Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 09 Oct 2011, at 18:29, benjayk wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
>>>>>> I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent  
>>>>>> logic
>>>>>> with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't  
>>>>>> turn
>>>>>> blue or taste like broccoli.
>>>>> Assuming non-comp.
>>>> There is no assumption needed for that. It is a category error to  
>>>> say
>>>> arithmetics turns into a taste. It is also a category error to say
>>>> that
>>>> arithmetic has an internal view.
>>> If by arithmetic you mean some theory/machine like PA, you *are*  
>>> using
>>> non comp.
>> The point is that we don't need any assumptions for that. It is just  
>> an
>> observation. There is only the internal view viewing into itself,  
>> and it
>> belongs to no one. It is just not possible to find an owner, simply  
>> because
>> only objects can be owned. It is a category error to say subjectivity
>> (consciousness) can be owned, just like, for example, numbers can't be
>> owned.
> We have discuss this. You are not aware that we search an explanation  
> for matter and consciousness.
I am aware of that. It is obvious that this is what you searching. The point
is, if you try to explain concsciousness you are applying a concept to
something that just doesn't fit what is talked about. Explaining
consciousness in the sense you mean it (explain it *from* something) is
nonsense, as consciousness is already required *before* anything at all can
arise. An explanation *from something* can just work if what you explain
from exists prior to that what is to be explained. No numbers can arise
without consciousness, and therefore consciousnes can't be explained from

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> As soon as you use
>> Gödel, you go beyond arithmetic, making the label "arithmetical  
>> truth" close
>> to meaningless.
> Godel's prove does not go beyond arithmetic. PA can prove its own  
> Gödel's theorem.
Where in arithmetic is the axiom that numbers can encode things? How does
Gödel prove work if they can't encode things?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> It makes as much sense to say that a
>>>> concept has an internal view.
>>>> nternal view just applies to the only thing
>>>> that can have/is a view, namely consciousness.
>>> It applies to person.
>> No. There is no person to find that has consciousness.
> This is depriving the littele ego, man, from having conscious  
> experience. That makes me chill.
Of course, it is threatening to the ego. The little ego has no conscious
experience. It is an object within the conscious experience.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  You statement contradict the whole endeavor of science,
Yes, if science thinks it can explain fundamental things. It can relatively
explain local things, and describe things very well, and be a good tool for
development of technology.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> and even of life.
Life is not for the ego, life is for God.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> It is like saying "look we will go in heaven, so why not kill  
> ourselves right now to end the suffering".
Killing ourselves will solve nothing, as we are just leaving a relative
body, which doesn't solve any fundamental problem.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  There is a physical universe and observers in it, even if  
> those things are not primary.
That's true.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  Theories concern them.
Yes, that's true also, but there is no theory that captures the whole of it.
If COMP does (except the 1% part that you acknowledge can't be explained),
just give concrete predictions of physical measurements, and then it will be

