to see how we can interpret the biological machines we are familiar with (namely, us) in terms of Löbian logic. Is human language an adequate substitute for the precise logical domain of arithmetic and Gödelian numbering of propositions? Natural language is so messy and imprecise, but I may be missing the point.

`In natural language, we confuse all modalities. We confuse easily ~Bx`

`with B~x (cf the confusion between atheism and agnosticism). Lucas and`

`Penrose, on Gödel, confuse Bp and Bp & p, and that confusion appears`

`also in all easy explanation of the mind-body problem. People often`

`confuse Bp and Dp, or tend to believe that Bp -> p, or that Bp -> Dp,`

`which is indeed the case for most modal logics studied before the`

`discovery of Löb's theorem (B(Bp -> p) -> Bp). I recall that B is put`

`for Gödel's beweisbar, and p is any arithmetical proposition.`

`So modal logic helps a lot, in both philosophy and math (provability/`

`consistency logics).`

Taking the biological as anexample, it is self-evident that we humans can talk about andevaluateour beliefs. But until we have an explanation for *how* we do thatatsome level below the psychological, we're still just dealing with descriptions, not explanations. Taking the abstract step towardslogical frameworks helps in terms of precision, for sure. But assoonas you invoke descriptors like Bp there's an element of "and thenthemagic happens."The machine lives in Platonia, so I give her as much time as theyneed.Let me give a simple example. The machine can prove/believe thearithmeticallaws, because those are axioms. They are sort of initialinstinctive belief.axiom 1: x+0 = x axiom 2: x + s(y) = s(x + y)Just from that the machine can prove that 1+1 = 2 (that is, theaddition ofthe successor of 0 with the successor of zero gives the successorof thesuccessor of 0: indeed:s(0) + s(0) = s(s(0) + 0) by axiom 2 (with x replaced by s(0)by thelogical substitution rule: the machine can do that)but s(0) + 0 = s(0), by axiom 1 (again, it is easy to give to themachinethe ability to match a formula with an axiom)so s(0) + s(0) = s(s(0)), by replacing s(0) + 0 with s(0) in theprecedingline. Amazingly enough, with just the mutiplication axiom: axiom 3: x * 0 = 0 axiom 4: x * s(y) = (x * y) + xyou add already prove all the sigma_1 sentences, that is, the onehaving theshape "it exists n such that P(n)", P(n) being decidable/recursive.This iscall sigma_1 completeness, and is equivalent with Turing-universality. Thatis certainly amazing, but a bit of logic + addition andmultiplication givesalready Turing universality.This means also that the machine, without induction, is already auniversaldovetailer (once asked to dovetail on all what she can prove). Butsuch amachine is not Löbian: it still needs the infinity of inductionaxioms. Thatinfinity is recursively computable, so it remains a machine! And that machine is Löbian, which technically means that not only themachine can prove all the true sigma_1 sentences, but she can provefor each(fasle or true) sigma_1 sentences p that p -> Bp. In a sense, aLöbianmachine is a universal machine which knows (in that technicalsense) thatshe is universal.But I am not a dovetailer.

`You are right. My fault: the "that" in the last paragraph refers to`

`the universal machine + the induction axiom (and I assume the`

`universal machine is presented in a logic system, or I take the least`

`first order logical specification of the universal machine (a priori a`

`universal machine is not an axiomatic system, but it can easily be`

`transformed into one).`

`The universal dovetailer itself is not even a universal machine, given`

`that it has no inputs, nor outputs. But this is dependent on the`

`definition chosen for "universal machine".`

Does a machine in your framework need to dovetail on what it can prove for us to explain how it gets access to its beliefs?

`It does not need that. Usually machines and observers are not conceive`

`as dovetailers, except when they do explicit exploration for searching`

`a proof.`

If no, do you think it is important to explain how biological machines like us do have access to our beliefs?

