Re: COMP is empty(?)

```I am omitting a lot, honestly most of the stuff isn't that relevant for what
I really want to express. I guess I still talk too much.```
```

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Explaining
>> consciousness in the sense you mean it (explain it *from* something)
>> is
>> nonsense, as consciousness is already required *before* anything at
>> all can
>> arise.
>
> This is not valid. I need consciousness, like a need a brain, to
> understand consciousness or the working of the brain.
> Like I need logic to to do metalogic.
>
Right. And if you need consciousness for everything in the first place, what
is the sense in assuming that there is something prior to it? What could
possibly be evidence for that?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> No numbers can arise
>> without consciousness, and therefore consciousnes can't be explained
>> from
>> them.
>
> But numbers do not belong to the category of what arise. Numbers never
> arise. The category error is here.
Yes, numbers arise. You confuse numbers and what they describe. You say that
I confuse numbers and their symbols, but your fundamental error is that you
confuse numbers and what they describe.
It is simply not the same, because in every context that numbers make sense
there is something beyond numbers. You reduce it to an internal view of
numbers, but it is beyond that also. This can't be proven, but simply look
into your experience and you will find that there is no way to seperate
numbers from what is (totally) beyond them. You will just find numbers in
the context of reflecting upon them, but then you at least have the 1-p
subject, which can't be reduced to numbers (as you say yourself). So what is
the meaning then of reducing the ontology to numbers? The 1-p perspective is
obviously totally *there* and therefore in which way is it just
epistemological?  Whether you call the 1-p perspective the "inside view" of
numbers or not doesn't make a difference at all.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> And it is quasi obvious that if we assume comp, consciousness has
> something to do with number relations, given that some number relation
> emulates computation, in the sense of Turing, Church & Co.
Not necessarily, as I explain in the other post.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> As soon as you use
>>>> Gödel, you go beyond arithmetic, making the label "arithmetical
>>>> truth" close
>>>> to meaningless.
>>>
>>> Godel's prove does not go beyond arithmetic. PA can prove its own
>>> Gödel's theorem.
>> Where in arithmetic is the axiom that numbers can encode things?
>
> You don't need such an axiom. You can prove the existence of encoding
> just by using the usual axioms.
But these already assume that you encode things with numbers.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> How does
>> Gödel prove work if they can't encode things?
>
> But number can encode things? They can even prove that they can encode
> things.
But just if they encode things.
I am not arguing that it is invalid for numbers to encode things, actually
they have much use in this. The point is that this is unprovable, *if we not
already assume that they can encode things*. Every proof of numbers about
themselves needs encoding in some way or another. If this isn't true, show
me the proof that doesn't assume it.
So, we go beyond numbers within numbers, *by assuming a capability of
numbers to refer to something beyond*. But in this case we use the
capability of things beyond numbers within numbers, and thus we can't make
any conclusions of the ability of numbers *by themselves* (I argue simply
because there is none, there are no numbers as thing by themselves).
It is utterly obvious that numbers can encode things, and this is probably
why no one bothers that this can't be proven without assuming it implictly
first. If we didn't use the obviousness of what numbers can do, we actually
would end up without formalized numbers, because numbers itself make only
sense by seeing their obviousness.
But because of that very fact numbers by themselves are not sufficient, and
thus can't be the sole basis of any valid theory (the same goes for anything
other expressible in terms of formal systems) - the obviousness that makes
us see what numbers are (and what they can do) necessarily transcends
numbers *in a fundamental way* (not "just"  as the inside view).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> It makes as much sense to say that a
>>>>>> concept has an internal view.
>>>>>> nternal view just applies to the only thing
>>>>>> that can have/is a view, namely consciousness.
>>>>>
>>>>> It applies to person.
>>>> No. There is no person to find that has consciousness.
>>>
>>> This is depriving the littele ego, man, from having conscious
>>> experience. That makes me chill.
>> Of course, it is threatening to the ego. The little ego has no
>> conscious
>> experience. It is an object within the conscious experience.
