Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:51, benjayk wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 08 Oct 2011, at 13:14, benjayk wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>> On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
>>>>>>> I don't see why.
>>>>>>> Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about
>>>>>>> numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for
>>>>>>> others.
>>>>>> Well, we don't need concrete *physical* objects, necessarily, but
>>>>>> concrete
>>>>>> "mental" objects, for example measurement. What do numbers mean
>>>>>> without any
>>>>>> concrete object, or measurement? What does 1+1=2 mean if there
>>>>>> nothing to
>>>>>> measure or count about the object in question?
>>>>> It means that when you add the successor of zero with itself you  
>>>>> get
>>>>> the successor of one, or the successor of the successor of zero.
>>>> But that does this *mean*? These are just a bunch of words. You
>>>> could as
>>>> well write
>>>> "It means that when you colmüd the pööl of ämpod with itself you
>>>> get
>>>> the pööl of trübda, or the pööl of the pööl of ämpod.".
>>> Exactly! That is the point of axiomatization.
>>> Hilbert said this to explain what his axiomatic geometry means: "you
>>> can replace the terms 'points', 'lines', and 'planes', by  the term
>>> 'elephant', 'table' and 'glass of bear'.
>>> Now, doing this would not be pedagogical, and we use the most  
>>> commonly
>>> used symbols. That is "+" for colmüd, "s" for pööl, and the symbol
>>> "0" for your ämpod. We already have some axioms for logic and
>>> equality, and all you need consists in agreeing or not with the
>>> following principles:
>>> 0 ≠ s(x)
>>> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
>>> x+0 = x
>>> x+s(y) = s(x+y)
>>> x*0=0
>>> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>>> The intended meaning being 0 is not a successor of any number, etc.
>>> You can say "the ämpod is different from all pööls". No problem,  
>>> but
>>> it is obviously quite unpedagogical, I think.
>> You don't get the point. Of course I can agree with these principles
>> concerning countable and measureable things.
> But then, unless you see a flaw in the reasoning, you should know that  
> at the obtic level, we don't need more, nor can we use more than the  
> countable collection of finite things, once we assume mechanism.
For the flaw in the reasoning, see my post above.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The point is that successor and 0 become meaningless, or just mere  
>> symbols,
>> when removed from that context.
> What context are you talking about. The theory is interpretation  
> independent. The interpretations themselves are part of model theory.  
> For using the axiom you need only the inference rules.
But just rules give just rules.
The context I am talking about are particular measurements, or particular
countable things. COMP uses it outside of this context, making it

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> I don't agree with these axioms removed from any context, as without  
>> it,
>> they are meaningless. I don't necessarily disagree with them,  
>> either, I just
>> treat them as mere symbols then.
> They are much more than that. There are symbols + finitist rule of  
> manipulation.
Which are just symols as well. The rules are just more then symbols with
unspecified meaning if they represent something.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  The difference is as big as the difference between what  
> you can feel looking at the string "z_n+1 = (z_n)^2 + c" and what you  
> can feel looking at a rendering of what it describes, like this:
This just works if we give the rules meaning in terms of particular objects,
namely pixels on the screen. In this context they aren't removed from
context, because an image of a screen with measureable distance is an
obvious context for numbers.
The equation without an geometrical context means very little to an average
human (of course to mathematician it means a lot in terms of other
mathematical things, which is no valid context for the average human).
COMP doesn't give an adequate context. If it would, you could give
particular predictions of what COMP entails in term of measureable or
countable objects.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Of course we can still use them in a meta-sense by using .. = "2" as a
>> representation for, say a nose, and ... = "3" as a representation  
>> for a rose
>> and succesor= "+1" as a representation for smelling, and then 2+1=3  
>> means
>> that a nose smells a rose. But then we could just as well use any  
>> other
>> symbol, like ß or more meaningfully ":o) o-".
> I am not sure that you are serious.
I am serious, I just presented it in a ";)"-manner.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  There are intented meaning, and logics is a science which study the
> departure between intended meaning and a mathematical study of meaning.
> Logic studied both the  
> syntactical transformation (a bit like neurophysiologist study the  
> neuronal firings) and the space of the possible interpretations.  
> Interesting things happen for the machine doing that on themselves.
This is a lot of talk of how meaningful it is without presenting any actual
relevant meaning. 

