On 09 Oct 2011, at 18:29, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent
logic
with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't
turn
blue or taste like broccoli.
Assuming non-comp.
There is no assumption needed for that. It is a category error to
say
arithmetics turns into a taste. It is also a category error to say
that
arithmetic has an internal view.
If by arithmetic you mean some theory/machine like PA, you *are*
using
non comp.
The point is that we don't need any assumptions for that. It is just
an
observation. There is only the internal view viewing into itself,
and it
belongs to no one. It is just not possible to find an owner, simply
because
only objects can be owned. It is a category error to say subjectivity
(consciousness) can be owned, just like, for example, numbers can't be
owned.
We have discuss this. You are not aware that we search an explanation
for matter and consciousness. We want to keep the qualia in the
picture (where Aristotle fails), but we don't want to make the inverse
error and throw the quanta away.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If by arithmetic you mean arithmetical truth then I can see some
sense
in which it is a category error.
I think what you call arithmetical truth has nothing to do with
arithmetical
truth in particular and thus doesn't deserve its name.
Arithmetical truth is a standard term in mathematical logic denoting
the set of all true first order logical sentences of arithmetic, or,
very often, the set of the Gödel numbers of such true sentences (to
make it a subset of N). It is a precise well defined, but highly non
constructive (machine generable) set of numbers.
You can use
arithmetic to point towards truth, but you can use anything for it.
Thus it
doesn't really make sense to call it arithmetical truth, except if
you only
mean the part that is provably true within arithmetic.
Not at all. Arithmetical truth (which you can defined in precise
mathematical way, like Hillbert space, or anything in math) escapes
the reach of machines, and humans. But it is use implicitly when we
defined things as simple as trigonometric functions, limit in
analysis, etc. Everyday mathematics is usually using concept beyond
arithmetical truth (like analytical truth, or second order arithmetic,
set theory, etc.). It is not controversial and "arithmetical truth" is
the usual name of it.
As soon as you use
Gödel, you go beyond arithmetic, making the label "arithmetical
truth" close
to meaningless.
Godel's prove does not go beyond arithmetic. PA can prove its own
Gödel's theorem.
But you are right: "arithmetical truth is not definable in PA", but
this does not make it meaningless.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It makes as much sense to say that a
concept has an internal view.
nternal view just applies to the only thing
that can have/is a view, namely consciousness.
It applies to person.
No. There is no person to find that has consciousness.
This is depriving the littele ego, man, from having conscious
experience. That makes me chill.
The is just a belief
that is not validated by experience. The experience of a person having
consciousness is just the experience of consciousness trying to make
itself
an object that belongs to someone (because consciousness first
starts to
learn to be conscious in terms of objects, as this is seemingly
requiring
less introspective ability). Actually consciousness just is (aware of
itself)
That does not make much sense at all.
and objects appear in that, including the object "the person as
relative subject".
That makes sense. And ?
Treating the relative subject, the person, as having the absolute
subject
(consciousness) is the illusion of ego, that creates samsara,
suffering. The
absolute subject can't suffer, as it has nothing to suffer from, nor
any
notion of difference that is required to suffer (suffering vs
suffering
ceasing).
Physics is for little ego, and physics is what I want to explain. You
statement contradict the whole endeavor of science, and even of life.
It is like saying "look we will go in heaven, so why not kill
ourselves right now to end the suffering". Things are far more subtle
than that. There is a physical universe and observers in it, even if
those things are not primary. Theories concern them. And yes, theology
has a word in that, but not as a tool for eliminating the quanta. You
are doing the inverse error of the aristotelian. They eliminate soul
and person, and you eliminate the observable quantitative patterns. In
fine, you argue against rationalism and science.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It might be a category error to say that
consciousness has consciousness. Consciousness is not a person, even
cosmic consciousness.
Right, consciousness doesn't really "have" consciousness,
Good.
this is just a
manner of speaking that I borrowed from "a person having
consciousness", I
think the former is more accurate than the latter. Actually
consciousness
just is (and through that it knows itself).
Not in practice, hereby, in our terrestrial conditions. A comatose
might be conscious or not, and a doctor deciding this can make the
difference between (terrestrial ) life and (terrestrial ) death.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is not a belief, this is
just the obvious reality right now.
Obvious for you.
Obvious for anyone (as there is only one that can be consciousness of
obviousness, namely consciousness).
You cannot talk like if everyone smoked salvia. You are missing the
coming back step. you should read the chan and zen masters.
Right now the only absolute thing you
find in your experience is consciousnes,
Sure.
without any owner.
Only when "enlightened". This is without purpose on earth. In Lobian
term you confuse G and G*. You are inconsistent.
Only the
intellect makes it possible for anything to "have" consciousness.
Right. But the intellect exists, and has its role in the big global
picture, and the local one.
In
actuality there is no such thing to find.
It can be non-obvious to a person, not to consciousness.