>
> You talk from experience. If that can inspire you for a theory, bring
> the theory, not the experience.
But this does not make sense, as I am precisely saying fundamental theories
just make sense with reference to experience. Even physical theories make
only sense from observation, there is no axiomatic basis for them.
So my theory is, if you want: "What is, is what is." The prediction of this
is that "What will be, will be." You can refute it, if what will be is not
what will be, whatever this is supposed to mean.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Your "threatening of the ego" is frightening coming from someone
> saying "no" to the doctor.
? Why is it frightening to say NO?
COMP is not treatening to my ego (I as a person wouldn't mind being a
machine, in fact I think machine is not such a bad anology for my body, just
not accurate enough for COMP to work). Actually I like it if my ego is
threatened, because I don't believe I am it.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> You statement contradict the whole endeavor of science,
>> Yes, if science thinks it can explain fundamental things.
>
> Science explains nothing. Science put some light, including on its
> limitation.
Right, of course science thinks nothing, I meant "scientists".
See, that is were my criticism is coming from. Even if you theory doesn't
explain anything (even though I am pretty sure you have claimed it does),
you shed little light, but pretend otherwise (not because of ill intention,
I am sure) - after all a TOE (even if just a near TOE for intents of our
physical world) would shed a lot light. See, I was majorly confused by your
theory, and I think it is always good to prevent confusion.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> It can relatively
>> explain local things, and describe things very well, and be a good
>> tool for
>> development of technology.
>>
>
> If you confine science on this, irrationalism will crop up in the
> fundamental, and we already know the amount of despair and suffering
This is just your theory, i'd like to hear evidence for that. I see that
rationalism leads to a lot of despair and suffering. Think of all the people
that believe in death for rational reasons (or materialism in general). Or
of believing in some ideology, there are many seemingly good rational
reasons for ideologies like Marx'. Or I think of myself who is often
horribly trapped in the intellect, *in spite* of seeing it is useless. It's
like a virus.
Rationalism makes a ideology out of a tool, which is never good.
irrationality is good. Irrationally just means contrary to reason, and since
reason is just a tool, there is nothing wrong about acting against
rationality, just as there is nothing bad about acting "against" cars and
instead use the bus. I don't even think that one could act "against"
rationally, since the ratio can be used to defend anything, according to the
premises you use.
Also it is plainly inconsistent to fundamentally argue against
irrationalism, as the foundation of the ratio is not rationally defensible.
All of our rational ideas necessarily stem from something beyond reason, and
so "irrationality" is needed for the ratio to even exist.
If you argue against irrationalism, you just argue against what you don't
like. Which is fine, but appeal to an authority (reason) misleads many
people. And therefore I try my best to show people that reason is not
sufficient for forming a foundation of how you act, not even it is necessary
as, and even more, it is harmful.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> and even of life.
>> Life is not for the ego, life is for God.
>
> Er... I am not sure of that. It is rather ambiguous also.
Really I am just saying ego is a illusion and really everyone is God. Of
course life is not for the purpose of having delusions. It is just the
natural consequence of life starting being relatively unconscious.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> If COMP does (except the 1% part that you acknowledge can't be
>> explained),
>> just give concrete predictions of physical measurements, and then it
>> will be
>> plausible.
>
> 1) it gives them, indeed all of them, for each notion of knowledge
> that you can define. But you have to understand this by yourself. The
> explanation is UDA. There is no choice in the matter.
You say it gives them, but don't give them. Even if the explanation is
valid, the predictions could well be totally trivial.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> 2) COMP is a widespread belief already use in many fields. I think
> that it is interesting that it leads to a different conception of
> reality.
That is no argument for its plausibility. Mass illusions are common.
Inevitable even, since we act much more as a collective than independent
individuals.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> And yes, theology  has a word in that, but not as a tool for
>>> eliminating
>>> the quanta. You
>>> are doing the inverse error of the aristotelian. They eliminate soul
>>> and person, and you eliminate the observable quantitative patterns.
