On 09 Oct 2011, at 18:29, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:

I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent logic with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't turn
blue or taste like broccoli.

Assuming non-comp.
There is no assumption needed for that. It is a category error to say
arithmetics turns into a taste. It is also a category error to say
arithmetic has an internal view.

If by arithmetic you mean some theory/machine like PA, you *are* using
non comp.
The point is that we don't need any assumptions for that. It is just an observation. There is only the internal view viewing into itself, and it belongs to no one. It is just not possible to find an owner, simply because
only objects can be owned. It is a category error to say subjectivity
(consciousness) can be owned, just like, for example, numbers can't be

We have discuss this. You are not aware that we search an explanation for matter and consciousness. We want to keep the qualia in the picture (where Aristotle fails), but we don't want to make the inverse error and throw the quanta away.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

If by arithmetic you mean arithmetical truth then I can see some sense
in which it is a category error.
I think what you call arithmetical truth has nothing to do with arithmetical
truth in particular and thus doesn't deserve its name.

Arithmetical truth is a standard term in mathematical logic denoting the set of all true first order logical sentences of arithmetic, or, very often, the set of the Gödel numbers of such true sentences (to make it a subset of N). It is a precise well defined, but highly non constructive (machine generable) set of numbers.

You can use
arithmetic to point towards truth, but you can use anything for it. Thus it doesn't really make sense to call it arithmetical truth, except if you only
mean the part that is provably true within arithmetic.

Not at all. Arithmetical truth (which you can defined in precise mathematical way, like Hillbert space, or anything in math) escapes the reach of machines, and humans. But it is use implicitly when we defined things as simple as trigonometric functions, limit in analysis, etc. Everyday mathematics is usually using concept beyond arithmetical truth (like analytical truth, or second order arithmetic, set theory, etc.). It is not controversial and "arithmetical truth" is the usual name of it.

As soon as you use
Gödel, you go beyond arithmetic, making the label "arithmetical truth" close
to meaningless.

Godel's prove does not go beyond arithmetic. PA can prove its own Gödel's theorem. But you are right: "arithmetical truth is not definable in PA", but this does not make it meaningless.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

It makes as much sense to say that a
concept has an internal view.
nternal view just applies to the only thing
that can have/is a view, namely consciousness.

It applies to person.
No. There is no person to find that has consciousness.

This is depriving the littele ego, man, from having conscious experience. That makes me chill.

The is just a belief
that is not validated by experience. The experience of a person having
consciousness is just the experience of consciousness trying to make itself an object that belongs to someone (because consciousness first starts to learn to be conscious in terms of objects, as this is seemingly requiring
less introspective ability). Actually consciousness just is (aware of

That does not make much sense at all.

and objects appear in that, including the object "the person as
relative subject".

That makes sense. And ?

Treating the relative subject, the person, as having the absolute subject (consciousness) is the illusion of ego, that creates samsara, suffering. The absolute subject can't suffer, as it has nothing to suffer from, nor any notion of difference that is required to suffer (suffering vs suffering

Physics is for little ego, and physics is what I want to explain. You statement contradict the whole endeavor of science, and even of life. It is like saying "look we will go in heaven, so why not kill ourselves right now to end the suffering". Things are far more subtle than that. There is a physical universe and observers in it, even if those things are not primary. Theories concern them. And yes, theology has a word in that, but not as a tool for eliminating the quanta. You are doing the inverse error of the aristotelian. They eliminate soul and person, and you eliminate the observable quantitative patterns. In fine, you argue against rationalism and science.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

It might be a category error to say that
consciousness has consciousness. Consciousness is not a person, even
cosmic consciousness.
Right, consciousness doesn't really "have" consciousness,


this is just a
manner of speaking that I borrowed from "a person having consciousness", I think the former is more accurate than the latter. Actually consciousness
just is (and through that it knows itself).

Not in practice, hereby, in our terrestrial conditions. A comatose might be conscious or not, and a doctor deciding this can make the difference between (terrestrial ) life and (terrestrial ) death.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

This is not a belief, this is
just the obvious reality right now.

Obvious for you.
Obvious for anyone (as there is only one that can be consciousness of
obviousness, namely consciousness).

You cannot talk like if everyone smoked salvia. You are missing the coming back step. you should read the chan and zen masters.

Right now the only absolute thing you
find in your experience is consciousnes,


without any owner.

Only when "enlightened". This is without purpose on earth. In Lobian term you confuse G and G*. You are inconsistent.

Only the
intellect makes it possible for anything to "have" consciousness.

Right. But the intellect exists, and has its role in the big global picture, and the local one.

actuality there is no such thing to find.
It can be non-obvious to a person, not to consciousness. Consciousness can't even conceive of an owner of itself, actually it can't directly conceive of
anything. Conceiving of something appears in it (and as it).