`That is crucial indeed. But this is exactly what Gödel did solve. A`

`simple arithmetical prover has access to its belief, because the laws`

`of addition and multiplication can define the prover itself. That`

`definition (the "Bp") can be implicit or explicit, and, like a patient`

`in front of the description of the brain, the machine cannot recognize`

`itself in that description, yet the access is there, by virtue of its`

`build in ability. The machine itself only identifies itself with the`

`Bp & p, and so, will not been able to ever acknowledge the identity`

`between Bp and Bp & p. That identity belongs to G* minus G. The`

`machine will have to bet on it (to say "yes" to the doctor).`

If the answer to that is no, are you just taking it on faith that assuming comp, any machine that can access its own beliefs is in implementation of a Löbian machine?

`Not at all. It is a theorem. All self-referentially correct machine`

`are Löbian, once she is universal and can prove the induction axioms.`

`All recursively enumerable extensions of Peano arithmetic, or of`

`equivalent theories, are Löbian.`

Maybe this is easy for you to prove, I may be missing that as well.

`It is not easy, but a minimal amount of familiarity with mathematical`

`logic makes it rather easy. It follows from standard proofs of Gödel's`

`theorem.`

Do you have an explanation for how Löbian self-reference occurs in biological machines? Is natural language required?

`I don't think natural language is required. On the contrary, I would`

`say that natural language will usually entails a departure from`

`Löbianity, due to the confusion described above. The humans, and any`

`"embodied in complex reality" machines, will usually have a non Löbian`

`supplementary layer to handle "beliefs revision". We don't need that`

`to solve the mind-body problem, which is better handled with ideal`

`machine in empty environment (closed eyes meditation!). The non`

`monotonic supplementary layers is of course the crucial ingredient for`

`having a machine capable to go through any form of concrete life`

`struggle. But that's AI, not fundamental cognitive/physical science.`

Believe me, I'm not expecting source code, so much as a clarification that we don't quite have a TOE yet.We have it. The "ontological TOE" (the ROE) is just elementaryarithmetic(without induction). Such a theory already emulates (in "platonia")allmachines, and this all the Löbian machines, which are considered astheinternal observers in arithmetic. Here we have to be careful of notdoingSearle's error, and to remember that by emulating a machine, youdon'tbecome that machine! (in particular your brain emulates you, butyour brainis not you; the UD emulates all machines, but is only oneparicular, nonuniversal, machines).I agree in the big picture, but I'm not sure you can say the TOE is complete without some more explanation.

`It is! In the sense of not necessitating any other axioms (than`

`elementary arithmetic, *without* induction). Then you need only`

`*definitions* to proceed. The reality = arithmetic without induction.`

`The observer = arithmetic with induction. The first emulate the`

`second, and the physics (and other modalities) are extracted from the`

`interview of the second, when emulated by the first.`

What does ROE stand for?

`Realm of Everything. It is the ontological part of the TOE. It is what`

`we take as existing or true independently of ourselves.`

Moving on, one technical question I have is how you get the basisforquanta/qualia distinction - namely the property ofnoncommunicability.Unfortunately I probably won't understand the answer as the Solovay logics are beyond me... but I hope to be able to understand how noncommunicability manifests as a logical property of a machine.It is consequence of what is called "the diagonalizationlemma" (Gödel1931).It asserts that for each arithmetical predicate P (like beingprime, beingthe Gödel number of a theorem by the machine, etc.) you can find asentencek such that PA (say) will prove k <-> P(k).So for each predicate you can find a so-called fixed point. The kabove.Now, take the predicate "provable", which Gödel has shown to bedefinable inPeano Arithmetic (or principia mathematica, whatever), that is, it is definable in the formal language of the machine under consideration.Now if P(n) is definable, then ~P(n) is also definable (= not P(n),if P isdefinable, the negation of P is also definable).So by the diagonalization lemma, you can find a sentence k suchthat PA willprove: k <-> ~P(k)From this you can prove that if the machine is ideally correct, shewillnever prove k. Indeed, if she proves k, she will prove ~P(k), andso willlose self-referential correctness (and thus correctness). She willprove kand she will proves that k is not provable.To be sure, Gödel assumed only omega-consistency (weaker fromcorrectness),and Rosser extends the result for all simply consistent machines.But Idon't want to go into much details, and I do assume the machines are correct, for other reasons.But you see that k is true also. Indeed by k <-> ~P(k), k assertsits ownnon provability, and k is indeed not provable. So k is an exampleof truebut non provable, or non communicable, sentence.That is the first incompleteness result. It is not difficult toshow aconcrete example of such a sentence k. Indeed ~Bf is such an example.Self-consistency is incommunicable by the consistent machine. (Itis what Ilike to call a protagorean virtue). f if the constant false, and t is constant true. Or you can take f = = '0 = s(0)', and t == '0=0'.thanks, I understand how you derive 'incommunicable' now, as the set of propositions that are true but not provable (as in Gödel's theorem).

