On 10 Oct 2011, at 22:50, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Oct 2011, at 18:29, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent
logic
with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't
turn
blue or taste like broccoli.
Assuming non-comp.
There is no assumption needed for that. It is a category error to
say
arithmetics turns into a taste. It is also a category error to say
that
arithmetic has an internal view.
If by arithmetic you mean some theory/machine like PA, you *are*
using
non comp.
The point is that we don't need any assumptions for that. It is just
an
observation. There is only the internal view viewing into itself,
and it
belongs to no one. It is just not possible to find an owner, simply
because
only objects can be owned. It is a category error to say
subjectivity
(consciousness) can be owned, just like, for example, numbers
can't be
owned.
We have discuss this. You are not aware that we search an explanation
for matter and consciousness.
I am aware of that. It is obvious that this is what you searching.
The point
is, if you try to explain concsciousness you are applying a concept to
something that just doesn't fit what is talked about.
I agree. That is part of the difficulty.
Explaining
consciousness in the sense you mean it (explain it *from* something)
is
nonsense, as consciousness is already required *before* anything at
all can
arise.
This is not valid. I need consciousness, like a need a brain, to
understand consciousness or the working of the brain.
Like I need logic to to do metalogic.
Perhaps you are asking for some kind of total or complete explanation,
but this does not exist for anything.
The nice thing is that we can "explain consciousness" by showing that
machine introspecting herself are lead to a term "#" which can help us
to understand they see the problem, and should perhaps not be
considered as zombie.
Machine can understand that such a "#" run deep, is non communicable,
cannot be explain, etc.
An explanation *from something* can just work if what you explain
from exists prior to that what is to be explained.
"exists prior" is ambiguous (especilly for a non believer in a
fundamental time).
No numbers can arise
without consciousness, and therefore consciousnes can't be explained
from
them.
But numbers do not belong to the category of what arise. Numbers never
arise. The category error is here.
And it is quasi obvious that if we assume comp, consciousness has
something to do with number relations, given that some number relation
emulates computation, in the sense of Turing, Church & Co.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
As soon as you use
Gödel, you go beyond arithmetic, making the label "arithmetical
truth" close
to meaningless.
Godel's prove does not go beyond arithmetic. PA can prove its own
Gödel's theorem.
Where in arithmetic is the axiom that numbers can encode things?
You don't need such an axiom. You can prove the existence of encoding
just by using the usual axioms.
How does
Gödel prove work if they can't encode things?
But number can encode things? They can even prove that they can encode
things. I can explain the detail in some period where I have more
time, or you can consult any textbook on the subject.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It makes as much sense to say that a
concept has an internal view.
nternal view just applies to the only thing
that can have/is a view, namely consciousness.
It applies to person.
No. There is no person to find that has consciousness.
This is depriving the littele ego, man, from having conscious
experience. That makes me chill.
Of course, it is threatening to the ego. The little ego has no
conscious
experience. It is an object within the conscious experience.
You talk from experience. If that can inspire you for a theory, bring
the theory, not the experience.
Your "threatening of the ego" is frightening coming from someone
saying "no" to the doctor.
You can evacuate "your" little ego like that, but not the other one,
nor the machine's one.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
You statement contradict the whole endeavor of science,
Yes, if science thinks it can explain fundamental things.
Science explains nothing. Science put some light, including on its
limitation.
It can relatively
explain local things, and describe things very well, and be a good
tool for
development of technology.
If you confine science on this, irrationalism will crop up in the
fundamental, and we already know the amount of despair and suffering
this leads to.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
and even of life.
Life is not for the ego, life is for God.
Er... I am not sure of that. It is rather ambiguous also.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is like saying "look we will go in heaven, so why not kill
ourselves right now to end the suffering".
Killing ourselves will solve nothing, as we are just leaving a
relative
body, which doesn't solve any fundamental problem.
I think you miss my point. It was an analogy.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
There is a physical universe and observers in it, even if
those things are not primary.
That's true.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Theories concern them.
Yes, that's true also, but there is no theory that captures the
whole of it.
there is no theory that capture the whole of arithmetic too.
If COMP does (except the 1% part that you acknowledge can't be
explained),
just give concrete predictions of physical measurements, and then it
will be
plausible.
