On 9/15/2011 10:46 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sep 14, 2011, at 10:36 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sep 14, 4:07 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tue, Sep 13, 2011 at 11:59 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:

On Sep 13, 9:25 pm, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:

Everything that can exist does, for there is no meta-rule prohibiting
object's existence.

I would call that a hasty generalization. Let's say it's the year
1066. Do cell phones exist in England? Is there a meta-rule
prohibiting their existence?

Things with a definition that rules out their definition do not exist. It
is like asking if there exists an even integer greater than 1, whose
remainder when divided by 2 is greater than 0. A cell phone which exists in
a location where it should not exist may similarly be ruled out by its own

You said "Everything that can exist does". That's not the case. There
can exist a box of girl scout cookies in your refrigerator, but that
doesn't mean that it does. There can exist a girl scout cookie that is
beef flavored, but there isn't.

Not everything exists at every location. Nor do things with impossible histories or inconsistent properties or definitions exist. Yet anything that can exist, does exist, somewhere. It may not exist in your refridgerator or on this planet, it may not exist in this universe. But if it is a self consistent structure it has a platonic existence.

Which is to say not at all. Note that even if you are a Platonist, you can't be sure whether a 'structure' is consistent and consistency may depend on the rules inference.

That said, nothing precludes a universe nearly identical to
this one where the initial condition is the universe as it existed in 1066
only a cell phone happens to exist in it. Such universes, however, are
considerably less numerable.

Well yes, if you believe in MWI, there would have to be a universe for
each kind of cell phone that could ever exist in any universe at every
moment in every location.

The idea that all possible worlds or all possible minds exist explains quantum 

"Possible" is a tricky word and always requires a context, which too often is left implicit, c.f

arXiv:quant-ph/0702121v1 by Elanor Rieffel

"Fewer worlds theory of quantum mechanics
Many papers discuss the pros and cons of the many worlds
theory. Here we mean to correct not that theory, but the
popular conception of it as “everything happens in some
universe”. Popular accounts of quantum mechanics, and
some scholarly articles, give the impression that quantum
mechanics, at least in the many worlds interpretation, implies
that everything happens in some universe. A typical
quote (Deutsch 1998): “There are even universes in which a
given object in our universe has no counterpart - including
universes in which I was never born and you wrote this article
instead.” The variety of imaginative examples suggest
that anything we can conceive of, even the highly unlikely,
happen, if only in a small number of universes. But much of
the surprise of quantum mechanics is that certain things we
thought would happen, even things we thought were sure to
happen, do not happen at all."


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