On 12 Aug 2011, at 18:56, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/12/2011 2:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Aug 2011, at 19:24, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/11/2011 7:14 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
In any case, I have made the thought experiment simpler by
that the replacement component is mechanically equivalent to the
biological tissue. We can imagine that it is a black box animated
God, who makes it tickle the surrounding neural tissue in exactly
right way. I think installation of such a device would
preserve consciousness. What do you think?
Are you assuming that there is no "consciousness" in the black box?
The problem is there. In fine, if the brain works like a machine,
consciousness is not related to its physical activity---which is a
sub level notion, but to the mathematical relation defining the
high level computation leading to the subject computational state.
A related problem: is the back box supposed to be counterfactually
correct or not, or is the black box accidentally correct for one
execution. Answering that question in keeping the mechanist
assumption leads to the "in fine" just above.
I think we are close to the question: does comp entails the 323
Right. If you idealize the brain as a digital computer then it
seems that register 323 is unnecessary.
Ah! Nice. But then comp makes physics a (very precise and constrained)
branch of machine's self-reference theory.
Well, you cannot say that comp idealizes the brain as a digital
machine. It makes the brain physically replaceable by a digital
computer with you not noticing any difference.
But the brain, like every thing else, ...
like every physical object (I guess)
... is a quantum object
Very plausibly. OK.
and it is characteristic of QM that possible interactions that don't
occur make a difference.
Yes. This is made clear by Hardegree's work on quantum logic. Quantum
logic's sazaki hook makes it a logic of counterfactual. But the Bp &
Dt logics too. And ... but I see that you foresee the objection:
Of course you may object that QM can be computed by a (classical)
digital computer -
Yes. So even if the brain is a quantum computer (contra Tegmark, and
you, actually), this would just push the 323-principle on a lower level.
but that's on true on in an Everttian interpretation.
Yes. And Everett's interpretation is the only one coherent with comp,
indeed. In both direction. Comp can be seen as a generalization of
Everett: comp provides a first person account of the collapse and the
swe (if the swe is correct).
The digital computer can't compute which interactions occur and
which don't; that probabilistic.
In copenhagen theory, or in the GRW theory. Well, in all those non
sensical theories. To be short.
All it can do is compute the probabilities for all the possible
outcomes, *inculding* the 323 ones.
But only on the level where the quantum brain operates. In the UD*,
all level are simulated, so that would not change the
"arithmeticalist" ontological conclusion.
I don't insist on that, but it is a key to get the *necessary*
ontological reduction to arithmetic (which does not entail an
I agree with what you say in another post: the term "behavior" is
ambiguous. The notion of substitution level disambiguates a part of
it, and the notion of counterfactuality disambiguates an orthogonal
part of it.
Am I right in thinking that the counterfactuality includes
*everything* that didn't happen?
Every possible inputs, yes.
I'm not sure that's a coherent concept.
Well, the UD will generates those counterfactuals, and we have to show
some of them relatively rare. You can certainly conceive that your
inputs might be chosen randomly (including the skin inputs). That
refers still to very huge but finite numbers.
Now, I don't think the doctor has to do an artificial brain equivalent
to mine satisfying *all* counterfactuals. He might as well suppress
'register' that are no more needed (like those perhaps related to
childhood's needs or something like that). This is certainly the case
if you agree that comp entails the 323 principle. But then ... the
coupling realities/consciousness emerges from addition and
multiplication, only, by the movie graph (or by Maudlin's argument).
If you agree that the physical activity for one specific computation
is enough, then consciousness cannot be associated with the physical
activity, and only to the (abstract, arithmetical) computations.
Jacques Mallah tried coherently, sometimes ago on this list, to block
the movie graph argument by attempting to define a physical notion of
counterfactuals, but this needs to believe that comp does not entail
the 323-principle, even if the brain is a quantum computer, which I
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