1) it gives them, indeed all of them, for each notion of knowledge
that you can define. But you have to understand this by yourself. The
explanation is UDA. There is no choice in the matter.
2) COMP is a widespread belief already use in many fields. I think
that it is interesting that it leads to a different conception of
reality.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
And yes, theology has a word in that, but not as a tool for
eliminating
the quanta. You
are doing the inverse error of the aristotelian. They eliminate soul
and person, and you eliminate the observable quantitative patterns.
In
fine, you argue against rationalism and science.
Of course there are observable quantitative patterns, how could one
deny
that?
Read the list or the literature. For any proposition, there is always
someone ready to deny them.
I just say they can't be captured by any theory
I don't like that. This is exactly the "shut up and don't even try to
understand". This is what pseudo-theologian argues forcefully but only
to preserve a fake power.
You might say "cannot be captured entirely", but anyone has the right
to suggest hypotheses and reasoning in any field. Questions makes
always sense.
I think you might attribute to me pretensions that I do not have.
and can just be
discovered by observation.
Of course, here I believe the contrary.
I might say that knowledge is what we can get despite observation.
With observation you get only belief.
All evidence we have right now points to that, no
one managed to give a theory that predicts our particular patterns
from a
priori principles.
But it is true that I argue for extending our view into realms of
trans-rationalism and post-science, and in this sense I argue
against using
rationalism and science where the former are more adequate
(fundamental
questions about reality).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
this is just a
manner of speaking that I borrowed from "a person having
consciousness", I
think the former is more accurate than the latter. Actually
consciousness
just is (and through that it knows itself).
Not in practice, hereby, in our terrestrial conditions.
Especially, even *only* in practice. Consciousness is entirely beyond
theories and in this sense totally practical.
Well that fits well with comp too. Unless you interpret this
normatively by condemning all theories attempting to put light on what
is consciousness.
I sincerily believe that if we know ourselves to be consciousness,
all other
problems solve themselves. Simply because consciousness is the
source of
all, and also the source of all solutions to problems, and just if
we know
ourselves to be it we can really harness that.
That is saying too much; You are killing your theory.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
A comatose might be conscious or not, and a doctor deciding this
can make
the
difference between (terrestrial ) life and (terrestrial ) death.
In this case we are speaking of a particular manifest aspect of
consciousness.
Yes. The usual ego.
Indeed it can be there or absent, but this has nothing to do
with consciousness as such,
?
so I don't know what this has to do with COMP
claiming to explain consciousness.
COMP has never claim to explain consciousness. It formulates the mind
body problem and it gives a good (but incomplete) explanation fro
consciousness (the machine's trust in some reality) and it shows that
the hard thing which remains to be explain is the hard problem of
matter (explaining physics without postulating primitive physical
things).
COMP explains consciousness as far as you grasp the argument, but it
starts from a miracle which is that you can be incarnated locally
through a digital physical brain.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is not a belief, this is
just the obvious reality right now.
Obvious for you.
Obvious for anyone (as there is only one that can be consciousness
of
obviousness, namely consciousness).
You cannot talk like if everyone smoked salvia. You are missing the
coming back step. you should read the chan and zen masters.
Coming back from what? From the obviousness of now? There is no
coming back
from this. The obviousness can only be eclipsed.
But that's obviousness is the one of the first person. It is easy to
not deny it for oneself, but that is not the problem: the problems are
more could that other moving (or not) bodies, like machines or
comatose people, incarnate conscious person. And that is never
obvious, as your reasonable doubt on comp already illustrates.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
without any owner.
Only when "enlightened". This is without purpose on earth. In Lobian
term you confuse G and G*. You are inconsistent.
Whether one is enlightened or not doesn't determine the fundamental
reality
of consciousness. All there is is an experience of an owner (of a
conceptual
image of consciousness), no actual owner can be found, as
consciousness is
not an object and so can't be owned.
I can be OK. But I am not sure you can say this without making it
false. And it is not relevant to the point of comp and its concequences.
Also you miss the whole purpose of enlightenment if you think it is
without
purpose on earth.
I have never said that.
It just means awakening to the source of everything,
yourself, and thus it helps to manifest the source in this world,
also.
Good news.
All
our problems and strifes are created by thinking (and feeling) we are
seperate individual that have enemies, that we have to protect
against, or
any seperate lovers, that we have to be attached to, in order to not
lose
them.