OK.

More difficult to prove, is the fact that if the machine believesalso inthe induction axioms, then the machine can prove that IF she isconsistent,then she cannot prove that she is consistent: ~Bf -> ~B~Bf or (if you see that ~Bf = Dt): Dt -> ~BDt; or again Dt -> DBf.Löb will find the maximal generalization of that sentence (B(Bp ->p) ->Bp). With p = f, it should be easy to see that Löb generalizesGödel (hint:in classical propositional logic ~p is equivaent with p -> f, soyou needjust to take p = f in Löb's formula).So a machine that holds no contradictory beliefs cannot prove to another that it never contradicts itself... interesting.

`Indeed. It is the key, + the fact that the machine can prove that very`

`fact, once she take for granted some description of itself (like the`

`one given by the doctor).`

Another concern I have is that there seems to me a lot ofimprecisionin the language used to correlate the consequences of the Löbian machine with the folk-psychological terms we all use. For instance,I've seen you refer to Bp in separate contexts as M's ability toprovep, and as M "believing" proposition p.It is "belief" as used in cognitive science and epistemology. Notthe beliefof religion. Although there are no differences, actually, but thatis a veryhot debate. It is weird because that use of belief is very common.It canonly shock people who believe religiously (pseudo-religiously) in thepropositions of science. But we always start from belief and getbeliefs.Here you are using 'belief' in a way that is counter-intuitive in the ordinary sense of the word.

`But this is weird. I really use "belief" like in the belief theory.`

`Like in "do you believe that it will rain today?", or like in "do you`

`believe that Obama is the president of the US?". It seems to me that I`

`heard that use all the times when seeing a movie. The religious notion`

`of belief is used only in the religious context, but the word belief`

`is much more wider than that. A confusion comes from the fact that`

`people believes (!) that science = knowledge. But science is only`

`belief. The main difference with knowledge is that for knowledge we`

`have Bp -> p (and B(Bp -> p)). For belief we don't have Bp -> p or we`

`don't have B(Bp -> p). For machine: the situation is clear: G* proves`

`Bp -> p (trivially in the sense that we work on correct machines, like`

`PA or ZF), but G does not prove it (the machine does not believe it,`

`or does not prove it). The machine cannot know that she is correct. By`

`Löb's theorem, the machine knows that only on the proposition she can`

`actually prove.`

`What is amazing, and is the core of Gödel discovery, is that proving`

`acts like believing, and not like knowing, for the correct machine.`

`That makes the correct machine maximally humble and modest.`

What you are saying suggests that "all primes are odd" has the same epistemological status as "God does not exist", or less controversially, "I am consistent". I hope we agree that these are different kinds of beliefs, the primary distinction involving provability. This is why invoking Bp in some contexts as 'provable' and in others as 'belief' is confusing.