Consciousness can't
even conceive of an owner of itself, actually it can't directly
conceive of
anything. Conceiving of something appears in it (and as it).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But is it obvious that PA is conscious: I don't think
so. Nevertheless, in case it is conscious, it is obvious from her
point of view. It is that obviousness we are looking a theory for.
PA is just an object within consciousness.
No. Here we differ. You assume consciousness to be primitive, but then
you are just saying "no" to the doctor. I have no problem with that,
except that it seems for you to be a "reason" to abandon reason,
democracy, etc. But this is ... the origin of suffering.
It can't have a point of view.
Nothing has a point of view in the sense you mean it.
Numbers have already them, with reasonable definition.
Points of views are
just relative manifestations inside/of consciousness.
That's my point. So is physical reality. But this does not mean we
have to abandon them. You go to far. It is half enlightenment like
that which gives bad reputation to the mystics.
PA could have a point of view in a relative sense, if you choose to
indentify with PA and then defend its position. But one could as
well say
that a triangle has a point of view, if I identify with it and
defend its
"position" (imagining it has any).
PA is a Löbian machine with deep self-reference abilities. I don't see
any for a triangle.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Can you find any number(s) flying around
that has any claim to an internal view right now?
Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer
only to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number
can have.
Or, to put it another way, the 1-person will not feel to be a number
at all;
and thus will not be a number(s), for all intents and purposes,
contradicting the very premise (maybe not logically, but it doesn't
really
make sense to bet on being a machine if the conclusion says that for
all
intents and purposes you are not a machine at all).
You confuse the 1-person and the 3-person. It makes a sense to bet
that you 3-I is a number. Indeed the doctor can put your 3-I on some
hard disk. The sense is: using comp to live older, to travel long
distances, to make fun with the stars, etc.
You talk like if you knew something. This cannot be done when we do
science.
Anyway, I doubt that you can find any number having a claim to an
internal
view other than in you imagination.
I doubt that too, but it is a matter of work to understand that it
follows from comp. You are perhaps just saying that you doubt comp,
and that suggests that you are not completely insane. I doubt comp
too, but I doubt all theories, so what?
Or you are just saying that you dislike comp. Again, that is your
right, but that is not an argument.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The only thing that you
can find is consciousness being conscious of itself (even an person
that
consciousness belongs to is absent, the person is just an object in
consciousness).
Here you present a theory like if it was a fact.
This is not a theory. It is not even a fact, it is just observation.
There
is consciousness, that is it. There is no person to find here,
except as
certain forms in consciousness (feeling seperate, thinking of "I",
feeling
to be in control, thinking of past and future,etc...).
Same reamrk as above and in other post. You just can't let your inner
God to do the science. You illustrate the tension between Bp and Bp &
p. In fact you annihilate Bp in favor of Bp & p. But science is a
dialog between many different Bp.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If that was obvious, we would not even discuss it.
Even though it is obvious, it can be overlooked. Obvious is relative.
Which makes it non obvious. Better to avoid that term in argumentation.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Consciousness, despite being an obvious
fact for conscious person, is a concept. As you say, concept does not
think.
Consciousness is as much of a concept as everything we can talk
about. This
doesn't say much. You can form any sentence with "... is a concept"
and it
will be true.
Of course I am talking not of consciousness as a concept but of
consciousness itself, which is just the obviousness of experiencing.
Indeed, consciousness does not think. It doesn't do anything, really.
Thinking is being witnessed within consciousness.
See my reply to "yellow" to Craig. Something seems simple to human,
because they are plausibly born with an already very efficacious
computer in the skull. Despite comp makes consciousness and bodies
independent of physical realities. But the goal here consists in
understanding all that, by separarting as clearly as possible the
levels of discourse.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
You abstract so much that you miss the obvious.
In interdisciplinary researches it is better to avoid the term
"obvious".
Why? If nothing is obvious we really have no point of reference at
all.
We can still agree on principles and axioms. No need to insult those
who chose different axioms.
At
least it is obvious that anything at all is obvious.
Why?
We can agree that it is
obvious that what is obvious is obvious.
Actually some logics exist where even this is false. On the real
numbers x = x is not obvious. (that fact itself is not obvious!).
That is what I am talking about.
Why shouldn't we talk about that?
We can talk on everything. Just avoid non valid reasoning if you want
convince other people.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I do agree that consciousness is obvious from the first person point
of view of a conscious person, but do you agree that a silicon
machine
can emulate a conscious person, indeed yourself (little ego)?
I think a person has no first person point of view that could perceive
consciousness.
Indeed. Consciousness is not in the category of perceivable thing.
It's point of view consists of relative perceptions and
emotions, etc... but it is within consciousness and thus can't be
aware of
it as an object.
Indeed. This can be related with the fact that the 1-I (Bp & p) is not
definable by the machine.
Yes, a silicon machine can, (in principle at least) emulate this
person, I
have little doubt about that. Yet this emulation will not be
accurate, as
this person itself cannot be divorced from its transcendent source.
