On Sep 14, 4:07 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 13, 2011 at 11:59 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:
>
> > On Sep 13, 9:25 pm, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > Everything that can exist does, for there is no meta-rule prohibiting
> > that
> > > object's existence.
>
> > I would call that a hasty generalization. Let's say it's the year
> > 1066. Do cell phones exist in England? Is there a meta-rule
> > prohibiting their existence?
>
> Things with a definition that rules out their definition do not exist.  It
> is like asking if there exists an even integer greater than 1, whose
> remainder when divided by 2 is greater than 0.  A cell phone which exists in
> a location where it should not exist may similarly be ruled out by its own
> definition.

You said "Everything that can exist does". That's not the case. There
can exist a box of girl scout cookies in your refrigerator, but that
doesn't mean that it does. There can exist a girl scout cookie that is
beef flavored, but there isn't.

 >That said, nothing precludes a universe nearly identical to
> this one where the initial condition is the universe as it existed in 1066
> only a cell phone happens to exist in it.  Such universes, however, are
> considerably less numerable.

Well yes, if you believe in MWI, there would have to be a universe for
each kind of cell phone that could ever exist in any universe at every
moment in every location. That's why MWI doesn't work for me. Each
letter I have typed spawns a universe of universes where any number of
typos were made and corrected or uncorrected. An entire universe for
every eyelash falling out at every possible moment that it could fall
out. In theory, that could solve some problems, but I think it
probably makes many more than it solves.

>
>
>
> > Have you ever considered that rules are created through existence
>
> Rules are a property of some structures which exist platonically.

What makes them exist Platonically? More rules that are a property of
some structures which exist meta-Platonically? A virtual homunculus?

>
> > It's not a matter of perception or not perception, it's a matter of
> > the depth and quality of the perception and the power and volition of
> > the sentience. A Cartesian theater-like experience is not a necessary
> > consequence of any mechanical process.
>
> Is there anything you think it is a necessary consequence of?

No, it's not inevitable, but significance accumulates as a consequence
of it's relation to entropy. In any universe that works like ours, you
will have incidences of deep meaningful perception eventually - not
necessarily in the form of human qualia and experience.

>What might
> determine whether or not it meets those necessary conditions?

Experience. The outcome of countless sensorimotive efforts against
countless evolutionary dice rolls.

>
> > If it were, then why would it
> > also be necessary to hide that experience in an invisible interiority?
>
> I am not certain what you mean by this.

I mean "> > Why not have an actual Cartesian theater where actual
miniature images
> > and full sensory movies can be seen under a microscope."

>
> > Why not have an actual Cartesian theater where actual miniature images
> > and full sensory movies can be seen under a microscope.
>
> This would only be a benefit to neuroscientists.  There would be little
> reason for such a function to evolve.

The function has already evolved, I'm asking what's the point of
making it invisible? Our experience should either look exactly like
the inside of a brain, or the inside of our brain should look exactly
like our experience, but instead, they seem to be largely divergent.

>
> > Why does this
> > impenetrable cloaking happen?
>
> Nature doesn't make everything easy to figure out.  For millions of years,
> the fact that the earth moved around the sun was a truth cloaked from
> humanity.  Just because we have not yet penetrated this cloak does not mean
> it is impenetrable.  Think how impenetrable the mystery of how traits are
> passed from parents to child must have seemed a thousand years ago.  Or how
> impossible it might have seemed to figure out whether or not matter was
> infinitely divisible, or what makes the stars shine.

That's why it doesn't make sense that nature is explainable in purely
physical terms. It would have no reason to figure itself out because
it already is what it is.

>
>
>
> > > > Functionally, there is no reasonable explanation for perception or
> > > > experience, especially if you believe in determinism.
>
> > > I disagree with this.  I don't see what adding randomness or
> > capriciousness
> > > to the mix does for perception.
>
> > I expect that you disagree with this, but how do you justify that
> > disagreement rationally?
>
> One of us must be irrational.

That doesn't justify your disagreement rationally, it's just a
(fallacious) opinion on opinions.

>
> > What is a reasonable explanation for a
> > deterministic universe to develop a capacity to perceive itself?
>
> It serves the purposes of life.

What deterministic purpose does life serve?

>
> > What
> > would be the point?
>
> As Bruno would say, to help ourselves, to eat and avoid being eaten.

Cockroaches do better. They must have really amazing perception that
is more powerful than ours?