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  And yes, theology  has a word in that, but not as a tool for eliminating
> the quanta. You  
> are doing the inverse error of the aristotelian. They eliminate soul  
> and person, and you eliminate the observable quantitative patterns. In  
> fine, you argue against rationalism and science.
Of course there are observable quantitative patterns, how could one deny
that? I just say they can't be captured by any theory and can just be
discovered by observation. All evidence we have right now points to that, no
one managed to give a theory that predicts our particular patterns from a
priori principles.
But it is true that I argue for extending our view into realms of
trans-rationalism and post-science, and in this sense I argue against using
rationalism and science where the former are more adequate (fundamental
questions about reality).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> this is just a
>> manner of speaking that I borrowed from "a person having  
>> consciousness", I
>> think the former is more accurate than the latter. Actually  
>> consciousness
>> just is (and through that it knows itself).
> Not in practice, hereby, in our terrestrial conditions.
Especially, even *only* in practice. Consciousness is entirely beyond
theories and in this sense totally practical.
I sincerily believe that if we know ourselves to be consciousness, all other
problems solve themselves. Simply because consciousness is the source of
all, and also the source of all solutions to problems, and just if we know
ourselves to be it we can really harness that.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  A comatose might be conscious or not, and a doctor deciding this can make
> the  
> difference between (terrestrial ) life and (terrestrial ) death.
In this case we are speaking of a particular manifest aspect of
consciousness. Indeed it can be there or absent, but this has nothing to do
with consciousness as such, so I don't know what this has to do with COMP
claiming to explain consciousness.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> This is not a belief, this is
>>>> just the obvious reality right now.
>>> Obvious for you.
>> Obvious for anyone (as there is only one that can be consciousness of
>> obviousness, namely consciousness).
> You cannot talk like if everyone smoked salvia. You are missing the  
> coming back step. you should read the chan and zen masters.
Coming back from what? From the obviousness of now? There is no coming back
from this. The obviousness can only be eclipsed.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> without any owner.
> Only when "enlightened". This is without purpose on earth. In Lobian  
> term you confuse G and G*. You are inconsistent.
Whether one is enlightened or not doesn't determine the fundamental reality
of consciousness. All there is is an experience of an owner (of a conceptual
image of consciousness), no actual owner can be found, as consciousness is
not an object and so can't be owned.
Also you miss the whole purpose of enlightenment if you think it is without
purpose on earth. It just means awakening to the source of everything,
yourself, and thus it helps to manifest the source in this world, also. All
our problems and strifes are created by thinking (and feeling) we are
seperate individual that have enemies, that we have to protect against, or
any seperate lovers, that we have to be attached to, in order to not lose

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> But is it obvious that PA is conscious: I don't think
>>> so. Nevertheless, in case it is conscious, it is obvious from her
>>> point of view. It is that obviousness we are looking a theory for.
>> PA is just an object within consciousness.
> No. Here we differ. You assume consciousness to be primitive, but then  
> you are just saying "no" to the doctor.
Indeed I do. I am just arguing that the whole thought construct of COMP&C
does not really make sense. If you don't want to discuss that, just say it.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  I have no problem with that, except that it seems for you to be a
> "reason" to abandon reason,  democracy, etc.
I don't want to abandon reason, just give it its proper place as a servant
of consciousness, not master. Indeed I am happy to abandon democracy, as it
is just mob rule. Consciousness doesn't need rulers, as it is entirely able
to take care of itself.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  But this is ... the origin of suffering.
I'd like to hear evidence for that. Rational people suffer not less than
others, and almost all people in democracies suffer. Many people are not
very rational and appear very happy (for example al those eastern spiritual
masters, I don't think they value the rational intellect much) .

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> It can't have a point of view.
>> Nothing has a point of view in the sense you mean it.
> Numbers have already them, with reasonable definition.
The definition do not matter. I am only interested in what is actually the
case, not what one can interpret in some definitions.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> PA could have a point of view in a relative sense, if you choose to
>> indentify with PA and then defend its position. But one could as  
>> well say
>> that a triangle has a point of view, if I identify with it and  
>> defend its
>> "position" (imagining it has any).
> PA is a Löbian machine with deep self-reference abilities. I don't see  
> any for a triangle.
It has the ability self-reference. As it is a triangle, it references

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Can you find any number(s) flying around
>>>> that has any claim to an internal view right now?
>>> Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer
>>> only to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number
>>> can have.
>> Or, to put it another way, the 1-person will not feel to be a number  
>> at all;
>> and thus will not be a number(s), for all intents and purposes,
>> contradicting the very premise (maybe not logically, but it doesn't  
>> really
>> make sense to bet on being a machine if the conclusion says that for  
>> all
>> intents and purposes you are not a machine at all).
> You confuse the 1-person and the 3-person. It makes a sense to bet  
> that you 3-I is a number.
Why should I believe in an 3-I? I just know a 1-I. All "3-" things are not I
but merely objects. Isn't the meaning of 1-person, I? So what does 3-I even
The only thing I could think of is my relative terrestial I as the body, but
this is not a number, but a body. So what exactly would I bet on being a