That is,
it'll miss the part that is transcendent of emulability (yet still
within
realms of what one could call "matter").
?
I don't know what'll come out of this emulation, if it is allowed to
express
itself. Funnily I dreamt being emulated, and my immediate response
was "I
have to get out of here", and so my soul left the (supposed)
emulation.
Maybe this will be how it is, that the emulation will be completely
dysfunctional, because consciousness immediatly realizes it is not a
suitable vessel. Maybe it will act like a human, but without emotional
capability. Maybe an emulation will never be possible for reasons of
self-consistency (if the emulation would be possible it may infer an
world
where there isn't an emulation, making the emulation not an
emulation at
all, but just an unrealizable theoretical possibility).
It may be possible that the emulation works, if consciousness
creates the
necessary transcendent interpretative intelligence around the
emulation
device, but I see that as unlikely. It doesn't sound plausible to me
that
this comes out of nowhere. It may be possible if the brain is partly
replaced by digital devices and the rest of the brain accommodates by
learning to interpret the output, and give the right input to the
device.
But there most probably is going to be a point where this doesn't work
anymore, as there is no space for further neurons (or no possibility
of
further enhancing their efficiency) that would be needed for
interpretation,
for example.
You are not argumenting. I don't care too much on the truth or falsity
of comp. My point is that with comp we have to use Plato instead of
aritstotle, and I illusy-trate we can do that with the usual criteria
of rationality. In particular I show weak materialism to be
incompatible with mechanism, and the proof is constructive, so I do
propose a "new physical science", and I show it testable.
I have no clue what is your problem with this, except that apparently
you believe that comp is false.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't know the answer to that question, but I can show that if that
is the case (that you can survive without any conscious change with
such a silicon prosthesis), then we have to come back to the
Platonician theologies, and naturalism and weak materialism, despite
being a fertile simplifying assumption (already done by nature) is
wrong.
I don't buy your argument, even though I agree with part of the
conclusion.
(better read the rest before responding to this, it may be
unecessary): [Why
I don't buy your argument? It is a thought experiment that can't be
carried
out in practice,
I use the practical comp assumption in step 1-6, for pedagogical
reason, and eliminate it in step 7 and 8.
and the implications of thoughts experiments don't
necessarily apply in the real world,
The real world is what we search. Also, I have no clue what you mean
by that given that only consciousness is real in your "theory".
so none of the conclusions are
necessarily valid. For example a substitution level is a theoretical
construct. In reality all substitution levels blur into each other via
quantum interference. Also there is no such thing as a perfect digital
machine, also due to quantum mechanics. It might be the case that some
digital machines work, and some don't.]
QM is not part of the assumption. But hopefully part of the
conclusion, and this is already partially confirmed technically.
Actually if you are strict in the interpretation of COMP, like you
want it
(so what I said above doesn't apply, because you assume quantum stuff
doesn't matter), your whole reasoning is tautological.
A refutable theory cannot be tautological. Come on, you have admitted
not having studied the theory, and now you talk like if you did, when
clearly you did not.
The "yes" you speak
of is really a yes towards being an immaterial machine, because you
assume
that just the digital functioning of the actual device matters (and
digital
functioning is not something that can be defined in terms of
matter). And if
you (and everybody else) are *only* an immaterial machine, and thus
you have
no world to be in, necessarily pysical reality has to come from that
and
can't be primary. How could it if you assume that you are an
*immaterial*
machine.
This is not the argument. If it was I would not need the step 8. Your
move here is equivalent with a move made by Peter Jones (1Z) which I
have answered. It is true that, by saying "yes" to the doctor, we can
already get the point that we are immaterial, but we can still believe
that we need a body to be conscious. Step 8 makes clear that
eventually the bodies are a construct of the (löbian numbers) mind in
a literal and precise (testable) sense.
You just say "yes" if you buy your reasoning, because if the
reasoning is
wrong you can't be an immaterial machine,
here you make an error in logic. Th reasoning can be wrong, and yet
the conclusion true, for some other reason.
contradicting your "yes".
So in this case, you really just prove that if you say "yes", you
say "yes",
which, well, is sort of obvious in the first place.
The problem is that no materialst is going to say yes in the precise
way you
want it.
Why is that a problem? On the contrary
They will have to argue the particular instantiation of the digital
machine matter, making them say "NO", as they don't agree with a
digital
substitution in the way you mean it.
I meant in in the usual clinical sense of suriving some medical
operation. The immateriality is a non trivial consequences, needing
all the steps of the reasoning. You cannot refute an argument by
simplifying it and criticize *your* simplification of it.
For them a digital substitution means
a particular digital machine, which is actually not *purely*
digital, making
them say "NO".
On the contrary, to refute the argument they have to say yes. If they
say "no", it just means that they believe that there is no level of
comp substitution.
Bruno
benjayk
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