>>> In
>>> fine, you argue against rationalism and science.
>> Of course there are observable quantitative patterns, how could one
>> deny
>> that?
>
> Read the list or the literature. For any proposition, there is always
> someone ready to deny them.
The only way one could deny it is an metaphysical context. Of course we can
observe patterns, claiming the opposite is like saying we don't see trees.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I just say they can't be captured by any theory
>
> I don't like that. This is exactly the "shut up and don't even try to
> understand".
No, it's "get out of your intellect (maybe shut up in this context) and see
that you CAN'T understand". You can try to understand as much as you want, I
am just wanting to help people to not get caught in the illusion of
understanding, because this was / is a big trap for me also.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>  This is what pseudo-theologian argues forcefully but only
> to preserve a fake power.
I don't think this is so bad of them. Getting people to transcend
understanding will just errode their own power, as people sooner or later
learn to transcend belief from the rationalists, whether the one's in power
want it or not.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> You might say "cannot be captured entirely", but anyone has the right
> to suggest hypotheses and reasoning in any field. Questions makes
> always sense.
> I think you might attribute to me pretensions that I do not have.
If you just ask questions, OK. But even if you don't want to do more, you do
more. You claim for example often that no one yet showed the invalidity of
your reasoning (implying it is valid), making people belief that there is
some truth in it.
If you are really humble, just don't make any statements about whether you
reasoning is valid or not. You really don't know, maybe the criticism of
many different people is actually valid and you just don't recognize it.
Making assertions that you admit are not provable, or defensable through
reason is actually more humble than that. That's why I don't like it as much
if you say,"just say "no'", as you pretty much take away the fundament of
any discussion. If you don't want to discuss, that's fine, but then it is
more wise to not say anything at all and not discuss while not wanting to
discuss the real issue at hand.
Maybe the reasoning and COMP are not clearly seperable, as the reasoning
supposes COMP to be true.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> and can just be
>> discovered by observation.
>
> Of course, here I believe the contrary.
>
> I might say that knowledge is what we can get despite observation.
How do you have access to any knowledge if not through obersving that it is

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> With observation you get only belief.
You must have missunderstand what I mean by observation, as by what I mean
with observation one gets experience, which is unrefutably beyond belief.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> this is just a
>>>> manner of speaking that I borrowed from "a person having
>>>> consciousness", I
>>>> think the former is more accurate than the latter. Actually
>>>> consciousness
>>>> just is (and through that it knows itself).
>>>
>>> Not in practice, hereby, in our terrestrial conditions.
>> Especially, even *only* in practice. Consciousness is entirely beyond
>> theories and in this sense totally practical.
>
> Well that fits well with comp too. Unless you interpret this
> normatively by condemning all theories attempting to put light on what
> is consciousness.
How does that fit well with COMP? If consciousness is beyond theories, you
wouldn't expect that you can substitute one of its primary means of
expressions (with regards to humans) with something that is build from our
theories (computers, actual computers are, you certainly agree with that).
I (try) to make no normative arguments whatsoever. If it sounds like it,
ignore what I say (better, contradict me).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I sincerily believe that if we know ourselves to be consciousness,
>> all other
>> problems solve themselves. Simply because consciousness is the
>> source of
>> all, and also the source of all solutions to problems, and just if
>> we know
>> ourselves to be it we can really harness that.
>
> That is saying too much; You are killing your theory.
I have no theory. It stated this quite a few times already.
When I say something, it is not meant to be understood theoretically.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> This is not a belief, this is
>>>>>> just the obvious reality right now.
>>>>>
>>>>> Obvious for you.
>>>> Obvious for anyone (as there is only one that can be consciousness
>>>> of
>>>> obviousness, namely consciousness).
>>>
>>> You cannot talk like if everyone smoked salvia. You are missing the
>>> coming back step. you should read the chan and zen masters.
>> Coming back from what? From the obviousness of now? There is no
>> coming back
>> from this. The obviousness can only be eclipsed.