>
>
>
> > > You think that because consciousness is a mystery,
>
> > No, you think consciousness is a mystery. I think it's ordinary.
> > Amazing, but ordinary. It's just the opposite of objective matter in
> > space (subjective 'energy' through time).
>
> You should not be satisfied until you can answer fundamental questions such
> as what are the requirements for consciousness,

Consciousness is just awareness of awareness. It's the degree of
elaboration that is interesting to us. What is required for
elaboration is experience over time.

> what creatures or plants are
> conscious and which are not,

The more a creature or plant is like what we are, the more 'conscious'
it will appear to be. It's not a binary distinction. Even with people,
those that remind us more of ourselves are deemed to be more
conscious.

>what is an appropriate substitution level to
> bet on before uploading one's brain, can computers be conscious in the same
> way as biological brains, etc.

That can only be ascertained through experiment, and it would
undoubtedly be different for different people at different times. What
is the appropriate substitution level to bet on for an artificial
kidney? It just depends. People's bodies react differently.

> Saying consciousness is simple and just is
> doesn't answer any of these questions, instead you rely on intuition and
> guessing to answer these questions, which is of little value to someone
> facing a life or death decision: Do I take the risky brain surgery where I
> have a 25% chance of surviving, or do I take the digital brain prosthesis?

My theory is no more or less relevant than yours. You would want first
hand reports of the prosthesis results in either case. There is no
substitute for actual experience.

>
>
>
> >  >it must not involve
> > > anything we can explain or understand.
>
> > Not at all. I understand it, and my understanding explains it.
>
> Assuming you do, you don't seem to be able to communicate this understanding
> to others.

No, a few people seem to understand what I'm talking about, just not
everyone. Which is exactly what my model predicts. I think that
eventually a lot of people will understand it, maybe not because of me
or my ideas, but because it makes more sense and the other ideas will
prove to be dead ends.

>
> > > Many mysteries have existed in the
> > > past and been answered.  This is a unique time where our knowledge can
> > > explain so much of ordinary occurances that the few things we lack
> > > sufficient explanation of appear to be insoluble, but don't let the
> > present
> > > lack of an answer cause you to lose faith that such answers exist.
>
> > I have found the answer already. It's not a mystery to me.
>
> Have you answers for some of the questions posted above as well?  Can you
> provide rational justifications for those answers beyond "Just trust me"?

I never say 'just trust me' at all. I say 'try thinking of it this way
and see if it makes more sense'. All of my answers are justified by
the rationality of the model I'm using and the sense that it makes.

>
>
>
> > > > > > > If you are non-deterministic,
> > > > > > > then nothing determines what you do and you are a slave to the
> > roll
> > > > of a
> > > > > > > die.
>
> > > > > > Only if you a priori eliminate the possibility of free will and
> > sense.
> > > > > > Then you are left with the options that make no sense and have no
> > free
> > > > > > will.
>
> > > > > You have a will, which determines what you do, but your will in turn
> > is
> > > > > determined by other things.
>
> > > > If it was completely determined by other things, then it's existence
> > > > would be redundant.
>
> > > The movement of cars is determined by the movement of atoms, but that
> > > doesn't mean cars are redundant.
>
> > Cars are redundant without human beings to drive them. They don't
> > exist as a self-sustaining phenomenon. Without us, they are just piles
> > of junk. Atoms, molecules, maybe shelter for some feral cats or
> > insects.
>
> > > > The fact that it is influenced by other things
> > > > doesn't mean that it is completely determined by other things and
>
> > > So what could these other things be that also help in determining it?
> >  How
> > > does it manifest physical effects with third-person visible consequences?
>
> > If you flip a coin, you flip both sides of the coin. They are
> > essentially the same thing, just with two opposite views.
>
> I don't follow this answer.

Phenomena have a subjective side and an objective side which relate to
each other. One side does not arise from the other as a cause but each
provides causality for the other dynamically and interactively. You
move your body, your body moves you.


>
> > I think you're on the right track, but for the wrong reason. If you
> > make up a fictional character, it may very well allow you to tell
> > stories from a different perspective than you would have otherwise,
> > but that presupposes that there are high level stories to tell in the
> > first place. Still every high level function could be accomplished
> > mechanically without any kind of perception being generated (if we
> > believed the world was purely mechanistic).
>
> Mechanism requires that certain mechanical processes perceive.