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Personally, I might prefer to use the combinators. But we have to
>>> agree on some principle about some initial universal system to see  
>>> how
>>> they reflect UDA, in such a way that we can explain the quanta and  
>>> the
>>> qualia, with the comp assumption in the background, and in the theory
>>> itself.
>> Yes, you can use any universal system, which is going to be just as
>> meaningless as numbers.
> That is like saying that a brain, which only manipulate finite  
> meaningless information pattern (assuming comp) is useless.
No, because it is an actual existing real object, you can interact with,
therefore it is not useless.
Also, numbers are of course not useless in general, just in the context you
are using it. So you could say in the context you are using it, that is, in
the context of a TOE, the brain is pretty useless also. It can just generate
a lot of words and concepts, but no useful TOE is actually found.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Are you just telling me that, like Craig, you assume non-comp?
No, I am saying COMP doesn't make sense, or at the very least is extremely
That is the only thing we can discuss, given that your reasoning is just a
restatement (or explantation) of the axiom that we are immaterial machine
("yes" doctor). The conclusion that if we are immaterial machine then matter
is just an appearance that follows from that is pretty trivial, so I surely
don't disagree there.
If you don't want to discuss COMP, then just say that and I'll stop talking
with you about that subject. It is just a bit dishonest to ask for a flaw of
the reasoning, apart from the axioms, if the reasoning itself is just an
explanation of the axiom. Your explanation is fine, if you want to hear

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Let's take a programming language. When the code says "while(i<5)  
>> then i++;
>> print "Nose smells rose" end" then this make sense for the user as  
>> he can
>> read "nose smells rose". But in an abstract context, "nose smells  
>> rose" has
>> no particular meaning and the while loop is just a loop, which also  
>> has no
>> particular meaning (though it has a particular function).
> This is false, it has a meaning (mainly that if the condition occur it  
> has to print some string). What you do with that information is more  
> complex, as it needs to study your brain, body, context (indeed). But  
> you illustrate that you agree that "xhile (i<5) ..." has a meaning.
Yes, but only in a limited context. *That is the point*.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Obviously, it has nothing to do with rose and smell. But both  
> mechanist cogniticians and reseracher in AI are not *that* naive.  
> Smell and rose require deeper loops, like the LUMs can manage (but not  
> a two line program).
Smell and rose can't arise out of mechanical loops. They are objects in
consciousness. If you claim they can arise out of them, just give me a
program that produces a smell of a rose. It's not possible. Even if you
write a detailed simulation, I can't smell it!

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> No matter what the
>> programming code says, it only makes sense through a user, or an  
>> intelligent
>> programmer.
> Comp entails  that self-referential machines (UMs and LUMs) can do that.
But COMP doesn't make sense. If you think it does, just make any statement
that has something to do with the actual world we live in. Yes, we are
immaterial, this is the part of the axiom that makes sense.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Are you telling me that a human having got an artificial digital brain  
> is a zombie?
There are no humans with artificial digital brains, and I don't think there
will ever be, so the question is meaningless.
If you are asking if someone who is stupid enough to replace his brain with
a computer is a zombie? Well he isn't, he is just dead.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> But you remove it from that context also, leaving no meaning
>> left, except empty symbol manipulation which could mean anything
> So a brain in a vat would be unable to make a person feeling like  
> living a dream?
I believe dreams are more primary than brains, brains are something
appearing in the more stable "dreams", so this question can't be answered.
If being a brain in a vat appear as content of consciousness, you are
probably *really* dreaming (in the ordinary sense), or you are watching a
moive where something like this happens and for a moment identitfy with the
brain in the vat.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I get more and more the feeling that you are assuming non-comp.
I am not assuming non-comp, I am observing that non-comp is  the case.
Consciousness doesn't arise out of anything (it doesn't arise at all, except
out of it self, if you want to say it this way), it is just there, therefore
metaphysical COMP&C is false.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> All the (formal) universal systems you can name have the exact same  
>> flaw as
>> numbers.
>> They only make sense in a context, otherwise they just function as
>> symbols making them as useful as saying
>> "ÜGFDÖÜGÖGÜÖFGÜFGÄFÄFÄFGÄFG--#-äsd#-ds#-d##" and then  
>> explaining that this
>> means "earth".
> If that is a flaw, do you agree that you can say the same thing about  
> brains? (even without comp, actually).
No, because brains make sense to us, directly (we can even touch them under
some circumstances and they reflect many of our inner processes if we
observe them), while "ÜGFDÖÜGÖGÜÖFGÜFGÄFÄFÄFGÄFG--#-äsd#-ds#-d##" does not
(unless you know some secret code or something).
If you mean whether brains make only sense in a context, well, obviously