>
> But that's obviousness is the one of the first person. It is easy to
> not deny it for oneself, but that is not the problem: the problems are
> more could that other moving (or not) bodies, like machines or
> comatose people, incarnate conscious person. And that is never
Just avoid hurting anything that might be conscious, or that claims to be
conscious. There is no theoretical solution anyway, as as you say yourself
(since COMP relies on faith either way).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> All
>> our problems and strifes are created by thinking (and feeling) we are
>> seperate individual that have enemies, that we have to protect
>> against, or
>> any seperate lovers, that we have to be attached to, in order to not
>> lose
>> them.
>
> That's naive.
Why? If we are God (and he is everything), isn't it obvious that we are in
paradise, unless we act and perceive like we aren't God (pretend or are in
the illusion that there is an other?). God hardly can be his own eternal
hell, and since he is everything it makes no sense to postulate that there
external problems that have to be solved.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> But is it obvious that PA is conscious: I don't think
>>>>> so. Nevertheless, in case it is conscious, it is obvious from her
>>>>> point of view. It is that obviousness we are looking a theory for.
>>>> PA is just an object within consciousness.
>>>
>>>
>>> No. Here we differ. You assume consciousness to be primitive, but
>>> then
>>> you are just saying "no" to the doctor.
>> Indeed I do. I am just arguing that the whole thought construct of
>> COMP&C
>> does not really make sense.
>
No! I am not defending any theory, not even anything that I say. It doesn't
matter what in particular I say. I don't want to anyone to believe my
opinion, but just be honest with reality.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> If you don't want to discuss that, just say it.
>
> You are defeating yourself here.
?
You are the one retracting to the position "just say 'no'" when it is not
clear how one could seperate COMP from your reasoning.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> I have no problem with that, except that it seems for you to be a
>>> "reason" to abandon reason,  democracy, etc.
>> I don't want to abandon reason, just give it its proper place as a
>> servant
>> of consciousness, not master.
>
> No problem with that. But I am not sure you do that.
Abandon reason? For me reason is just using the intellect, and obviously I
do that when I write to you.
Indeed I want to abandon reason as an authority. No authority is needed for
God.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> But this is ... the origin of suffering.
>> I'd like to hear evidence for that. Rational people suffer not less
>> than
>> others, and almost all people in democracies suffer. Many people are
>> not
>> very rational and appear very happy (for example al those eastern
>> spiritual
>> masters, I don't think they value the rational intellect much) .
>
> The opposition between reason and mysticism is a recent human social
> schizophrenia maintained by bandits. You are playing for them by
> insisting on that separation. I'm afraid.
I don't want to seperate it, of course we can use reason. USE reason. But
what you do is not use reason, but let reason be the master. If your message
were just "We are immaterial beings, and machines are cool." than just say
that and don't pretend there is something more to it. You admitting yourself
that COMP relies on faith, and the reasoning can just work if COMP is true,
so everything you say relies on faith. But you don't seem to admit it,
unless you want to found reason purely on faith.
Your reasoning works for you, if you think it and COMP are valid, that's all
there is to it. But you defend your theory as if it is something beyond that
(a useful scientific theory), which is dishonest. Scientific theories are
meant to predict *actual events* and you didn't do that yet. You just
believe that it *could* do that, which is a big differnece.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> The only thing I could think of is my relative terrestial I as the
>> body, but
>> this is not a number, but a body. So what exactly would I bet on
>> being a
>> number?
>
> The number here is just the description of the body, or some body state.
OK, but what use is the description? The actual thing matters, no the
description, just as I don't bet on being the description of myself as
"Benjamin" I don't bet on being a number (or even a body, for that matter).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Indeed the doctor can put your 3-I on some
>>> hard disk. The sense is: using comp to live older, to travel long
>>> distances, to make fun with the stars, etc.
>> You can try that, I am just betting all my money it won't work.
>
> You seem so sure.