If a process can perceive, then it doesn't need a mechanism
determining it's behavior. Perception contradicts mechanism directly.
My view is the universe is that contradiction. The inherent
polarization of it is such that it cannot be resolved and that it must
be resolved. That is the engine of the cosmos. On the micro and
macrocosmic levels (relative to us), the polarity is arithmetic, but
on the mesocosmic level (isomorphic to us) the polarization is
blurred, ambiguous, and figurative. That's another polarity entirely,
but they arise from each other logically.

>
>
>
> > > > Isn't it obvious that
> > > > different levels of perception yield different novel possibilities?
> > > > That a ripe peach does something that a piece of charcoal doesn't?
> > > > That yellow is different from just a bluer kind of red?
>
> > > I believe that the sensations you describe are equivalent to certain
> > > computations.
>
> > What is equivalent? Is an apple equivalent to an orange? It's a matter
> > of pattern recognition. If you recognize a common pattern, you can
> > project equivalence, but objectively, there is no equivalent to
> > yellow. You either see it or it does not exist for you. No computation
> > can substitute for that experience. It has no equivalent. It can be
> > created in people who can see yellow by exposure to certain optical
> > conditions, but also by maybe pushing on your eyeball or falling
> > asleep. Yellow is associated with various computations, but it is not
> > itself a computation. It is a sensorimotive subjective presence.
>
> Perhaps your "sensorimotive subject" supervenes on these computations.

If it did, then why have yellow at all? Why not just have the
computations?

>
>
>
> > >Thus consciousness, and computation are higher-level
> > > phenomenon, and accordingly can be equivalently realized by different
> > > physical media, or even as functions which exist platonically in number
> > > theory.
>
> > Human consciousness is a higher level phenomenon of neurological
> > awareness, which is a higher level phenomena of biology, genetics,
> > chemistry, and physics.
>
> I think you are on to something with this.

cool. if you do end up getting what I'm talking about, It's possible
that you'll find it pretty interesting. All of this bickering over AGI
and zombies is really not at all what I'm here to talk about.
Speculating on the consciousness of non-human subjects is really the
least valuable implication of my hypothesis. What my idea lets you to
is to look out of your own eyes and see what you actually see
(meaning, image, feeling) without compulsively translating it
intellectually into the opposite of what it is (generic, arithmetic
mechanism). Then you can get a firm handle on what the difference is,
why it's important, and how they can coexist without one disqualifying
the other.

My hope is that there is a threshold where is is possible for someone
will reach a supersaturated tipping point and crystallize an
understanding of what I'm talking about, like those 'When You See
it..." memes (http://static.black-frames.net/images/when-you-see-
it_____________.jpg). Once you realize that what we perceive is both
fact and fiction and that both fact and fiction are themselves a
matter of perception then it gives you the freedom to appreciate the
cosmos as it is, in all it's true demented genius, rather than as a
theoretical construct to support the existence of fact at the expense
of fiction (or vice versa).

>
> > It is also a lower level phenomenon of
> > anthropology, zoology, ecology, geology, and astrophysics-cosmology.
> > Some psychological functions can be realized by different physical
> > media, some physical functions, like producing epinephrine, can be
> > realized by different psychological means (a movie or a book, memory,
> > conversation, etc).
>
> > > > > > How do you get 'pieces' to 'interact' and obey
> > > > > > 'rules'? The rules have to make sense in the particular context,
> > and
> > > > > > there has to be a motive for that interaction, ie sensorimotive
> > > > > > experience.
>
> > > > > If there were no hard rules, life could not evolve.
>
> > > > 'Hard rules' can only arise if the phenomena they govern have a way of
> > > > being concretely influenced by them. Otherwise they are metaphysical
> > > > abstractions. The idea of 'rules' or 'information' is a human
> > > > intellectual analysis. The actual thing that it is would be
> > > > sensorimotive experience.
>
> > > Are you advocating subjective idealism or phenomenalism now?
>
> > I'm advocating a sense monism encapsulation of existential-essential
> > pseudo-dualism.
>
> Could you please restate this using words with a conventional meaning?

I'm advocating a universe based entirely on sense, sense being the
unresolvable tension between, yet unity among, subjective experiences
and objective existence.