`It is the belief of the perfect (self-referentially correct machine)`

`when talking about a third person presentation of itself. Of course it`

`is the scientific third person self-reference. The itself is the 3-I,`

`or the body, or a description of the body.`

`Now, the epistemology is not in the proposition. So it makes no sense`

`to argue of the nature of the three propositions; because their`

`epistemological status will depend on the machine that you interview,`

`or of the theory that you are using.`

`For example, if you take the theory PA + "God exists" (a ridiculous`

`theory just for making my point), then "all the primes are odd" and`

`"God does not exist" have the same status (refutable).`

`"I am consistent" is true and not provable, nor refutable, in that`

`theory. The epistemology is in the machine/theory, not in any`

`proposition (I suspect you have some implicit theory in the`

`background; you should not).`

`if you define like me (and Plato) God by Truth. Then the proposition`

`"God does not exist" is no more expressible in the language of (any)`

`machines. Weakening of it will be accessible under the form of a bet`

`or guess.`

That is confusing precisely because proof and belief are actually opposed in certain human-psychological contexts, such as belief in god. This concern extends to the language you invoke in your "discourse with Löbian machines" which I feel takes a lot of liberties with anthropomorphizing, and sneaks in a lot of folk-psychological concepts. Giving you the benefit of the doubt, I understand that evangelizing these ideas means being able to make non-technical analogies in the interest of accessibility. But it is also possible that in one context you mean Bp to mean "prove" and in another you mean Bp to "believe" in semantically non-identical ways,I try not. You can feel that the theorem will apply to you and to any machine which1) are machine (obvious for the machine, and it is equivalent tocomp, forthe human)2) believes in the elementary axioms of PA (so belief that x + 0 =x, etc.).3) are arithmetically correct (this is the "simplifying" assumptionorstudying *that* class of machine, which is motivated byinterviewing correctmachine to get the correct physical laws).I think this gets to the core of my issues. I think we can agree that humans that have never done any arithmetic in their lives are still conscious (e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pirah%C3%A3_people). So (2) and (3) do not apply to humans.

`Well, here I disagree. I have worked with strongly mentally disabled`

`people during two years. They were unable to count and most of them`

`could not even talk. With the help of computers I have been able to`

`convince external observers that they were only handicapped, and that`

`they were able to count, add an multiply, ... and to do induction. I`

`don't think it exists humans for which "2)" and "3)" does not apply,`

`even if the task for motivating them, and helping them to express`

`themselves, can be insuperable.`

`I am not convinced at all that the Piraha people escapes "2)" and`

`"3)". It seems clear that they are just not interested, like they are`

`not interested in canoe, nor in anything capable of changing their`

`life, and it is their right. But they are Löbian.`

`Actually I tend to believe that octopus and spider, and all`

`vertebrates are Löbian. Löbianity concerns believability, not actual`

`beliefs. Still less the ability to use or express such beliefs.`

`And also, Löbianity is needed only for self-consciousness, but`

`universality is enough for consciousness, I begin to think. More on`

`this below.`

and this lets you "cover more ground" in making the leap to the aspects of consciousness that we can analogize from. In other words, imprecise language may allow you to claim a more comprehensive mapping from Löbianity to psychology than is actually possible.It might be the case, but I don't think so. You might try to find aspecificexample.OK, beyond the Bp confusion (if only in my head), another example is making the leap from identifying a logical domain of propositions that are true but not provable to our experience of qualia. While it is certainly true that qualia can be considered true propositions (from machine's 1p) that are not communicable (provable in 3p), it is not obviously true that all such incommunicable propositions represent qualia. Yet the AUDA routinely makes these kinds of leaps.