Yes... This is simply based on faith, I'll openly admit that.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> You talk like if you knew something. This cannot be done when we do
>>> science..
>> I know a lot of stuff, but nothing when it comes to the fundamental
>> things,
>> you are right.
>
> That contradicts what you just said.
What I say is not meant to be understood as knowledge, and neither is is

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I don't think these can be known. I am not speaking from
>> knowledge, I am just pointing towards experience with words.
>
> Which is better to avoid, especially in science approaching the notion
> of experience.
It is the only thing that we can do. All our science necessarily stems from
experience, and if we deny that we will just remain in a state of ignorance.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> It is not valid.
Whether it's valid or not is besides the point. The question is whether it
works. Good science for me is mainly pointing to our experience with use of
relatively precise measurements. We just say "Look what I discovered, who
knows what that might mean, maybe XYZ, but form your own opinion, look for
yourself at what I discovered, and look for yourself whether you can confirm
the discovery within your own experience (maybe by making an experiment
yourself.".
What you do is hiding the most important thing. You want to approach the
notion of experience and then avoid pointing towards it. How the hell is
this supposed to work?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> Anyway, I doubt that you can find any number having a claim to an
>>>> internal
>>>> view other than in you imagination.
>>>
>>> I doubt that too, but it is a matter of work to understand that it
>>> follows from comp. You are perhaps just saying that you doubt comp,
>>> and that suggests that you are not completely insane. I doubt comp
>>> too, but I doubt all theories, so what?
>>> Or you are just saying that you dislike comp. Again, that is your
>>> right, but that is not an argument.
>> I am trying to argue that COMP is (close to) nonsense. You might say
>> this
>> just means I doubt or dislike COMP, OK.
>
> Ah? But I have seen nothing making comp nonsense in your talks, except
> reference to your experience, which can't help us.
There is no way to see that it's nonsense from words alone. The words of
COMP sound "reasonable".

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> We can agree that it is
>>>> obvious that what is obvious is obvious.
>>>
>>> Actually some logics exist where even this is false. On the real
>>> numbers x = x is not obvious. (that fact itself is not obvious!).
>> Gee, that's why I am not talking of some mathematical structure or
>> some
>> logics. It is also obvious that what is obvious is sometimes non-
>> obvious.
>> Nevertheless it is obvious.
>
> OK. You win. What is obvious is obvious.
See. That's the only thing I am saying, really.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> That is what I am talking about.
>>>> Why shouldn't we talk about that?
>>>
>>> We can talk on everything. Just avoid non valid reasoning if you want
>>> convince other people.
>> I do not want to do valid reasoning, am I rather trying to point
>> towards
>> something that does not need to be validated by reason.
>
> Then you mlight suggest some help for people, but without referring
> explicitly to the experience, which is beyond word.
> But going from the obviousness and directness of the conscious
> experience to machines can't be conscious, or to "brains are not
> computers" is quite a jump.
It is not a big jump. We know from experience what computers are, and that
brains are not what computers are, in fact brains were there long before
computers. We simply have no reason to suppose that brains are computers,
except in theoretical constructs, but theoretical constructs might not have
much to do with reality.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't know the answer to that question, but I can show that if
>>>>> that
>>>>> is the case (that you can survive without any conscious change with
>>>>> such a silicon prosthesis), then we have to come back to the
>>>>> Platonician theologies, and naturalism and weak materialism,
>>>>> despite
>>>>> being a fertile simplifying assumption (already done by nature) is
>>>>> wrong.
>>>> I don't buy your argument, even though I agree with part of the
>>>> conclusion.
>>>>
>>>> (better read the rest before responding to this, it may be
>>>> unecessary): [Why
>>>> I don't buy your argument? It is a thought experiment that can't be
>>>> carried
>>>> out in practice,
>>>
>>> I use the practical comp assumption in step 1-6, for pedagogical
>>> reason, and eliminate it in step 7 and 8.