>
>
>
> > > > No. Just the fact of not occupying the same space as my body makes it
> > > > different.
>
> > > Not different in any way you could notice.
>
> > I would notice if someone that looked exactly like me was standing
> > somewhere else besides where I'm standing.
>
> >  >If everything in the universe
> > > were shifted to the left by 10 meters, would this universe be different?
>
> > That's not possible, since space is inside of the universe, not
> > outside of it. Space is an abstraction we use to understand the
> > relation between objects.
>
> > > Would it affect your consciousness in any noticeable way?
>
> > > > The idea of two separate things being 'identical' is a
> > > > function of pattern recognition. Identical to who?
>
> > > > > > There is of course a strong correlation between physical and
> > > > > > psychological phenomena of a human mind/body, but that correlation
> > is
> > > > > > not causation. Psychological properties can be multiply realized in
> > > > > > physical properties,
>
> > > > > This means you think other different physical forms can have
> > identical
> > > > > psychological forms.  E.g., a computer can have the experience of
> > red.
>
> > > > If the computer was made out of something that can experience red,
> > > > then sure.
>
> > > The human experience of perceiving red is equivalent to a certain
> > > computation.
>
> > What computation would that be? If I arrange milk bottles so that they
> > fall over in a pattern which is the equivalent to that computation,
> > will the milk bottles see red?
>
> No, the mind which supervenes on the computation of the milk bottles will
> experience red.

A mind arises from a collection of milk bottles? Automatically? Does
it think about anything other than the one momentary experience of red
that occurs somehow from bottles knocking each other down in some
particular configuration?

>
> > Will I see red if I look at the milk
> > bottles?
>
> No.
>
> > How can you seriously entertain that as a reality?
>
> You won't see red when you look at a neuron involved in the processing of
> that sensory data, nor will the individual neurons which serve as the basis
> for that processing know the experience of red.

I agree. So what is it exactly that does know the experience of red?

>Entertaining the idea of
> milk bottles having a private experience is no more a leap than entertaining
> the idea that the cells in your brain can do the same.

On one level that's true, since we have no direct access to what other
things experience, but it doesn't mean that it's very likely that the
experience it has could ever be comparable to that of our brain cells.
If it were, there would be no reason to have brain cells at all. We
could just be a giant amoeba or pile of sand and have any experience
possible - human or otherwise. Instead of needing eyes we could just
drill a hole in our skull. Something makes humans different from non-
humans, I think that it's related to the experiences of organisms over
time as well as the consequences of the physical conditions local to
their bodies.

>
> > > This computation could be performed by any kind of matter that
> > > can be arranged into a functional Turing machine.  This computation also
> > > exists in mathematics already.
>
> > I'm confident that no computation generated by a Turing is equivalent
> > to seeing red.
>
> We should have an answer in a few decades, when you can ask those with
> digital brains what color a ripe strawberry has.

Promises promises.

>
>
>
> > > > > > but physical properties can be multiply realized
> > > > > > in psychological properties as well. Listening to the same song
> > will
> > > > > > show up differently in the brain of different people, and different
> > > > > > even in the same person over time, but the song itself has an
> > > > > > essential coherence and invariance that makes it a recognizable
> > > > > > pattern to all who can hear it. The song has some concrete
> > properties
> > > > > > which do not supervene meaningfully upon physical media.
>
> > > > > Different physical properties can be experienced differently, but
> > that's
> > > > not
> > > > > what supervenience is about.  Rather it says that two physically
> > > > identical
> > > > > brains experiencing the same song will have identical experiences.
>
> > > > Identical is not possible, but the more similar one thing is
> > > > physically to another, the more likely that their experiences will
> > > > also be more similar. That's not the only relevant issue though. It
> > > > depends what the thing is. A cube of sugar compared to another cube of
> > > > sugar is different than comparing twins or triplets of human beings.
> > > > The human beings are elaborated to a much more unpredictable degree.
> > > > It's not purely a matter of complexity and probability, there is more
> > > > sensorimotive development which figures into the difference. We have
> > > > more of a choice. Maybe not as much as we think, and maybe it's more
> > > > of a feeling that we have more choice, but nevertheless, the feeling
> > > > that smashing a person's head is different from smashing a coconut
>
> > > I hope you don't speak from experience. ;-)
>
> > If the universe was only arithmetic, what would be the difference?
>
> The difference between a primitively physical universe or the difference
> between a coconut and a human's head?

The difference between committing murder and making a Pina Colada.

> > > Logic gates in a computer can detect and change according to their
> > > detection.  If this ability forms the "atom" of experience, then by
> > > extension, computers possess the appropriate building blocks to build any
> > > form of experience.
>
> > Maybe, but I think that the computer might have to assemble those
> > building blocks into the experiences of actual living cells and
> > organisms first.
>
> What about copying it, by translating this evolved history into a different
> physical substrate?