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> This is what COMP&C (this means comp and conlusion) does. It makes a  
>> lot of
>> complicated assumption and long-winded explantions and  
>> interpretation of
>> symbols, just to conclude that the 1-p (which is practically the only
>> perspective there is) cannot be captured by any rational means anyway.
> But it get good formal approximation at the metalevel. Indeed, it can  
> even explain why it has to jump from a level to another to understand  
> its non formal nature.
Not really. The explanation is just intelligible with a lot of words
additional words to explain the explanation, so the actual explanation uses
something beyond numbers, which can't even be formalized (natural language).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Then
>> it claims to be a refutable theory, but without making any particular
>> prediction that is not obvious already.
> This is a gratuitous false assumption showing you don't take the time  
> to study the work, as you have already confess.
Instead of making these assertions, just give a concrete prediction of some
physical measurement, or predict the contents of my dreams, or something.
Maybe I have missed these in your work, in this case I am apologizing, and I
will begin to take COMP seriously, but please point to them to make it
easier for me.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  You seem to just have  
> a prejudice against machine. You believe that you are different. It is  
> your right, but you might try an argument.
I have no prejudice whatsoever against machines. Of course I am different, I
am not a machine.
I just take a unbiased look at reality, there is not much need to argue for
it. If you want this is the argument: If one just looks at what is obviously
here, one doesn't find any machines in ones consciousness that somehow give
rise to it. The only place I find machines are when I use my rational mind
and apply it to this quite abstract concept.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> If you just have a bunch of words without being able to make sense
>>>> of them,
>>>> everything you "derive" from it will just be whatever you happen to
>>>> interpret in a bunch of non-sensical words.
>>> The axioms above are used by all scientists everyday, implicitly or
>>> explicitly.
>> Of course they are! I say nothing to the contrary. The axioms are  
>> used as
>> *tools* because they reflect some aspect of reality.
> This contradicts what you said above.
What exactly?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Then the point is that by assuming comp ("yes doctor"), the observable  
> feature of reality are explainable from that aspect of reality, and we  
> don't need to make anything else explicit. We get also the  
> communicable and non communicable part of that (epistemological)  
> reality.
If this is true, just communicate the communicable part and make concrete
predictions. Saying physics is non-boolean and follows quantum logic is not
a concrete prediction, it is neither concrete, nor a prediction.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> But they can only be
>> used where this is the case, namely comparable measurements and  
>> countable
>> things.
> On the contrary. It explains why machines, even if they desire to  
> grasp their countable bahaviors only, HAVE to believe in the  
> uncountable, big infinities, etc.
Then show what the axioms mean apart from comparable measurements and 
countable things. It does not count to just interpret whatever you want into
them, because this has nothing to do with numbers (or any thing computable
for that matter) in particular.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> COMP claims to explain quanta and qualia, which as such are not
>> measurable and countable (of course particular quanta can be  
>> measured, but
>> not quanta as such), therefore it uses a tool that is useless in this
>> endavour (and useless here means meaningless).
> Hmm... What can I say. from this I can only encourage you to study the  
> theory.
This is just not possible if you can't explain what even only the axioms
mean, except giving definitions that explain nothing at all, or refer to
numbers in their usual sense, that makes no sense, as you don't refer to
anything in particular that is countable or measurable.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The result is the same as
>> just using the axioms p and ~p. You get whatever you manage to  
>> interpret
>> into the axioms, which doesn't mainly depend on the axiom, but  
>> rather your
>> compassity to be creative with your ability of interpretation.
> I just assume we can survive with digital brain, and then I explain  
> that Aristotle naturalism must be replaced by Platonian form of  
> reality view.
This argument just goes through if a digital brain is purely digital, which
is just not the case in practice. There are no "pure" digital machines. If
the digital machines are not actually digital, but just approximately, and
fundamentally are material, or made of spririt, no conlusion can be drawn
that rests on the basis that there are actual pure digital machines and a
correct substitution level.
If you insists that they are, then you just have the conlusion in the axiom,
since pure digital machine would necessarily be immaterial, making them
independent of material reality, and as you assume we are them, they have to
be the actual reality.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> What you say does not make sense.
>> Then just explain what numbers mean.
> The numbers are the object of discussion. They *are* the meaning, when  
> I talk about them.
If they are the meaning, what is the meaning? Or do you mean numbers are
meaning itself? If this is the case, what's the evidence for that?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  If you have forget what they mean, just buy a book  
> on arithmetic.
They just provide definitions, or explain numbers as measurement devices of
(relatively) concrete things (for example lines on paper, in the case of
graphs or geometry).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  Then computer science explain how numbers can develop  
> themselves and becomes conscious (together with the whole context of  
> arithmetic), etc.
No, it doesn't. If it does, give an explanation, or link to an explantion,
how consciousness can rise out of anything other than consciousness. Just
interpreting consciousness into numbers doesn't count. I can just as well
interpret consciounsess into apples.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> You could have asked me what is the meaning of "brain", or of "neural  
> firing".
That would be entirely justified if you wanted to make a TOE based on brains
or neuronal firing.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> And no, repeating the axioms does not
>> constitute an explantion. They just make (obvious) sense with  
>> regards to
>> countable things. Please explain the sense beyond that.
> Once you are willing to suppose that your physical brain is a finite  
> machine, then many things I am saying are rather easy to figure out.  
Obviously they are not. Many people here expressed problems with what you
say, and this probably doesn't mean that all of them are terribly ignorant.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> If not, then you are obliged to study computer science to get the  
> point that numbers can at least behave (relatively to other numbers)  
> in an intelligent way.
As it happens, I do study computer science full-time (well, full-time in
theory at least :D). There is nothing at all there that explains that
numbers behave in an intelligent way, except in the usual sense that they
are a useful structure, and in that sense "behave" "intelligently".