>> The same thing applies. For example you speak of virtual
>> reconstitutions in
>> step 7, and that these are actual is just true within you thought
>> experiment, and not necessarily in reality.
>
> That's the point of theorizing.
Yes, but then your theorizing is just theorizing and without any consquence
with respect to actual experience.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> and the implications of thoughts experiments don't
>>>> necessarily apply in the real world,
>>>
>>> The real world is what we search.
>> So, if you don't even know what's real it makes it only more
>> plausible that
>> your thought experiments don't apply in the "real world".
>
> They apply on the context of what I assume. That's science. It is
> modest. It search truth, but never pretend to have it. Only pseudo-
> scientists and pseudo-priests can do that.
Indeed it is immodest to say we have truth, as it is not an object to be
had. You claim to be modest, but then say that COMP makes actual
predictions, but refuse to make any actual predictions using it. That is
just immodest.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Actually if you are strict in the interpretation of COMP, like you
>>>> want it
>>>> (so what I said above doesn't apply, because you assume quantum
>>>> stuff
>>>> doesn't matter), your whole reasoning is tautological.
>>>
>>> A refutable theory cannot be tautological.
>> COMP itself can bre refuted, of course "yes" doctor can be refuted by
>> showing that actually no one survives with a digital brain.
>
> That would not refute comp. That would refute this or that level. To
> refute comp you have to extract a fact from it, and shows that nature
OK, that might be true in theory. Yet maybe it is not even possible to
extract a fact from it? You claim that is refutable, but say yourself it is
extremely difficult to extract facts from it. If it is, it is for all
intents and purposes not refutable.
Like a theory is not refutable that could be refuted by building a particle
accelerator the size of the universe.
At least say that you don't know whether its refutable yet.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I am only saying
>> the reasoning is (almost) tautological, that it, it doesn't say much
>> more
>> than what is already assumed at the beginning.
>
>
> Explain then why almost all scientist believe in comp, and yet are
> worrying about the reversal it implies. Explain why all atheists are
> materialist and mechanist. It is just not completely obvious that
> mechanism is incompatible with (weak) materialism.
That is true, but I don't see that any reasoning helps there. Guess why
hardly an materialist is convinced by the argument.
Truth that can't be accessed through reasoning is hard to swallow for
someone that beliefs in rationalism, and that's the simple reason that so
many people are mechanists and materialst. From reasoning alone, it is not
obvious that is makes no sense, I think because neither belief alone makes
much sense in the first place. So I don't wonder about that.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Come on, you have admitted
>>> not having studied the theory, and now you talk like if you did, when
>>> clearly you did not.
>> What do you expect from me? I have read the reasoning and understood
>> the
>> gist of it, of course I can't study 20 years computer science before
>> I can
>> respond to the reasoning,...?
>
> The UDA is complete in itself, with a rough idea on what is the UD,
> and why it is plausible that it exists (by Church thesis).
But that doesn't answer any of my critique points.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> The "yes" you speak
>>>> of is really a yes towards being an immaterial machine, because you
>>>> assume
>>>> that just the digital functioning of the actual device matters (and
>>>> digital
>>>> functioning is not something that can be defined in terms of
>>>> matter). And if
>>>> you (and everybody else) are *only* an immaterial machine, and thus
>>>> you have
>>>> no world to be in, necessarily pysical reality has to come from that
>>>> and
>>>> can't be primary. How could it if you assume that you are an
>>>> *immaterial*
>>>> machine.
>>>
>>> This is not the argument. If it was I would not need the step 8.
>> Step 8 doesn't work if we are "digital"-material machine. You assume
>> there
>> that experiences are associated to computations, not actual
>> computations,
>> which are not mere computations in the sense of computer science.
>
> ?
> No, I do the contrary. I assume we are digital material machine, and
> get the epistemological contradiction from that.
> Which version of MGA are you reading. Please quote my text, because it
> don't see what you are referring too.