Possible, and I have considered that, but it's kind of like faux
antiques or pre-distressed jeans. I'm not sure that it works that way.
Having a book on your shelf isn't the same thing as having read it,
and it's certainly not the same thing if that book is your
autobiography and you haven't lived it.

>
> > Our consciousness is a community of a specific kind
> > of organic subjective agents. They perform logical functions but they
> > are not limited to them. It's like saying we could build the Great
> > Barrier Reef out of Play Dough... maybe in theory, but not really.
>
> > > > > > Nothing
> > > > > > about the physical functions of the brain, neurons, or electrons we
> > > > > > observe suggest the existence of a mind.
>
> > > > > The particles in the brain model their external reality,
>
> > > > In what way? Where is this model located?
>
> > > In the patterns of the neuron firings:
> >http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MElU0UW0V3Q
>
> > That's cool technology, but the model being used is developed by
> > researchers. The patterns of the neurons are the experiences of the
> > person, not a model of them. They are the physical presentation that
> > corresponds to the psychological presentation. We have to reverse
> > engineer a Rosetta Stone of code equivalence to match up our first
> > person experience with the third person measurements. Without the
> > first person reports, there would be no suggestion of a mind.
>
> > > > The forest could be modeling
> > > > intergalactic p0rn for all we know, but without any experience of the
> > > > result of that 'model', we can't really say that is what the brain is
> > > > doing at all. The brain is just living cells doing the things that
> > > > living cells do.
>
> > > > > analyze patterns,
> > > > > process sensory information, digest it, share it with other regions,
> > and
> > > > > enable the body to better adapt and respond to its environment.
>
> > > > The immune system does that too. The digestive system. Bacteria does
> > > > that.
>
> > > For all you know, those systems could be conscious.  The Craig Weinberg I
> > am
> > > communicating with on this list is not Craig Weinberg's immune system, so
> > I
> > > have no way to ask your immune system if it is conscious.
>
> > Oh, I agree. I think that awareness of different sorts is in
> > everything, but it wouldn't automatically be that way just to fulfill
> > functional purposes. Even if there were a functional advantage, there
> > isn't any functional material process which would or could discover
> > awareness if it wasn't already a built in potential.
>
> > > > >These
> > > > > behaviors and functions suggest the existence of a mind to me.
>
> > > > Only because you have a mind and you are reverse engineering it. If a
> > > > child compares live brain tissue under a microscope to pancreas tissue
> > > > or bacteria under a microscope, they would not necessarily be able to
> > > > guess which one was 'modeling' a TV show and which was just producing
> > > > biochemistry.
>
> > > If you zoom in on anything too much you crop out all the context.  If you
> > > zoomed in to the point where all you could see is a silicon atom, you
> > have
> > > no idea if it is part of an integrated circuit or a grain of sand on a
> > > beach.
>
> > So what context would you have to zoom out from or in to before the
> > existence of a mind presents itself in the absence of any pre-existing
> > notion of 'mind'? Like what pattern besides red would make you see red
> > if you had never seen it?
>
> A similar computation and state compared to that of human subjects who
> report experiencing the sight of red.

What would that be though? What is similar to red but not a color?

>
>
>
> > > > The suggestion of a mind is purely imaginary, based upon
> > > > a particular interpretation of scientific observations.
>
> > > When we build minds out of computers it will be hard to argue that that
> > > interpretation was correct.
>
> > Ah yes. Promissory Materialism. Science will provide. I'm confident
> > that the horizon on AGI will continue to recede indefinitely like a
> > mirage, as it has thus far. I could be wrong, but there is no reason
> > to think so at this point.
>
> If you told any AI researcher in the 70s of the accomplishments from the
> links I provided they would break out the campaign bottles.  The horizon is
> not receding, rather you are in the slowly warming pot not noticing it is
> about to boil.

I do think there is a lot of great science and technology coming out
of it, but I think we are no closer to true artificial general
intelligence than we were in 1975. We just understand more about
emulating certain functions of intelligence. When we approach it from
a 1-p:3-p sense based model rather than a 3-p computation model, I
think we will have the real progress which has eluded us thus far.

>
> > > I think your analogy is in error.  You cannot compare the strip of metal
> > to
> > > the trillion cell organism.  The strip of metal is like a red-sensing
> > cone
> > > in your retina.  It is merely a sensor which can relay some information.
> > > How that information is interpreted then determines the experience.
>
> > Aren't you just reiterating what I wrote? "because a strip of metal is
> > so different from a trillion cell living being"
>
> What I mean is that the metal strip is not the mind, and should not be
> equated with one.  It is more like a temperature sensitive nerve-ending.  A
> thermostat with the appropriate additional computational functions could
> feel, sense, be aware, think, be conscious, care, etc.

or it could just compute and report a-signifying data.