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  Indeed the doctor can put your 3-I on some  
> hard disk. The sense is: using comp to live older, to travel long  
> distances, to make fun with the stars, etc.
You can try that, I am just betting all my money it won't work.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> You talk like if you knew something. This cannot be done when we do  
> science..
I know a lot of stuff, but nothing when it comes to the fundamental things,
you are right. I don't think these can be known. I am not speaking from
knowledge, I am just pointing towards experience with words.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Anyway, I doubt that you can find any number having a claim to an  
>> internal
>> view other than in you imagination.
> I doubt that too, but it is a matter of work to understand that it  
> follows from comp. You are perhaps just saying that you doubt comp,  
> and that suggests that you are not completely insane. I doubt comp  
> too, but I doubt all theories, so what?
> Or you are just saying that you dislike comp. Again, that is your  
> right, but that is not an argument.
I am trying to argue that COMP is (close to) nonsense. You might say this
just means I doubt or dislike COMP, OK.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> The only thing that you
>>>> can find is consciousness being conscious of itself (even an person
>>>> that
>>>> consciousness belongs to is absent, the person is just an object in
>>>> consciousness).
>>> Here you present a theory like if it was a fact.
>> This is not a theory. It is not even a fact, it is just observation.  
>> There
>> is consciousness, that is it. There is no person to find here,  
>> except as
>> certain forms in consciousness (feeling seperate, thinking of "I",  
>> feeling
>> to be in control, thinking of past and future,etc...).
> Same remark as above and in other post. You just can't let your inner  
> God to do the science.
I don't want to, either. It is just that consciousness is not graspable or
explainable by science.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> At
>> least it is obvious that anything at all is obvious.
> Why?
Obviously you just wrote "Why?"? ???

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> We can agree that it is
>> obvious that what is obvious is obvious.
> Actually some logics exist where even this is false. On the real  
> numbers x = x is not obvious. (that fact itself is not obvious!).
Gee, that's why I am not talking of some mathematical structure or some
logics. It is also obvious that what is obvious is sometimes non-obvious.
Nevertheless it is obvious. 

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> That is what I am talking about.
>> Why shouldn't we talk about that?
> We can talk on everything. Just avoid non valid reasoning if you want  
> convince other people.
I do not want to do valid reasoning, am I rather trying to point towards
something that does not need to be validated by reason.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> I don't know the answer to that question, but I can show that if that
>>> is the case (that you can survive without any conscious change with
>>> such a silicon prosthesis), then we have to come back to the
>>> Platonician theologies, and naturalism and weak materialism, despite
>>> being a fertile simplifying assumption (already done by nature) is
>>> wrong.
>> I don't buy your argument, even though I agree with part of the  
>> conclusion.
>> (better read the rest before responding to this, it may be  
>> unecessary): [Why
>> I don't buy your argument? It is a thought experiment that can't be  
>> carried
>> out in practice,
> I use the practical comp assumption in step 1-6, for pedagogical  
> reason, and eliminate it in step 7 and 8.
The same thing applies. For example you speak of virtual reconstitutions in
step 7, and that these are actual is just true within you thought
experiment, and not necessarily in reality.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> and the implications of thoughts experiments don't
>> necessarily apply in the real world,
> The real world is what we search.
So, if you don't even know what's real it makes it only more plausible that
your thought experiments don't apply in the "real world".

