On 07 Jul 2011, at 02:41, Richard Miller wrote:
All: Can someone please post a design for an experiment that will
test some
of these great theories? As long as the arguments remain
theoretical the
obvious limiters are semantics and math--and over the course of the
last 137
(!) messages we've seemed to reach both of those walls. It's
beginning to
look like the number-of-angels-on-a-pinhead stuff again.
I think you miss the point. UDA shows that IF we are machine, then the
mind-body problem is reduced to a body problem in arithmetic and logic.
The AUDA point is the arithmetical version of the body problem. It
says exactly where is physics, so to test it, you just compare it with
physics. All usual physical experience are then test of the physics
extracted from comp + the classical theory of knowledge.
That is the whole point. Comp makes itself into completely testable
theory. It gives the origin of the physical laws (in th head of the
universal machine). It is hard to imagine a more testable theory, even
if that point is theoretical, given that it is in its infancy and it
leads quickly to open mathematical question. Then comp explains why
first person (plural) indeterminacy and non locallity occur, why
matter is non clonable and non computable in the details. All this
concerns the fundamental question in the long run.
The main advantage is that the theory is really a theory of a coupling
consciousness/realities. Simple mathematical logic does help to
disentangle locally the meaning from the machine's activity. With
comp, the real physics is universal machine independent, and with
respect to the mind body problem, physics makes a bit treachery when
observing around, and picking some particular universal machinery.
Bruno
R Miller
-----Original Message-----
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Constantine
Pseudonymous
Sent: Wednesday, July 06, 2011 2:48 PM
To: Everything List
Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Bruno, is it possible that there is no "fundamental reality" or
"primary
reality"... and even if there was, and it was non- observational or
non-experiential.... why would it matter to us?
It seems to me that reality or knowledge always implies a blind
dualism that
reflects the way in which "we" ("I") experience phenomena (subject/
object,
knower/known distinction-absurdity)
we are always looking in front or ahead. We are always looking at.
-It- is always -away-.
If reality is the Other and we are derived from the Other and this
Other is
transcendent or "fundamental".... then what of this "Other"
and what is its relation to us, or what is our relation to it....
does it
have any subjectivity and do we have any ultimicity in relation to it.
It seems like any reality is assumed to not be us and we are assumed
to be
related to it... therefore it is separate and either conceived of as
blind
and inferior to us, our super conscious and superior to us.
and why are we seemingly superior to this other...
Unless you assume we are the One.... then I would tell you that the
One is
absurd.
On Jun 28, 9:38 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 27 Jun 2011, at 21:51, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 26.06.2011 22:33 meekerdb said the following:
On 6/26/2011 12:58 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be>
...
The idea that our theories are approaching some metaphysical truth
is essentially just the same as assuming there is some more
comprehensive and coherent theory. I note that Hawking and Mlodinow
recently suggested that we might accept a kind of patch-work set of
theories of the world, rather than insisting on a single coherent
theory.
Could you please give references to such a statement? In my view,
this is exactly the way to implement efficiently some simulation of
the world. It is unnecessary for example to simulate atoms until
some observer will start researching them.
Ah ah, ... but so you can guess that it would be more easy for
arithmetic too, in that case. That (a need for patch-work theories in
physics) could happen if the partially sharable numbers' 'dreams'
don't glue well enough.
But we don't know that. It is 'just' an open problem in the frame of
comp. Arithmetical evidences and empirical evidence is that the
dreams
glue pretty well, I would say.
I think Hawking and Mlodinov are assuming that the fundamental
reality is physical. The fact that the physical needs patch-work set
of theories does not entail that the big picture needs that too, as
comp (uda) and "formal arithmetical comp" (auda) illustrate
precisely.
The fact that physicists can arrive to such extremities illustrates
perhaps an inadequacy of the metaphysics of Aristotle.
Bruno
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