Bruno Marchal wrote:

But is it obvious that PA is conscious: I don't think
so. Nevertheless, in case it is conscious, it is obvious from her
point of view. It is that obviousness we are looking a theory for.
PA is just an object within consciousness.

No. Here we differ. You assume consciousness to be primitive, but then you are just saying "no" to the doctor. I have no problem with that, except that it seems for you to be a "reason" to abandon reason, democracy, etc. But this is ... the origin of suffering.

It can't have a point of view.
Nothing has a point of view in the sense you mean it.

Numbers have already them, with reasonable definition.

Points of views are
just relative manifestations inside/of consciousness.

That's my point. So is physical reality. But this does not mean we have to abandon them. You go to far. It is half enlightenment like that which gives bad reputation to the mystics.

PA could have a point of view in a relative sense, if you choose to
indentify with PA and then defend its position. But one could as well say that a triangle has a point of view, if I identify with it and defend its
"position" (imagining it has any).

PA is a Löbian machine with deep self-reference abilities. I don't see any for a triangle.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Can you find any number(s) flying around
that has any claim to an internal view right now?

Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer
only to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number
can have.
Or, to put it another way, the 1-person will not feel to be a number at all;
and thus will not be a number(s), for all intents and purposes,
contradicting the very premise (maybe not logically, but it doesn't really make sense to bet on being a machine if the conclusion says that for all
intents and purposes you are not a machine at all).

You confuse the 1-person and the 3-person. It makes a sense to bet that you 3-I is a number. Indeed the doctor can put your 3-I on some hard disk. The sense is: using comp to live older, to travel long distances, to make fun with the stars, etc.

You talk like if you knew something. This cannot be done when we do science.

Anyway, I doubt that you can find any number having a claim to an internal
view other than in you imagination.

I doubt that too, but it is a matter of work to understand that it follows from comp. You are perhaps just saying that you doubt comp, and that suggests that you are not completely insane. I doubt comp too, but I doubt all theories, so what? Or you are just saying that you dislike comp. Again, that is your right, but that is not an argument.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

The only thing that you
can find is consciousness being conscious of itself (even an person
consciousness belongs to is absent, the person is just an object in

Here you present a theory like if it was a fact.
This is not a theory. It is not even a fact, it is just observation. There is consciousness, that is it. There is no person to find here, except as certain forms in consciousness (feeling seperate, thinking of "I", feeling
to be in control, thinking of past and future,etc...).

Same reamrk as above and in other post. You just can't let your inner God to do the science. You illustrate the tension between Bp and Bp & p. In fact you annihilate Bp in favor of Bp & p. But science is a dialog between many different Bp.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

If that was obvious, we would not even discuss it.
Even though it is obvious, it can be overlooked. Obvious is relative.

Which makes it non obvious. Better to avoid that term in argumentation.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Consciousness, despite being an obvious
fact for conscious person, is a concept. As you say, concept does not
Consciousness is as much of a concept as everything we can talk about. This doesn't say much. You can form any sentence with "... is a concept" and it
will be true.
Of course I am talking not of consciousness as a concept but of
consciousness itself, which is just the obviousness of experiencing.
Indeed, consciousness does not think. It doesn't do anything, really.
Thinking is being witnessed within consciousness.

See my reply to "yellow" to Craig. Something seems simple to human, because they are plausibly born with an already very efficacious computer in the skull. Despite comp makes consciousness and bodies independent of physical realities. But the goal here consists in understanding all that, by separarting as clearly as possible the levels of discourse.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

You abstract so much that you miss the obvious.

In interdisciplinary researches it is better to avoid the term
Why? If nothing is obvious we really have no point of reference at all.

We can still agree on principles and axioms. No need to insult those who chose different axioms.

least it is obvious that anything at all is obvious.


We can agree that it is
obvious that what is obvious is obvious.

Actually some logics exist where even this is false. On the real numbers x = x is not obvious. (that fact itself is not obvious!).

That is what I am talking about.
Why shouldn't we talk about that?

We can talk on everything. Just avoid non valid reasoning if you want convince other people.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

I do agree that consciousness is obvious from the first person point
of view of a conscious person, but do you agree that a silicon machine
can emulate a conscious person, indeed yourself (little ego)?
I think a person has no first person point of view that could perceive

Indeed. Consciousness is not in the category of perceivable thing.

It's point of view consists of relative perceptions and
emotions, etc... but it is within consciousness and thus can't be aware of
it as an object.

Indeed. This can be related with the fact that the 1-I (Bp & p) is not definable by the machine.

