Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 31 Jul 2011, at 19:31, benjayk wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
>>>> theory that can be used to predict everything.
>>>
>>> A TOE should do that, in principle at least.
>>> Of course it should be able to predict everything which is
>>> predictible, in the right condition. No one asks for a TOE which can
>>> predict things which are not predictible. No TOE can predict that you
>>> will feel to be, just after the duplication, in W or in M.
>> OK. But what is predictable may be quite limited in the end.
> 
> Predicting is not the goal of the TOE. It is just a little obligation  
> to be accepted as a scientific theory, so as to be refutable.
> The goal is more like searching a bigger picture, rational, and which  
> help, first in formulating the mind-body problem, and then in solving  
> it as far as possible.
OK.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Is there a
>> result showing that it is possible at all to derive precise physical  
>> laws
>> from COMP and a bet on our substitution level?
> 
> Yes. And you don't need to know the substitution level, although a  
> comparison of the physics derived from comp, and the physics inferred  
> from measurement might suggest higher bounds for our substitution level.
Alright. So which form would the physics derived from COMP take? I can
hardly imagine that one / a few equation describes the physics for all of
the omniverse. There would probably be an infinity of laws with approximate
and local validity. How could this be formulated (let alone derived, but I
probably would understand none of your explanations regarding that?).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> So no theory
>>>> can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being
>>>> a gap.
>>>
>>> OK. You are right. I will abandon the label TOE, for TOAE. Theory of
>>> almost everything.
>> Well, but the part that is unexplainable doesn't seem to be small at  
>> all.
>> Frankly it explains almost nothing (which is the most we will ever  
>> explain,
>> as there is infinitely much to explain!).
> 
> Well, you have admitted not having study the details, but normally it  
> explains a lot: indeed God, belief, knowledge, observation and  
> sensation, and all this including all reason why we cannot completely  
> understand what happens to be introspectively unexplainable. Ad  
> normally, in principle, it explains the origin of the physical laws,  
> without assuming anything physical.
Well, OK, saying it explains almost nothing might be too harsh. There is
probably no objective way to say how much it explains, as the unexplainable
part is (largly?) unmeasurable. But I don't see why it would be almost
nothing, so it's not a TOAE either.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Which is quite an astounding result, don't get me wrong, but let's  
>> not make
>> the mistake of adjusting to the immodesty of the reductionist  
>> materialists.
>> This way you may not be taken as seriously, but being modest and  
>> honest
>> seems more important to me.
> 
> The modesty is in the reiterared act of faith of saying "yes" to the  
> doctor, and accepting the classical Church thesis. All the rest  
> follows from that: from the explainable to the ineffable.
It seems to me we postulate the ineffeable at the start by saying "yes", and
so it's not really a conclusion of the theory, but we just give it a place
in a theoretical framework.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> And in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent  
>>> picture of
>>> almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included, and
>>> this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.
>> I tend to agree. But it's coherent picture of everything includes the
>> possibility of infinitely many more powerful theories. Theoretically  
>> it may
>> be possible to represent every such theory with arithmetic - but  
>> then we can
>> represent every arithmetical statement with just one symbol and an  
>> encoding
>> scheme, still we wouldn't call "." a theory of everything.
>> So it's not THE theory of everything, but *a* theory of everything.
> 
> Not really. Once you assume comp, the numbers (or equivalent) are  
> enough, and very simple (despite mysterious).
They are enough, but they are not the only way to make a theory of
everything. As you say, we can use everything as powerful as numbers, so
there is an infinity of different formulations of theories of everything.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>  The many more powerful theories are internal views *in* the number realm,
> but strictly  
> speaking they are introducing the complexity, and should be compared  
> to event taken "place" in the number realm.
How do you know the more powerful theories are just internal views, and not
implicit in the "yes" (consciousness)? We might just get what we
(implicitly) assume at the start, and give it a place in the theory.

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