>
>
>
> > > > (I doubt we share the same sense of humor with
> > > > thermostats either).
>
> > > > > > In contrast, we understand what temperature means to us and why we
> > > > > > care about it.
>
> > > > > An appropriately designed machine could care about it too.
>
> > > > Why do you think that a machine can care about something?
>
> > > We do.  And we are molecular machines.
>
> > We are also sentient human beings. It's only the subjective view of
> > the thing as a whole that cares, not the vibrating specks that make up
> > the tubes and filaments of the monkey body.
>
> I can agree with this.  Going slightly further, the composition of those
> tubes and filaments should make no difference in what the thing as a whole
> might be capable of feeling.

We know that it makes some difference, because diseases which change
the flexibility of those tubes or permittivity of those filaments make
differences in what we as a whole are capable of feeling. Why wouldn't
it? Why would a machine executed in semiconductor glass be any more
effective at reproducing the anguish of a suffering animal than a pile
of finely chopped scallions would be at running a spreadsheet
application? Why doesn't matter matter?

>
> >  "There cannot be a Microsoft Windows difference without an Intel chip
> > difference". To say that Windows determines what the chip does you
> > would say that Intel and AMD chips both supervene upon Windows. It
> > seems backwards at first but it sort of makes sense, sort of a synonym
> > for 'rely upon'. It's still kind of an odious and pretentious way to
> > say something pretty straightforward, so I try to just say what I mean
> > in simpler terms.
>
> I see, it is defined confusingly.  I can also see it interpreted as follows:
> The state of the Microsoft word program cannot change without a change in
> the state of the underlying computer hardware.  But not all changes in the
> computer hardware correspond to changes in the state of the program.

Right, I can see that interpretation too. That's why I hate reading
philosophy, haha.

>
>
>
> > > > > > > > and reduces
> > > > > > > > our cognition to an unconscious chemical reaction.
>
> > > > > > > If I say all of reality is just a thing, have I really reduced
> > it?
>
> > > > > > It depends what you mean by a 'thing'.
>
> > > > > Does it?
>
> > > > Of course. If I say that an apple is a fruit, I have not reduced it as
> > > > much as if I say that it's matter.
>
> > > How you choose to describe it doesn't change the fact that it is an
> > apple.
>
> > I think the exact opposite. There is no such fact. It's only an apple
> > to us. It's many things to many other kinds of perceivers on different
> > scales. An apple is a fictional description of an intangible,
> > unknowable concordance of facts.
>
> > > Likewise, saying the brain is a certain type of chemical reaction does
> > not
> > > devalue it.  Not all chemical reactions are equivalent, nor are all
> > > arrangements of matter equivalent.  With this fact, I can say the brain
> > is a
> > > chemical reaction, or a collection of atoms.  Neither of those statements
> > is
> > > incorrect.
>
> > I don't have a problem with that. You could also say the brain is a
> > certain type of hallucination.
>
> > > > > > > Explaining something in no way reduces anything unless what you
> > > > really
> > > > > > value
> > > > > > > is the mystery.
>
> > > > > > I'm doing the explaining. You're the one saying that an explanation
> > is
> > > > > > not necessary.
>
> > > > > Your explanation is that there is no explanation.
>
> > > > Not really.
>
> > > An explanation, if it doesn't make new predictions, should at least make
> > the
> > > picture more clear, providing a more intuitive understanding of the
> > facts.
>
> > I think that mine absolutely does that.
>
> > > > > > > Also, I don't think it is incorrect to call it an "unconscious
> > > > chemical
> > > > > > > reaction".  It definitely is a "conscious chemical reaction".
> >  This
> > > > is
> > > > > > like
> > > > > > > calling a person a "lifeless chemical reaction".
>
> > > > > > Then you are agreeing with me. If you admit that chemical reactions
> > > > > > themselves are conscious,
>
> > > > > Some reactions can be.
>
> > > > > > then you are admitting that awareness is a
> > > > > > molecular sensorimotive property and not a metaphysical illusion
> > > > > > produced by the brain.
>
> > > > > Human awareness has nothing to do with whatever molecules may be
> > feeling,
> > > > if
> > > > > they feel anything at all.
>
> > > > Then you are positing a metaphysical agent which supervenes upon
> > > > molecules to accomplish feeling. (which is maybe why you keep accusing
> > > > me of doing that).
>
> > > Yes, the mind is a computation which does the feeling and it supervenes
> > on
> > > the brain.
>
> > Why does the computation need to do any feeling?
>
> When a process is aware of information it must have awareness.