That's naive.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But is it obvious that PA is conscious: I don't think
so. Nevertheless, in case it is conscious, it is obvious from her
point of view. It is that obviousness we are looking a theory for.
PA is just an object within consciousness.
No. Here we differ. You assume consciousness to be primitive, but
then
you are just saying "no" to the doctor.
Indeed I do. I am just arguing that the whole thought construct of
COMP&C
does not really make sense.
In your theory.
If you don't want to discuss that, just say it.
You are defeating yourself here.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I have no problem with that, except that it seems for you to be a
"reason" to abandon reason, democracy, etc.
I don't want to abandon reason, just give it its proper place as a
servant
of consciousness, not master.
No problem with that. But I am not sure you do that.
Indeed I am happy to abandon democracy, as it
is just mob rule. Consciousness doesn't need rulers, as it is
entirely able
to take care of itself.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But this is ... the origin of suffering.
I'd like to hear evidence for that. Rational people suffer not less
than
others, and almost all people in democracies suffer. Many people are
not
very rational and appear very happy (for example al those eastern
spiritual
masters, I don't think they value the rational intellect much) .
The opposition between reason and mysticism is a recent human social
schizophrenia maintained by bandits. You are playing for them by
insisting on that separation. I'm afraid.
In the east, rationalism is as much present, if not more, than in the
west, especially in the fundamentals.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It can't have a point of view.
Nothing has a point of view in the sense you mean it.
Numbers have already them, with reasonable definition.
The definition do not matter. I am only interested in what is
actually the
case, not what one can interpret in some definitions.
Sure. But numbers too. Still when we talk on a complex subject we can
ask for definition.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
PA could have a point of view in a relative sense, if you choose to
indentify with PA and then defend its position. But one could as
well say
that a triangle has a point of view, if I identify with it and
defend its
"position" (imagining it has any).
PA is a Löbian machine with deep self-reference abilities. I don't
see
any for a triangle.
It has the ability self-reference. As it is a triangle, it references
itself.
Not in the sense of a brain or a computer representing the owner of
the brain, or the computer. Like in most theories of mind.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Can you find any number(s) flying around
that has any claim to an internal view right now?
Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will
refer
only to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number
can have.
Or, to put it another way, the 1-person will not feel to be a number
at all;
and thus will not be a number(s), for all intents and purposes,
contradicting the very premise (maybe not logically, but it doesn't
really
make sense to bet on being a machine if the conclusion says that for
all
intents and purposes you are not a machine at all).
You confuse the 1-person and the 3-person. It makes a sense to bet
that you 3-I is a number.
Why should I believe in an 3-I?
Have you never been to doctor?
I just know a 1-I.
But you can still belief in bodies and other persons, all right. You
are not solipsist. Or you are still confusing the three principal
hypostases (God, the divine reason, and the soul).
All "3-" things are not I
but merely objects.
But you can believe in them (and be neutral about their fundamental
nature).
Isn't the meaning of 1-person, I? So what does 3-I even
mean?
Me, as seen locally by a tierce person. "My body" which I can trust a
doctor to study in case of health problem, etc.
The only thing I could think of is my relative terrestial I as the
body, but
this is not a number, but a body. So what exactly would I bet on
being a
number?
The number here is just the description of the body, or some body state.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Indeed the doctor can put your 3-I on some
hard disk. The sense is: using comp to live older, to travel long
distances, to make fun with the stars, etc.
You can try that, I am just betting all my money it won't work.
You seem so sure.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
You talk like if you knew something. This cannot be done when we do
science..
I know a lot of stuff, but nothing when it comes to the fundamental
things,
you are right.
That contradicts what you just said.
I don't think these can be known. I am not speaking from
knowledge, I am just pointing towards experience with words.
Which is better to avoid, especially in science approaching the notion
of experience.
It is not valid.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Anyway, I doubt that you can find any number having a claim to an
internal
view other than in you imagination.
I doubt that too, but it is a matter of work to understand that it
follows from comp. You are perhaps just saying that you doubt comp,
and that suggests that you are not completely insane. I doubt comp
too, but I doubt all theories, so what?
Or you are just saying that you dislike comp. Again, that is your
right, but that is not an argument.
I am trying to argue that COMP is (close to) nonsense. You might say
this
just means I doubt or dislike COMP, OK.