`The true and not provable sentences are given by G* minus G, and they`

`does NOT represent the qualia.`

`For the qualia, I am using the classical theory of Theaetetus, and its`

`variants. So I define new logical operator, by Bp & p, Bp & Dt, Bp &`

`Dt & p. The qualia appears with Bp & p (but amazingly enough those`

`qualia are communicable, at least between Löbian entities). The usual`

`qualia (red, yellow, pain, pleasure) appears in the non communicable`

`part of the logic with the operator defined by Bp & Dt & p. Bp makes`

`it UD accessible, Dt makes it belonging to a "reality" (a model, a`

`maximal extension of a computation) and "p" makes it true. The logic`

`we get is close to the "quantum logic" of field perception (but works`

`remains to assess this, and evaluate such logics). Note that the`

`motivation of such classical knowledge theory in AUDA are given in the`

`UDA. Note also that I interview computationalist machines (not just`

`correct one), and this is formalized by restricting the atomic`

`arithmetical propositions to the sigma_1 sentences (having the shape`

`ExP(x) with P decidable).`

As humans, we are epistemologically bound to consider abstract arguments such as AUDA in the context of our experience. It is too easy for us, in other words, to make those leaps with you in a non-critical way, because we are already leaping just to comprehend the argument. This is why the lack of precision concerns me, because intuitively I feel that those leaps need more scaffolding, so to speak.

`The scaffolding is given by the classical theory of knowledge, that`

`the self-referentially correct machine is bound to find by itself when`

`introspecting herself. It leads to 8 (natural) hypostases, although in`

`reality it is 4 + 4*infinity (indeed, the weakening like "BBBp & DDt`

`& p" plays a role too, and seems to be necessary for some belief in`

`some notion of space, but again this is under development, well sleepy-`

`development, since a time.`

I see more evidence of imprecision in your willingness to describe your salvia experiences as totally non-personal.To be sure I have published all my works in the 1988, except for thedicovery of the arithmetical quantum logic, which I have publishedin thenineties, and I have discovered salvia in 2008. The experience salvia are personal experiences.But they lead sometimes the experiencer to a total amnesia whichmakes itfeel as being a non personal experience.OK, you are saying you (sometimes) have no memories of what happened? They are completely inaccessible to to you?

`Not really. When lucky, I can have a good memory of what happened.`

`When the memory comes back, I do remember that I was lacking my`

`memories, retrospectively.`

It sounds more like you are saying you have zero self-awareness.

`You can say that. Zero self-awareness, or even zero-self-`

`consciousness, but yet: maximal awareness, or maximal consciousness.`

`Memories and the self seems to make you less conscious (paradoxically).`

If that's the case, that does not mean that your (constructed) self is gone, necessarily, only that you are not aware of it in the ongoing experience.

OK.

Now, I have noexperience with salvia myself. However, the fact that suchexperienceis available to you afterwards tells me that some aspect of yourselfis still present during the experience, regardless of how it feels.Well, possibly so.Contrast this with the experience of a baby, who actually has no psychological self yet, or an extremely rudimentary one, and tell me you are able to remember what it's like to be a baby.Some experience are described like that. you feel becoming a baby,or youfeel becoming what you have been before birth, or before the bigbang, orbeyond. It is just a feeling, and is reported as such by theexperiencer.This is used for inspiration, or for doubting some prejudices only.I waswilling to believe that consciousness and time was the construct ofthethird hypostases (Bp & p), but the salvia experience makes me feel consciousness is more primitive than time, indeed.So long as one can remain skeptical about the results of such inspirations, I think such voyages away from our ordinary consciousness can be extremely valuable. We can never forget how easy it is to delude ourselves about what we feel, sober or not.

`Yes. Those interested in consciousness are lucky that something like`

`salvia exists. It looks not toxic at all (even beneficious) and it can`

`lead to a short but quite interesting change of consciousness, which`

`is repeatable, and with an experience which is shared by many people`

`who are patient enough with the plant.`

`Like with sharable experiment, you learn only through it, by refuting`

`or doubting previous prejudices.`

Arguments made from introspection are always suspect.

