On 9/26/2011 9:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Suppose that you are currently in state S (which exist by the comp assumption).


But what does "you" refer to? The comp assumption seems ambiguous. Is it the assumption that "you" are instantiated by a specific computation? Or is it the assumption that your brain could be replaced, without you noticing, by a physically different computer, so long as it computed the same function (at some level). These seem slightly different to me and are only identical if QM is false and the world is strictly classical and deterministic. At a practical level the brain is certainly mostly classical and so I might say 'yes' to the doctor even though my artificial brain will have slightly different behavoir because it has different counterfactual quantum behavior. But this difference seems to present a problem when trying to identify "you" within the inifinite bundle of computations instantiating a particular state in the UD computations.

Of course if you replace the whole universe with an emulation, instead of just my brain, then my emulated brain in the emulated universe can have the same behavior as my natural brain in this universe.

The UD generates an infinity of computations going through that state. All what I say is that your future is determined by all those computations, and your self-referential abilities. If from this you can prove that your future is more random than the one observed, then you are beginning to refute rigorously comp. But the math part shows that this is not easy to do. In fact the random inputs confer stability for the programs which exploits that randomness, and again, this is the case for some formulation (à-la Feynman) of QM.

How is this?

Brent

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