Ah, well, I might admit that it is quite inconsistent to believe in COMP and
materialism, because indeed most materialists would probably have to agree
with that:
"But then,  Maudlin  ingenuously  showed  that counterfactual  correctness
can be  recovered, by  adding  non active devices  which  will  be triggered
only  if  some  (counterfactual)  change would  appear  in  the environment.
Now  this shows that any inner experience can be associated with an
arbitrary low (even null) physical activity,  and  this  in  keeping
counterfactual  correctness.  And  that  is  absurd  with  the conjunction
of both comp and materialism. "
Though we can rescue materialism if we admit that matter is a very
mysterious thing that is all-pervading and indivisible and that thus we
can't precisely associate any experience with physical activity (and the
substitution works in spite of that). Which is just another way of saying
that matter is more like spirit (most materialst say consciousness is just
physical activity, which is clearly absurd with the statement above). Almost
no materialist will accept it, so I grant that it is absurd to believe in
MEC and MAT.
So I just defend my own position, namely that even if no experience can be
associated with computations in general, the substitution might still work.
The association may just work in practice (even though I strongly doubt
this), even though we can't associate them as a general principle. The
substitution might just works in an abstract way that certain substitutions
are without consequence as they are subjectively not happening, even when
they do happen (due to subjective consistency of experience)

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> You just say "yes" if you buy your reasoning, because if the
>>>> reasoning is
>>>> wrong you can't be an immaterial machine,
>>>
>>> here you make an error in logic. Th reasoning can be wrong, and yet
>>> the conclusion true, for some other reason.
>> That's true. But that doesn't really matter with regards to this
>> discussion.
>
> Then it means your point was not relevant for the discussion.
Exactly.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> They will have to argue the particular instantiation of the digital
>>>> machine matter, making them say "NO", as they don't agree with a
>>>> digital
>>>> substitution in the way you mean it.
>>>
>>> I meant in in the usual clinical sense of suriving some medical
>>> operation. The immateriality is a non trivial consequences, needing
>>> all the steps of the reasoning. You cannot refute an argument by
>>> simplifying it and criticize *your* simplification of it.
>> The reasoning doesn't work just with the assumption that we survive
>> some
>> medical operation.
>
> Then show me the flaw.
There is no specific flaw in the reasoning. We just might surive the
substitution regardless whether we are actually digital machines. If you say
"I will substitute your generalized brain, which is the whole milky way with
a digital machine", I won't say no, in theory (if we makes me unconscious
during the procedure and has the "yes" from the rest of the sentient being
in the milky way also, and I know for sure that he can do what he claims to
be able to, which of course will never be the case in practive). Since I am
pretty sure I will just experience that this was a dream anyways (though it
"actually" happened in a parallel universe); the "digital part" of my
personal history will just be a minor interference of my actually
experienced personal history.
We can say YES in theory, but not in practice, and so your reasoning may
only follow in theory, but not in practice. Yet you should accept our "yes",
since it is just a thought experiment. This is why I argue against COMP&C
even though I could in theory, say "yes".

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> The reasoning assumes that just the digital functioning of
>> the device matters.
>
> That is ambiguous.
Maybe the digital functioning does not matter and we still survive.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> We may survive, even if not just the digital functioning
>> of the device matters.
>
The ability of concsiousness to build itself a consistent history / world
independent of any digital functioning, and despite a digital substitution.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> For them a  digital substitution means
>>>> a particular digital machine, which is actually not *purely*
>>>> digital, making
>>>> them say "NO".
>>>
>>> On the contrary, to refute the argument they have to say yes.
>> Yes. So what? If all materialist say no, the reasoning makes no
>> sense to
>> refute materialism.
>
> It does not refute at all materialism. It refute materialism +
> mechanism. Indeed the materialist who says no like you and Craig
> should love UDA (but can hate AUDA; which keep mechanism, despite UDA,
> and go on to show it mlakes sense already to the UMs and LUMs).
OK. I am not a materialist at all, but I really don't mind what I am called.
You can call me materialist if matter is God / consciousness.

benjayk
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