Ah? But I have seen nothing making comp nonsense in your talks, except
reference to your experience, which can't help us.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The only thing that you
can find is consciousness being conscious of itself (even an
person
that
consciousness belongs to is absent, the person is just an object
in
consciousness).
Here you present a theory like if it was a fact.
This is not a theory. It is not even a fact, it is just observation.
There
is consciousness, that is it. There is no person to find here,
except as
certain forms in consciousness (feeling seperate, thinking of "I",
feeling
to be in control, thinking of past and future,etc...).
Same remark as above and in other post. You just can't let your inner
God to do the science.
I don't want to, either. It is just that consciousness is not
graspable or
explainable by science.
That's true. You should love the Löbian machine, they are already
saying that.
That statement of yours confirms comp. It does not refute it.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At
least it is obvious that anything at all is obvious.
Why?
Obviously you just wrote "Why?"? ???
No. It means I do not understand the sentence.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
We can agree that it is
obvious that what is obvious is obvious.
Actually some logics exist where even this is false. On the real
numbers x = x is not obvious. (that fact itself is not obvious!).
Gee, that's why I am not talking of some mathematical structure or
some
logics. It is also obvious that what is obvious is sometimes non-
obvious.
Nevertheless it is obvious.
OK. You win. What is obvious is obvious.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
That is what I am talking about.
Why shouldn't we talk about that?
We can talk on everything. Just avoid non valid reasoning if you want
convince other people.
I do not want to do valid reasoning, am I rather trying to point
towards
something that does not need to be validated by reason.
Then you mlight suggest some help for people, but without referring
explicitly to the experience, which is beyond word.
But going from the obviousness and directness of the conscious
experience to machines can't be conscious, or to "brains are not
computers" is quite a jump.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't know the answer to that question, but I can show that if
that
is the case (that you can survive without any conscious change with
such a silicon prosthesis), then we have to come back to the
Platonician theologies, and naturalism and weak materialism,
despite
being a fertile simplifying assumption (already done by nature) is
wrong.
I don't buy your argument, even though I agree with part of the
conclusion.
(better read the rest before responding to this, it may be
unecessary): [Why
I don't buy your argument? It is a thought experiment that can't be
carried
out in practice,
I use the practical comp assumption in step 1-6, for pedagogical
reason, and eliminate it in step 7 and 8.
The same thing applies. For example you speak of virtual
reconstitutions in
step 7, and that these are actual is just true within you thought
experiment, and not necessarily in reality.
That's the point of theorizing.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
and the implications of thoughts experiments don't
necessarily apply in the real world,
The real world is what we search.
So, if you don't even know what's real it makes it only more
plausible that
your thought experiments don't apply in the "real world".
They apply on the context of what I assume. That's science. It is
modest. It search truth, but never pretend to have it. Only pseudo-
scientists and pseudo-priests can do that.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Also, I have no clue what you mean
by that given that only consciousness is real in your "theory".
Right, so I mean that the thought experiments won't necessarily
apply in our
direct experience.
Assuming non-comp, you can indeed be sure, but it begs the question.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
so none of the conclusions are
necessarily valid. For example a substitution level is a theoretical
construct. In reality all substitution levels blur into each other
via
quantum interference. Also there is no such thing as a perfect
digital
machine, also due to quantum mechanics. It might be the case that
some
digital machines work, and some don't.]
QM is not part of the assumption.
See, yet in reality it still there.
Where?
You can not rid yourself of reality be
not assuming it.
???
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Actually if you are strict in the interpretation of COMP, like you
want it
(so what I said above doesn't apply, because you assume quantum
stuff
doesn't matter), your whole reasoning is tautological.
A refutable theory cannot be tautological.
COMP itself can bre refuted, of course "yes" doctor can be refuted by
showing that actually no one survives with a digital brain.
That would not refute comp. That would refute this or that level. To
refute comp you have to extract a fact from it, and shows that nature
contradicts that fact.
I am only saying
the reasoning is (almost) tautological, that it, it doesn't say much
more
than what is already assumed at the beginning.
Explain then why almost all scientist believe in comp, and yet are
worrying about the reversal it implies. Explain why all atheists are
materialist and mechanist. It is just not completely obvious that
mechanism is incompatible with (weak) materialism.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Come on, you have admitted
not having studied the theory, and now you talk like if you did, when
clearly you did not.
