On Aug 11, 10:14 am, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
> >> Not a good analogy since the US is not conscious as a single entity. > > > How would we know? It's at least as much of a single entity as any > > computer. > > It's possible that all sorts of systems are conscious without us > knowing it but there is no evidence for it. Evidence is not the criteria, since we already know that awareness cannot be proved. Logically though, an autopoietic organic system like the United States is a much better analogy of an organism's brain than a manufactured electronic device. It gives us some objectivity to understand the nature of the processes involved without making wild assumptions about what could or could not be replaced. > > The brain is not conscious as a single entity either - we are not > > conscious of much of what we are doing, let along what our brain is > > doing. I don't accept the objection to the analogy and I think we > > should continue using it since it reveals the issues specific to > > understanding the difference between an entity of millions of quasi- > > autonomous living organisms and a logical template being executed > > mechanically. > > >> Please explain what would you think would happen if you replaced part > >> of your brain with an unconscious component that interacted normally > >> with the surrounding neurons. Would you say "I feel different" or > >> would you say "I feel exactly the same as before"? > > > Please explain why you want to keep coming back to this fallacious > > example. There is no such thing as a component which interacts > > 'normally' when you are talking about a living being. Yes, the natural > > part of the brain could notice the difference, but it would not > > necessarily notice, depending on how much of the brain was exchanges, > > what parts, for how long, how much that part is used by that person at > > that time, etc, but above all it would depend on how closely the > > replacement part resembled the original. As I have asserted > > repeatedly, there is no such thing as a replacement that is > > functionally identical to the original without it actually being the > > original. That there could be is a radically misinformed assumption > > about the nervous system and consciousness which attempts to reduce > > the subtlety of the issue to a simplistic logical rubric. > > You've asserted that only the original could be functionally identical > but you haven't explained why you think this: it implies that there is > uncomputable physics in the brain, Our own first hand subjective experience is either undiscovered physics or it is metaphysics. I choose the the former. I don't know what deviations or how much deviation from the original that we could expect to be tolerated and still be considered 'functionally identical' because we don't know what it is that is conscious - an abstract functional pattern that happens to be in a brain, or living tissue that happens to function as a mind. To me, there is ample evidence to suggest that living tissue on all scales suggests sensorimotive interiority, but logical mechanisms, sculpted in any substance suggest no such interior experience. Even a paramecium has it's own idiosyncratic preferences - no two will exactly perform the same function in the same way, yet an enormous cybernetic organization like the internet has yet to express a single preference of it's own or any sign of changing it's behavior to suit it's own needs rather than ours. ? and this goes against the > scientific mainstream. Yes. The scientific mainstream is not approaching this issue scientifically. If you make such a radical claim you need very > good evidence, but I suspect you haven't thought about the > implications for physics at all. There are no implications for physics, other than in its interpretations for a larger context. What I suggest is an involuted set complement to physics which doubles the scope of the cosmos from our current conception. The existing physical hemi-comsos remains as it is. > In any case, I have made the thought experiment simpler by *assuming* > that the replacement component is mechanically equivalent to the > biological tissue. We can imagine that it is a black box animated by > God, who makes it tickle the surrounding neural tissue in exactly the > right way. It's not that simple. The neurons are not merely tickled, any more than the citizens of Los Angeles can be tickled in the same way that they would be if the citizens of Las Vegas were replaced with a giant factory. The equivalence level may be fractal. Each handshake and hot dog cart sign might have to be reproduced. Even if you could fool the citizens of L.A., that doesn't mean that the experiences of a sewage factory is equivalent to the experiences taking place in Las Vegas. If you say that something is mechanically 'equivalent' or replaces the original in 'exactly the right way', then you are answering your own question. You are saying 'if God makes something exactly like water, it is then the equivalent of water'... it's tautological. > I think installation of such a device would *necessarily* > preserve consciousness. What do you think? If you make up another alphabet that functions exactly like English, does it preserve English? It's the wrong question. There is no inorganic alphabet for human consciousness. As fare as we know, only one particular group of atoms seems to be able to become living cells. If we find another group of atoms that makes cells that appear to be alive, and appear to be replaceable with our own, then cool, but we have no reason to assume that human consciousness can be sustained without such a physical, cellular substrate. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