`They are 100% useless in the scientific endeavor. But like`

`consciousness, they can be the object of the scientific endeavor when`

`we tackle the mind body problem. Here, a lot of people confuse those`

`things. They understand that first person experiences are not`

`scientific (third person communicable), and so they induce that we`

`cannot talk *about* such experiences in any third person way. Of`

`course that is non a valid deduction, and it is a confusion of`

`category. In science we can talk about anything once we make our`

`theory clear enough. The idea that science cannot *address* some`

`question is obscurantism.`

OK. I take the opportunity of the explanation above to explain whatis the(Bp & p) stuff, and clarify why consciousness, or first person self-apprehension leads to a notion which is beyond word. Gödel's incompleteness theorem asserts Dt -> ~BDt (consistent -> non provable consistent). So Dt, that is ~Bf, is not provable. But ~Bf isequivalent with Bf -> f. So, in general Bp -> p is not provable. Soingeneral Bp does not imply p, like a knowledge predicate or operatorshoulddo. So it makes sense to define, like Theaetetus, Kp (the knowledgeof p) byBp & p (knowledge = true (justified) belief). Of course we have Kp -> p(trivially given that Kp is Bp & p, and from a & b you can deduceb). IndeedKp, defined in this way does follows the usual axiom of knowledge(eventemporal knowledge) theories.So you see that incompleteness justifies the working of theclassical theoryof knowledge for the machines.Even more interesting is that Bp & p leads to an operator which isnotdefinable in the language of the machine, and this explains a lot ofconfusion in philosophy and theology, including why consciousnesscannot bedefined (only lived). The 1-I (captured by the Bp & p) has no namefrom thepoint of view of the machine.You might try to define it like (Bp & Tp), with Tp put for anarithmeticaltruth predicate. But such a predicate cannot exist. Indeed, if itexists,then you can find a k, by applying again the diagonalization lemmaof Gödelon ~V(n), so that PA would prove p <-> ~Vp, and from this you canproof thatPA is inconsistent. So already Truth is not definable by the machine(although she can define many useful approximations). Similarly, itcan beproved that no notion of knowledge by a machine can be defined by themachine. Classical (Theaetetical) knowledge is already likeconsciousness:we can' define it. But again, we can define the knowledge ofsimpler (thanus) machine, derived the theology, and lift it on us, in a bettingway, atour own risk and peril. We do that when we say "yes" to the doctor:it *is*a theological act, and people have the necessary right to say "no".Now, we can study Bp & p logic at the modal level, and so can themachinestoo. This is a trick which makes us possible to bypass our's or the machine's limitations.The (Bp & p) hypostase (the first person point of view) has many ofthefeature of the "universal soul" of Plotinus (the greek mysticalinner God).The machine lives it, but cannot give a name to it. It answers RamanaMaharsi koan "Who am I?". The Lôbian machine's answer is "I don'tknow, butI can explain why I *cannot* know that in case I (my third person 3-I, orbody) is a machine".To get the logic of measure one in UD multiplication, Bp & p is notenough,we need a weakening and a strengthening which are given by Bp & Dt,and Bp &Dt & p.You might take a look on the Plotinus paper, but to be honest, itrequiresfamiliarity in logic.I can give it a shot, do you have a link?

`It is on my front page of my URL. Click on the little "pdf" near the`

`title of the Plotinus paper, or just click here:`

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf

My final concern, as I've tried to elaborate on previously, is your willingness to posit consciousness as a property of a (virgin) universal machine. For me this is pretty counter-intuitiveFor me too. That is why I have already written 8 diaries from thesalviaexperience. I see it, but can't believe it :)It is very counter-intuitive. And I can't dismiss the experience asa merehallucination, because it is the very existence of thathallucination whichis counter-intuitive.Why is the existence of the hallucination counter-intuitive?