Yes, a silicon machine can, (in principle at least) emulate this person, I have little doubt about that. Yet this emulation will not be accurate, as this person itself cannot be divorced from its transcendent source. That is, it'll miss the part that is transcendent of emulability (yet still within
realms of what one could call "matter").


I don't know what'll come out of this emulation, if it is allowed to express itself. Funnily I dreamt being emulated, and my immediate response was "I have to get out of here", and so my soul left the (supposed) emulation.
Maybe this will be how it is, that the emulation will be completely
dysfunctional, because consciousness immediatly realizes it is not a
suitable vessel. Maybe it will act like a human, but without emotional
capability. Maybe an emulation will never be possible for reasons of
self-consistency (if the emulation would be possible it may infer an world where there isn't an emulation, making the emulation not an emulation at
all, but just an unrealizable theoretical possibility).
It may be possible that the emulation works, if consciousness creates the necessary transcendent interpretative intelligence around the emulation device, but I see that as unlikely. It doesn't sound plausible to me that
this comes out of nowhere. It may be possible if the brain is partly
replaced by digital devices and the rest of the brain accommodates by
learning to interpret the output, and give the right input to the device.
But there most probably is going to be a point where this doesn't work
anymore, as there is no space for further neurons (or no possibility of further enhancing their efficiency) that would be needed for interpretation,
for example.

You are not argumenting. I don't care too much on the truth or falsity of comp. My point is that with comp we have to use Plato instead of aritstotle, and I illusy-trate we can do that with the usual criteria of rationality. In particular I show weak materialism to be incompatible with mechanism, and the proof is constructive, so I do propose a "new physical science", and I show it testable. I have no clue what is your problem with this, except that apparently you believe that comp is false.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

I don't know the answer to that question, but I can show that if that
is the case (that you can survive without any conscious change with
such a silicon prosthesis), then we have to come back to the
Platonician theologies, and naturalism and weak materialism, despite
being a fertile simplifying assumption (already done by nature) is
I don't buy your argument, even though I agree with part of the conclusion.

(better read the rest before responding to this, it may be unecessary): [Why I don't buy your argument? It is a thought experiment that can't be carried
out in practice,

I use the practical comp assumption in step 1-6, for pedagogical reason, and eliminate it in step 7 and 8.

and the implications of thoughts experiments don't
necessarily apply in the real world,

The real world is what we search. Also, I have no clue what you mean by that given that only consciousness is real in your "theory".

so none of the conclusions are
necessarily valid. For example a substitution level is a theoretical
construct. In reality all substitution levels blur into each other via
quantum interference. Also there is no such thing as a perfect digital
machine, also due to quantum mechanics. It might be the case that some
digital machines work, and some don't.]

QM is not part of the assumption. But hopefully part of the conclusion, and this is already partially confirmed technically.

Actually if you are strict in the interpretation of COMP, like you want it
(so what I said above doesn't apply, because you assume quantum stuff
doesn't matter), your whole reasoning is tautological.

A refutable theory cannot be tautological. Come on, you have admitted not having studied the theory, and now you talk like if you did, when clearly you did not.

The "yes" you speak
of is really a yes towards being an immaterial machine, because you assume that just the digital functioning of the actual device matters (and digital functioning is not something that can be defined in terms of matter). And if you (and everybody else) are *only* an immaterial machine, and thus you have no world to be in, necessarily pysical reality has to come from that and can't be primary. How could it if you assume that you are an *immaterial*

This is not the argument. If it was I would not need the step 8. Your move here is equivalent with a move made by Peter Jones (1Z) which I have answered. It is true that, by saying "yes" to the doctor, we can already get the point that we are immaterial, but we can still believe that we need a body to be conscious. Step 8 makes clear that eventually the bodies are a construct of the (löbian numbers) mind in a literal and precise (testable) sense.

You just say "yes" if you buy your reasoning, because if the reasoning is
wrong you can't be an immaterial machine,

here you make an error in logic. Th reasoning can be wrong, and yet the conclusion true, for some other reason.

contradicting your "yes".
So in this case, you really just prove that if you say "yes", you say "yes",
which, well, is sort of obvious in the first place.
The problem is that no materialst is going to say yes in the precise way you
want it.

Why is that a problem? On the contrary

They will have to argue the particular instantiation of the digital
machine matter, making them say "NO", as they don't agree with a digital
substitution in the way you mean it.

I meant in in the usual clinical sense of suriving some medical operation. The immateriality is a non trivial consequences, needing all the steps of the reasoning. You cannot refute an argument by simplifying it and criticize *your* simplification of it.

For them a  digital substitution means
a particular digital machine, which is actually not *purely* digital, making
them say "NO".

On the contrary, to refute the argument they have to say yes. If they say "no", it just means that they believe that there is no level of comp substitution.


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