On 27 Sep 2011, at 02:01, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 11:08 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
On 26 Sep 2011, at 04:42, Pierz wrote:
- it's not well explained in the paper
yet contains the all the really sweeping and startling assertions.
When I presented UDA at the ASSC meeting of 1995 (I think) a
"famous" philosopher of mind left the room at step 3 (the
duplication step). He pretended that we feel to be at both places at
once after a self-duplication experience. It was the first time
someone told me this. I don't know if he was sincere. It looks some
people want to believe UDA wrong, and are able to dismiss any step.
Was this Chalmers? You mentioned to me at one point that he
believed a duplicated person experiences both perspectives.
But not at once. Not simultaneously, from their first person
experience points of view. The point of self-duplication is to
illustrate the indeterminacy of the immediate outcome of some
experience/experiment. He left the room too quickly so I cannot even
be sure of what he meant. I do think he was a bit brainwashed by some
This is a view I can sympathize with, in the sense that we are
part of a universal person who experiences all perspectives.
I sympathize as well. In fact we can argue that such a universal
person is described by the 8 arithmetical "hypostases". We are the
same person in that sense, but that is useless to derive physics from
computations statistic. OK.
A person who steps into a duplicator does experience both Washington
and Moscow, but at either position, does not have the memories of
the other, and thus so cannot talk about those experiences. It is
similar to a person who is tortured, then given a drug to cause
total amnesia. Is it not the same person who experienced being
It can be considered in this way, but this does not make the first
person immediate experiences determined in self-multiplication.
It is determined in God's eyes, but the indetermination is a local
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