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> What axioms are you disagreeing with?
>> All. They make little to no sense in the context you use them.
> You could say: Einstein theory of gravitation makes no sense at all.  
Right, in the context of explaining the fundamental reality it doesn't. It
is just a useful theory, because it predicts useful, concrete things. COMP
doesn't, or if it does, I haven't yet seen it (then please mention it, with
precise numbers).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> The guy does not explain why 1+1=2, but is using all the time that idea.
Yes and this makes perfect sense, as he deals with things that are actually
measurable, like time and space. In this context I know what 1+1=2 means, as
I am not complete moron. ;)

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> If for you something like " different natural numbers have different  
> successors" makes no sense, I can hardly help you.
Of course it does make sense. I never pretended the opposite. It seems you
are just ignoring what I say. I am saying it makes no sense to use them out
of the context that they are describing, namely measurable or countable
things. But COMP wants to explain quanta and qualia as such (of course *a
part of them in concrete instances* is measurable, I am not denying that),
which is just nonsense, as numbers don't relate to these things in a precise
way (as far as I can see). So I am asking you to make sense of the axioms of
numbers *with respect to this*.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>> The diophantine equation x^2 = 2y^2 has no solution. That fact  
>>>>>>> does
>>>>>>> not seem to me to depend on any concreteness, and I would say  
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> concreteness is something relative. You seem to admit that naive
>>>>>>> materialism might be false, so why would little "concrete" pieces
>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>> stuff, or time, helps in understanding that no matter what: there
>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>> no natural numbers, different from 0, capable to satisfy the  
>>>>>>> simple
>>>>>>> equation x^2 = 2y^2.
>>>>>> This is just a consequence of using our definitions consistently.
>>>>> Not really. In this case, we can indeed derived this from our
>>>>> definitions and axioms, but this is contingent to us. The very idea
>>>>> of
>>>>> being realist about the additive and multiplicative structure of
>>>>> numbers, is that such a fact might be true independently of our
>>>>> cognitive abilities.
>>>> Yeah, so I ask what is the meaning of being realist about it? I
>>>> can't see
>>>> any. The only meaning is when we work with countable objects, or
>>>> measurements, which indeed follow some rules that mathematics
>>>> describe.
>>> Mathematics is born from the fact that abstract things can have  
>>> meaning.
>> Obviously. So what? I am not denying that.
> OK. Then it is just a question of patience and technic to grasp that I  
> am not using anything more than that.
You have to. The fact that abstract things can have meaning is not an axiom
you derive anything from in a precise way. If you admit that you just
interpret something into that, this is another thing. That's OK, but that's
just what everyone does when we speculate about metaphysical things, so you
can have no claim to rigor in this case.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Having meaning does not mean
>> "being realist about".
> The idea is that the meaning is independent of the machine which  
> handle that meaning.
This could well be the case, yet this still does not entail "being realist
It could be true that Harry Potter is an idea of a person that exists
independent of the book Harry Potter, I actually bet he does, as the same
idea is probably manifested in countless other books in parallel universes.
Still I don't have to be realist about Harry Potter, except in the trivial
sense that it is a real idea. I am not even sure there is such a thing as an
unreal idea. Maybe an idea that has hardly any meaning in it, like "blue
cloudlike triangle squares with i-sides".

