Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
>> The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
>> theory that can be used to predict everything.
> 
> A TOE should do that, in principle at least.
> Of course it should be able to predict everything which is  
> predictible, in the right condition. No one asks for a TOE which can  
> predict things which are not predictible. No TOE can predict that you  
> will feel to be, just after the duplication, in W or in M.
OK. But what is predictable may be quite limited in the end. Is there a
result showing that it is possible at all to derive precise physical laws
from COMP and a bet on our substitution level?



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> I am critical of the very notion of a TOE. It doesn't make much  
>> sense. Even
>> current physics clearly shows that results of experiments can't be  
>> predicted
>> precisely. So is the TOE supposed to give a perfect probability
>> distribution? But what is this even supposed to mean?
> 
> The exact contrary. Comp is not just a change in  
> 'perspective' (Aristotle -> Plato), but the discovery of a creative  
> bomb (the UM).
> With comp we begin to know that we don't know what we are doing. We  
> can (machines can) understand that by trying to control it, we make it  
> less controllable. A bit like a mother with a baby. That is not  
> something entirely new, but here it appears in the 3-theories.
Right. That's why we could almost say COMP is an anti-TOE.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> So no theory
>> can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being  
>> a gap.
> 
> OK. You are right. I will abandon the label TOE, for TOAE. Theory of  
> almost everything.
Well, but the part that is unexplainable doesn't seem to be small at all.
Frankly it explains almost nothing (which is the most we will ever explain,
as there is infinitely much to explain!). If anything, it shows there is an
infinite hierarchy of ever more efficient theories.
Which is quite an astounding result, don't get me wrong, but let's not make
the mistake of adjusting to the immodesty of the reductionist materialists.
This way you may not be taken as seriously, but being modest and honest
seems more important to me.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> But *that* fact, that there are mysteries, is no more a mystery.
At the cost that the very foundation of our theory is mysterious! We use a
mystery to explain that there are more mysteries. Which is the best we can
ever do - how exciting!


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>  And in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent picture of  
> almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included, and  
> this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.
I tend to agree. But it's coherent picture of everything includes the
possibility of infinitely many more powerful theories. Theoretically it may
be possible to represent every such theory with arithmetic - but then we can
represent every arithmetical statement with just one symbol and an encoding
scheme, still we wouldn't call "." a theory of everything.
So it's not THE theory of everything, but *a* theory of everything.
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