I can be aware of Chinese subtitles, but I have no awareness of
Chinese. A CD player can play a sad song for us, but that doesn't mean
that it makes the CD player sad. Every physical thing has some kind of
'awareness' or sensorimotive content, however primitive, but
computation itself does not necessarily have it's own existence. It's
just a text in the context of our awarenss. A cartoon character
doesn't have any feelings. It can be seen to respond to it's cartoon
environment but it's not the awareness of the cartoon you are
watching, it's the awareness of the cartoonist, the producer, the
writer, the animator that you are watching.


>
> > Why have we not seen a single information processing system indicate
> > any awareness beyond that which it was designed to simulate?
>
> Watson was aware of the Jeopardy clue being asked, was it not?

No. Watson is just a massive array of semiconductors eating power and
crapping out zillions of hierarchically distilled results. It's an
intelliformed organization, not an intelligent organism. It doesn't
care if it's right or wrong or how well it understands the clue, it's
just going to run it's meaningless algorithms on the meaningless data
it's being fed. No different from a doll that cries when you pick it
up. There may be a mercury switch that detects being picked up, and
there may be a chip that detects the mercury switch and plays the
audio sample of crying, but there is no sense making going on between
the two things. The doll as a whole doesn't know anything.

>
> The Herbivores in the simulation I posted yesterday are aware of nearby
> predators and their color.

They are designed to simulate something, so they do. How does that
constitute indicating an awareness beyond their design?

>
> > What kind
> > of awareness does a book have without a reader? Information is
> > something I used to assume could exist on it's own, but now it's like
> > a glaring red Emperor's New Clothes to me. A brick is nothing but
> > 'information' and information is the really the brick. Um, yeah. I
> > understand the appeal, but it's a figment of a 21st century Occidental
> > imagination.
>
> > > > How does it come to affect physical things?
>
> > > Because the aware systems we are familiar with are supervening on
> > physical
> > > objects.
>
> > So because awareness needs physical objects, that means objects are
> > affected by awareness? But then somehow that doesn't mean that human
> > awareness affects our neurological behaviors?
>
> Changes in states of the mind are reflected by physical changes.

That's what I've been saying, but you insist that it's only changes in
the mind which are reflections of physical changes and not the other
way around. You say that if the mind's changes affect the physical
processes then it has to be magic.

>
>
>
> > > > > > > > If that were the
> > > > > > > > case then you could never have a computer emulate it without
> > > > exactly
> > > > > > > > duplicating that biochemistry. My view makes it possible to at
> > > > least
> > > > > > > > transmit and receive psychological texts through materials as
> > > > > > > > communication and sensation but your view allows the psyche no
> > > > > > > > existence whatsoever. It's a complete rejection of awareness
> > into
> > > > > > > > metaphysical realms of 'illusion'.
>
> > > > > > > I think you may be mistaken that computationalism says awareness
> > is
> > > > an
> > > > > > > illusion.  There are some eliminative materialists who say this,
> > but
> > > > I
> > > > > > think
> > > > > > > they are in the minority of current philosophers of mind.
>
> > > > > > How would you characterize the computationalist view of awareness?
>
> > > > > A process to which certain information is meaningful.  Information is
> > > > > meaningful to a process when the information alters the states or
> > > > behaviors
> > > > > of said process.
>
> > > > What makes something a process?
>
> > > Rules, change, self-reference.
>
> > What makes something a rule,
>
> Some invariant relation in some context.

So then invariance, relation, and context are more primitive than
rules. Which is the same conclusion I reach. Those are actually
synonyms for my three sense elements: invariance = essence, relation =
existence (senseĀ²),  context = Sense (senseĀ³).  Invariance =
sensorimotive coherence. Relation = sensorimotive-electromagnetic
variance of coherence and incoherence. Context = Relativity of
perception and perception of relativity. Inertial frames. The key
difference though is that I see the primitive unit of sense as an
*experience* from which the concept of invariance is derived.  The
experience has no name, it's just isness. Self. A non-computable
vector of orientation.

>
> > or a change,
>
> When one thing varies with another.
>
> > or a self, or a reference?
>
> Self-reference is when one thing's definition refers to itself, recursively
> or iteratively.

