On 17.08.2011 02:01 Jason Resch said the following:
On Tue, Aug 16, 2011 at 1:03 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi<use...@rudnyi.ru>
On 15.08.2011 23:42 Jason Resch said the following:
But all of this is an aside from point that I was making
regarding the power and versatility of Turing machines. Those
who think Artificial Intelligence is not possible with computers
must show what about the brain is unpredictable or unmodelable.
Why that? I guess that you should prove first that consciousness
is predictable and could be modeled.
Everyone (except perhaps the substance dualists, mysterians, and
solopists -- each non-scientific or anti-scientific philosophies)
believe the brain (on the lowest levels) operates according to simple
and predictable rules. Also note, the topic of the above was not
consciousness, but intelligence.
The matter is not about our beliefs (though it would be interesting to
look at the theology that Bruno develops).
Yes, the point was about intelligence but the reason about success (if I
have understood it correctly) was that it is possible to simulate even
the whole universe. To this end in my view, it would be good first to
develop a theory for consciousness. Here however the theory is missing
(I do not know if you agree with Bruno's theory). What dualism concerns,
let me quote Jeffrey Gray
p. 73. “If conscious experiences are epiphenomenal, like the melody
whistled by the steam engine, there is not much more, scientifically
speaking, to say about them. So to adopt epiphenomenalism is a way of
giving up on the Hard Problem. But it is too early to give up. Science
has only committed itself to serious consideration of the problem within
the last couple of decades. To find casual powers for conscious events
will not be easy. But the search should be continued. And, if it leads
us back to dualism, so be it.”
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