What do you expect from me? I have read the reasoning and understood
the
gist of it, of course I can't study 20 years computer science before
I can
respond to the reasoning,...?
The UDA is complete in itself, with a rough idea on what is the UD,
and why it is plausible that it exists (by Church thesis).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The "yes" you speak
of is really a yes towards being an immaterial machine, because you
assume
that just the digital functioning of the actual device matters (and
digital
functioning is not something that can be defined in terms of
matter). And if
you (and everybody else) are *only* an immaterial machine, and thus
you have
no world to be in, necessarily pysical reality has to come from that
and
can't be primary. How could it if you assume that you are an
*immaterial*
machine.
This is not the argument. If it was I would not need the step 8.
Step 8 doesn't work if we are "digital"-material machine. You assume
there
that experiences are associated to computations, not actual
computations,
which are not mere computations in the sense of computer science.
?
No, I do the contrary. I assume we are digital material machine, and
get the epistemological contradiction from that.
Which version of MGA are you reading. Please quote my text, because it
don't see what you are referring too.
You are
arguing with precise computations, like in "For any given precise
running
computation associated to some inner experience,..." which don't
exist if
we assume we are only "digital"-material machine.
Yes, I assume comp also. Your current computer is a digital material
machine.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is true that, by saying "yes" to the doctor, we can
already get the point that we are immaterial, but we can still
believe
that we need a body to be conscious.
But if we are immaterial, but need the material, then we aren't really
immaterial after all, are we? I thought immaterial means
"independent of
material".
It is like in the dreams, or like in the matrix. We need stable
patterns to let the computations be stable relatively to us. The point
will be that such "matter" is a construct of consciousness.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
You just say "yes" if you buy your reasoning, because if the
reasoning is
wrong you can't be an immaterial machine,
here you make an error in logic. Th reasoning can be wrong, and yet
the conclusion true, for some other reason.
That's true. But that doesn't really matter with regards to this
discussion.
Then it means your point was not relevant for the discussion.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
contradicting your "yes".
So in this case, you really just prove that if you say "yes", you
say "yes",
which, well, is sort of obvious in the first place.
The problem is that no materialst is going to say yes in the precise
way you
want it.
Why is that a problem? On the contrary
The problem is that if just people that believe we are immaterial
machine
say "yes", the conlusion that we are immaterial machine that dream
up the
world, and the world has to be derived from the workings of the
immaterial
machines is almost just a restatement of the assumption, making the
reasoning quite empty as an argument (but a nice explanation of the
hypothesis).
NO. many people see quickly that comp makes us immaterial, but still
believe that there is a primary material universe, and that we have to
pstulate the physical las, where I show that we have to derived the
laws from computer science.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
They will have to argue the particular instantiation of the digital
machine matter, making them say "NO", as they don't agree with a
digital
substitution in the way you mean it.
I meant in in the usual clinical sense of suriving some medical
operation. The immateriality is a non trivial consequences, needing
all the steps of the reasoning. You cannot refute an argument by
simplifying it and criticize *your* simplification of it.
The reasoning doesn't work just with the assumption that we survive
some
medical operation.
Then show me the flaw.
The reasoning assumes that just the digital functioning of
the device matters.
That is ambiguous.
We may survive, even if not just the digital functioning
of the device matters.
What should be add?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
For them a digital substitution means
a particular digital machine, which is actually not *purely*
digital, making
them say "NO".
On the contrary, to refute the argument they have to say yes.
Yes. So what? If all materialist say no, the reasoning makes no
sense to
refute materialism.
It does not refute at all materialism. It refute materialism +
mechanism. Indeed the materialist who says no like you and Craig
should love UDA (but can hate AUDA; which keep mechanism, despite UDA,
and go on to show it mlakes sense already to the UMs and LUMs).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If they say "no", it just means that they believe that there is no
level
of
comp substitution.
Right, that is the point. There can just be a precise level of correct
substitution if we already assume we are immaterial machine, because
matter
has no precise levels, making the reason invalid for the purpose of
refuting
materialism. If the premise already excludes materialism, it is of
no use to
refute it.
The premise might quickly (for some people) refutes that we are
material, not that the universe is immaterial.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