Those describe the meaning of the terms, but not the physics of the
phenomenon. How does a 'self' come to 'refer' to something?

>
>
>
> > > > Are all processes equally meaningful?
>
> > > No.
>
> > > > > > What makes the difference between something that is aware and
> > > > > > something that is not?
>
> > > > > Minimally, if that thing possesses or receives information and is
> > changed
> > > > by
> > > > > it.  Although there may be more required.
>
> > > > We are changed by inputs and outputs all the time that we are not
> > > > aware of.
>
> > > There may be other conscious parts within us which are disconnected from
> > the
> > > conscious part of us which does the talking and typing.  For example,
> > your
> > > cerebellum performs many unconscious calculations affecting motor
> > control,
> > > but is it really unconscious?  Perhaps its information patterns and
> > > processing are merely not connected to the part of the brain which
> > performs
> > > speech.  Similarly, a bisected brain becomes two minds by virtue of their
> > > disconnection from each other.
>
> > I agree, but it doesn't explain why the inputs and outputs we are
> > aware of are different from those we are not aware of.
>
> For those we are not aware of, there is no integration into the
> computational state of high dimensionality which includes most of the
> functions and processes of the cortex.

Right, but what determines what gets integrated and what doesn't?

>
> > Ok, but the Taj Mahal is just made of mainly stone. Either way the
> > dynamics of either one won't ever get you closer to predicting the
> > shape of the Taj Mahal than anything else.
>
> The stone model doesn't describe those that designed or built it, while the
> atomic model would.

I don't follow. The atomic model predicts India?

>
>
>
> > > > > > Human consciousness is a specific Taj Mahal of sensorimotive-
> > > > > > electromagnetic construction. The principles of it's construction
> > are
> > > > > > simple, but that simplicity includes both pattern and pattern
> > > > > > recognition.
>
> > > > > Pattern and pattern recognition, information and information
> > processing.
> > > > > Are they so different?
>
> > > > Very similar yes, but to me information implies a-signifying
>
> > > Could you define "a-signifying" for me?
>
> > Meaning that the information has no meaning to the system processing
> > it. A pattern of pits on a CD is a-signifying to the listener and the
> > music being played is a-signifying to the stereo. In each case,
> > fidelity of the text is retained, but the content of the text is
> > irrelevant outside of the context of it's appropriate system. A TV set
> > isn't watching TV, it's just scanning lines. That's information.
> > Handling data generically without any relevant experience..
>
> This is the difference between a recording (or information being sent over a
> wire) compared to information being processed (in which it has particular
> meaning by virtue of the context and difference it makes in the
> processing).

You're still hallucinating 'information' into wires. There's no
objective information there to the wire other than atomic collisions.
Information is just a way of saying external assistance to sense-
making. Whether the text has meaning in a particular context or not
depends on the relation between the two. A machine can't make sense of
feelings, it can only make sense of  it's intended measurements in
terms of objective measurements. There is no private subjectivity
going on. It's all accessible publicly.

>The self driving Google car's cameras which transmit the raw
> input data possesses no meaning, but the software that determines that it
> sees a car, or a stop sign generates meaning from this information.  "Stop
> sign *means* we need to decelerate"

No, the software doesn't know what a car or a stop sign is, it just
presents a an instruction set to a microprocessor switches the circuit
on that leads to the actuator that happens to lead to the accelerator
(it could lead to a toaster or a nuclear missile). Optical patterns
which satisfy the software's description of stop signs cause a circuit
to close. There is no meaning or choice involved. Turning on a water
faucet doesn't mean anything to the plumbing. There are consequences
on a physical level, but not one that leads on it's own to psychology.


>
> > A choice is being made from the 3-p view, but that isn't the one that
> > matters. The computer has no knowledge of it's choices. It's just
> > executing an instruction set.
>
> It does have knowledge.  What you ascribe to having no knowledge of the
> decision is the underlying basis of the computation.  Similarly, your
> neurons (individually) have no idea of what stock you are purchasing or
> selling at the time you do.  Only you (the higher level process does).  It
> is the same with a computer-supported mind.

The difference is that our higher level processes arise autopoetically
from our neurology. A computer has is our higher level processes
imposed on semiconductors which have no capacity to develop their own
higher level processes - which is precisely why these kinds of
materials are used. Making a computer out of living hamsters in a maze
is not going to be very reliable. Hamsters have more of their own
agenda. Their behavior is less predictable. Humans even more so.

Craig

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to