`Because it is an hallucination of a de-hallucination. With most`

`hallucinogen, you feel like dreaming or hallucinating, with some range`

`of lucidity. With salvia you loose completely lucidity, and feel the`

`experience as being realer than what you feel usually, and you feel`

`like awakening from an hallucination (your life) and being, at last,`

`really awake.`

`It is an hallucination that your life was an hallucination. With high`

`dose, you feel like your life is a vague dream and you forget it like`

`we usually forget dreams. With low dose, you keep the memory, but you`

`get disconnected from it. You feel your life as a dream, but not even`

`a personal dream, you can feel it as not belonging to you: you are`

`someone else, not even related to anything you knew.`

`To be honest, the experience can have other very astonishing feature,`

`and not all of them are easy to conciliate with comp, although that`

`might be possible (but then it is even more astonishing).`

`Another utterly counterintuitive aspect of the experience, is that,`

`you can feel to be conscious, yet you don't feel time going on, and`

`you can even forget what time (and space) are. before salvia, I was`

`linking consciousness and (subjective) time. I was thinking that all`

`qualia (like seeing red) was embedded in a time-like sensation. Even`

`now, I cannot imagine giving sense to any qualia, with some`

`subjectivity of time. With salvia people can hallucinate that time`

`disappear. You can be eternal for happens to be later a short instant!`

`It gives the mystical immortality apprehension, where immortality is`

`not some hope in some afterlife, but the living of eternity ... in the`

`past. You get the feeling you know that you are immortal, because you`

`have lived it. That's paradoxical and counterintuitive at the most.`

`Coming back from there, I am tempted to dismiss this as insanity (type`

`Bf, as it is most plausibly), but if I do the experience again, it is`

`(again) felt as the most obvious fact of life.`

`The hallucination existence is counter-intuitive because it seems to`

`imply that our consciousness is statical, and that the time is a`

`complex product of the brain activity (or of the existence of some`

`number relation). I thought that consciousness needs the illusion of`

`time, but salvia makes possible an hallucination which is out of time.`

`How could we hallucinate that? I see only one solution, we are`

`conscious even before we build our notion of time. Mathematically,`

`with comp, this invites us to consider that consciousness begins with`

`universality, even the statical one "living" in Platonia.`

(which is saying something because I'm with you on the UDA!).Wow. I am very glad to hear that.I had already come to an intuitive sense of the UDA before I encountered your arguments, so I had already experienced that "metaphysical vertigo" you warn about :-] Then to see that you had actually mathematically formalized that intuition, I was pretty blown away by that. The AUDA arguments are all new to me and that is what I'm struggling with.It means mycomputer is conscious in some form, regardless of (or in spite of)theprogram it is running. And that for me leads to a notion of consciousness that is extremely weak. It is why I compared it to panpsychism previously, because panpsychism similarly attributes consciousness to aspects of reality (assuming MAT) that lead to an extremely weak form of consciousness that deprives it of any explanatory potential. In your case at least it is possible in principle to explain what it is about a universal machine that givesrise to consciousness (and that, without any recourse to Löbianityoranything beyond universality).When I read salvia reports, I was quite skeptical. I don't like theideathat the non Löbian machine is already conscious. But then the mathare OK.Such machine lacks only the ability to reflect on the fact. Theybelieve t,Bt, BBt, BBBt, etc. but they cannot believe Bp -> BBp. So they havea farsimpler notion of themselves, and they lack the full self-introspectiveself-awareness of the machines having the induction axioms. Notealso thatalthough non löbian universal machine are in principle very simple,they arestill far from trivial.When you talk about the consciousness of the universal machine, you require that it be dovetailing, in order for it believe t, Bt, etc., correct?

`Not at all. That is again a consequence of my ambiguous use of "that"`

`above. The universal dovetailer is not a universal machine, and`

`usually, universal machine does not dovetail. "Bp is true" means "the`

`machine justifies or believes p", and if "Bp is asserted by the`

`machine", it means that the machine justifies or believes that "the`

`machine justifies or believes p"".`

A virgin universal machine represents pure potential, and attributing consciousness to pure potential is no different from saying (in MAT) that all matter is conscious.