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  Also, I have no clue what you mean  
> by that given that only consciousness is real in your "theory".
Right, so I mean that the thought experiments won't necessarily apply in our
direct experience.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> so none of the conclusions are
>> necessarily valid. For example a substitution level is a theoretical
>> construct. In reality all substitution levels blur into each other via
>> quantum interference. Also there is no such thing as a perfect digital
>> machine, also due to quantum mechanics. It might be the case that some
>> digital machines work, and some don't.]
> QM is not part of the assumption.
See, yet in reality it still there. You can not rid yourself of reality be
not assuming it.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Actually if you are strict in the interpretation of COMP, like you  
>> want it
>> (so what I said above doesn't apply, because you assume quantum stuff
>> doesn't matter), your whole reasoning is tautological.
> A refutable theory cannot be tautological.
COMP itself can bre refuted, of course "yes" doctor can be refuted by
showing that actually no one survives with a digital brain. I am only saying
the reasoning is (almost) tautological, that it, it doesn't say much more
than what is already assumed at the beginning.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  Come on, you have admitted  
> not having studied the theory, and now you talk like if you did, when  
> clearly you did not.
What do you expect from me? I have read the reasoning and understood the
gist of it, of course I can't study 20 years computer science before I can
respond to the reasoning,...?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The "yes" you speak
>> of is really a yes towards being an immaterial machine, because you  
>> assume
>> that just the digital functioning of the actual device matters (and  
>> digital
>> functioning is not something that can be defined in terms of  
>> matter). And if
>> you (and everybody else) are *only* an immaterial machine, and thus  
>> you have
>> no world to be in, necessarily pysical reality has to come from that  
>> and
>> can't be primary. How could it if you assume that you are an  
>> *immaterial*
>> machine.
> This is not the argument. If it was I would not need the step 8.
Step 8 doesn't work if we are "digital"-material machine. You assume there
that experiences are associated to computations, not actual computations,
which are not mere computations in the sense of computer science. You are
arguing with precise computations, like in "For any given precise  running
computation associated  to some  inner experience,..." which don't exist if
we assume we are only "digital"-material machine.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> It is true that, by saying "yes" to the doctor, we can  
> already get the point that we are immaterial, but we can still believe  
> that we need a body to be conscious.
But if we are immaterial, but need the material, then we aren't really
immaterial after all, are we? I thought immaterial means "independent of

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> You just say "yes" if you buy your reasoning, because if the  
>> reasoning is
>> wrong you can't be an immaterial machine,
> here you make an error in logic. Th reasoning can be wrong, and yet  
> the conclusion true, for some other reason.
That's true. But that doesn't really matter with regards to this discussion.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> contradicting your "yes".
>> So in this case, you really just prove that if you say "yes", you  
>> say "yes",
>> which, well, is sort of obvious in the first place.
>> The problem is that no materialst is going to say yes in the precise  
>> way you
>> want it.
> Why is that a problem? On the contrary
The problem is that if just people that believe we are immaterial machine
say "yes", the conlusion that we are immaterial machine that dream up the
world, and the world has to be derived from the workings of the immaterial
machines is almost just a restatement of the assumption, making the
reasoning quite empty as an argument (but a nice explanation of the

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> They will have to argue the particular instantiation of the digital
>> machine matter, making them say "NO", as they don't agree with a  
>> digital
>> substitution in the way you mean it.
> I meant in in the usual clinical sense of suriving some medical  
> operation. The immateriality is a non trivial consequences, needing  
> all the steps of the reasoning. You cannot refute an argument by  
> simplifying it and criticize *your* simplification of it.
The reasoning doesn't work just with the assumption that we survive some
medical operation.The reasoning assumes that just the digital functioning of
the device matters. We may survive, even if not just the digital functioning
of the device matters.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> For them a  digital substitution means
>> a particular digital machine, which is actually not *purely*  
>> digital, making
>> them say "NO".
> On the contrary, to refute the argument they have to say yes.
Yes. So what? If all materialist say no, the reasoning makes no sense to
refute materialism.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> If they say "no", it just means that they believe that there is no level
> of  
> comp substitution.
Right, that is the point. There can just be a precise level of correct
substitution if we already assume we are immaterial machine, because matter
has no precise levels, making the reason invalid for the purpose of refuting
materialism. If the premise already excludes materialism, it is of no use to
refute it.


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