`The assertion that matter is conscious does not make sense, for me.`

`Only a machine, or a person vehiculated by that machine, can be said`

`conscious.`

`Some years ago, I would have said that you need Löbianity to have a`

`person, but now, I think that the universal machine can be conscious,`

`and so I have to enlarge my notion of person. It is not to hard,`

`because a universal machine is not a completely trivial machine. Sure,`

`just addition and multiplication gives rise to universality, but the`

`whole point of Gödel & Co. is that addition and multiplication are`

`only apparently trivial. In fact they are not trivial at all. Number`

`theorists intuit this from their working familiarity of numbers (like`

`the quasi random primes), but it is an hard work for a logician, or`

`its students, to show that addition+multiplication are Turing universal.`

`And yes, it attaches consciousness to a potential. As I said, this is`

`counterintuitive, mainly because that consciousness is necessarily out`

`of time, space, or anything physical.`

<snip>In my view of things, bacteria and viruses are not conscious because they lack a nervoussystem that would satisfy the cybernetic organization I have inmind.I am interested in your proof they are universal, btw.We agree, I think. All universal machine have a sophisticate, yetsometimeshidden in a subtle apparent simplicity, cybernetic organization.Bacteriahave very complex series of regulator genes, which make it possibletoprogram them for addition and multiplication (or simpler, but stilluniversal tasks). Viruses too, at least in combination with theirhosts.I think also that an eukaryotic cells are already the result of alittlebacteria colony, so that we are swarms of bacteria, somehow.The cybernetic organization does not need neurons, it can use genesand"meta-genes" (genes regulating the action of other genes). In fact abacteria like E. Coli, is an incredibly complex structure, withvery subtleself-regulating actions.I see, yes, and actually I want to say I remember hearing about research that involved programming bacteria for some task, but I could be wrong. What has become so appealing about cybernetics to me is that it tries to characterize systems in terms of information flows, which may be implemented in any kind of substrate (or none at all, as in platonia!)

`Well, with UDA you should be able to see that substrate can't help. To`

`introduce substrate can only hinder the search of a solution to the MB`

`problem.`

I'm alsowondering if you have an english-language explanation of theMGA... Irecall seeing one a long time ago.Try with this: http://old.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html Let me now if you have a problem.Thanks, that is a very effective argument. The one thing I didn't understand very well was Maudlin's argument... is there a meaty summary of that argument somewhere? I don't get how the counterfactuals can be dealt with by such minimal additions to the machine. On an unrelated (to this thread) topic, I have a question about 1p indeterminacy. You say the universe as we experience it is a sum on the computational histories of an infinity of programs running on the UD.

Yes. This is the UDA conclusion.

And that what makes the universe consistently communicable from one person to another is the "gluing properties" of such histories. Can you explain "gluing properties"? Is there a mathematical formalization of that concept?

Well, not yet really. I leave this for the next generation :)

`As I did explain to Stephen, to formalize it in the AUDA, you need to`

`define a tensor product in the matter hypostases, and for this is you`

`need some sophisticated semantics for the Z and X logics. Progresses`

`have been done, but it lead toward difficult mathematical questions.`

`Actually this is a problem even for quantum mechanicians, and solution`

`already exists in the frame of some logic (by Girard, but also`

`Kaufmann (in knot theory!) and Abramski, linking knot theory and`

`quantum statistic, but it would still be treachery to use them`

`directly without extracting them from the self-reference logics (which`

`would threat the theory of qualia, which needs to extract quanta and`

`qualia simultaneously from self-reference).`

`So, I use "glueing" in the intuitive sense that you can extract from`

`the UDA. Basically two dreams (computations seen from inside, that is`

`from first person points of view/hypostases) by different subjects`

`will glue if there is a reality (or just locally: a larger`

`computation) generating those two computations, in some "natural way".`

`The usual instinctive root of gluing dreams, is the idea that there is`

`a common geometrical reality. But that simple idea is not available in`

`the UD, or in arithmetic, given that there are infinitely many`

`computations, and no primitive geometry at all. Technically it means`

`that we have to extract a notion of resource (linearity), and of`

`tensor product (interaction). The logic of the material hypostases are`

`very promising for doing that (or at least they show that the`

`impossibility of this is hard to prove, and this shows that the white`

`rabbits might be hunted away in the comp frame). We can come back on`

`this, I have to go now.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.