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> They are real as epistemological constructs, and what
>> they describe is a part of reality. But real in an ultimate sense is  
>> only
>> reality itself (awareness).
> I am not again the idea that reality is awareness, and I show comp go  
> in that direction. But comp makes it possible to explain this from  
> simpler third person communicable proposition (like "the prime numbers  
> behave randomly", etc.).
No, it doesn't. It doesn't for the simple reason that you can explain ideas,
concepts, things, objects from something, but you can't explain awareness
from something, since it is the thing that is required for any explanation
at all to arise in the first place. Just like you can't explain wheels from
bikes (you don't get what a bike is if you have no clue whatsoever what a
wheel is) you can't explain awareness from anything (you don't get anything
at all if you don't already have a faint clue what consciousness is).
Another way to state it: Everthing comes from awareness, therefore awareness
comes from nothing.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Just
>> awareness does, and these things are expressions of it (the more  
>> concrete
>> things just temporary expressions, like my body).
> OK, but if you say "yes" to the doctor (and agree that you survived)  
> then you can understand where awareness come from (as amazing as it  
> might seem: I agree it is not obvious at all).
This statement just doesn't make sense, as awareness doesn't "come from". It
is simply is already here. And don't say that that is a dogma, it simply the
case as you can see for yourself.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Got the feeling that you want awareness to be more primitive than the  
> numbers. You might try a theory going in that direction, and then we  
> will see if your theory forces you to say "no" to the doctor. That  
> would be interesting.
There is no theory needed for that, as it is already the case that awareness
is primitive, and is the thing everything arises in, and out of.
Without awareness nothing at all can arise, therefore it is primitive.
It is nonsense to want a theory for that. It is like asking for a theory to
show that existence exists (awareness is existence itself). You can't ask
for as theory for something which by its very nature is primary to any
theory, and beyond any theory. The only theory I can give about that is
"What is obvious is obvious, and this is required for anything to make
sense, therefore it is primary. The only thing that can be obvious is
consciousness, since without it nothing whatsoever can be obvious. This
theory is refuted if you show that something cannot be obvious." or "!" or
"Axiom 1: Axiom 1". Really every theory is just as good if it only really
explains that no theory suffices, or can even touch awareness. But we should
be honest about that, and not claim that it explains "99%" or some BS like

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> We don't know if there is an infinity of twin primes, but we can
>>>>> still
>>>>> believe that "God" has a definite idea on that question.
>>>> We could as well say that our definitions make the answer to that
>>>> question
>>>> well-defined, even if we haven't yet figured out what the answer is.
>>> So the answer does no more depend on us. That is what I mean by being
>>> realist.
>> The answer depends on us as we invented the numbers (we = rationally
>> intelligent beings., including all forms of aliens that might  
>> exists, I
>> guess that they are probably humanoid as well). There is no  
>> requirement that
>> we know all the consequences of everything we invent.
> Numbers have been discovered by humans, not invented. You put too  
> much, or not enough, credits in the humans.
It depends on what you mean by invented. Ultimately nothing can be invented
if you require invention to be something fundamentally else than discovery.
Every invention is a discovery of some kind.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> This
>>>> doesn't mean that the answer describes an independently existent
>>>> entity.
>>> It implies that the truth of existential arithmetical proposition  
>>> does
>>> not depend on us.
>> It doesn't in the way that when the humans on this earth die there  
>> will most
>> probably still be other intelligent beings left that can assert the
>> proposition.
>> But even if they do not depend on us as humans, they may not be true
>> independently of the context, that is, they only make sense with  
>> respect to
>> some aspects of reality, not all of it  (which would be required for a
>> meaningful TOE).
> That's the case for all theories.
Right. That's why a TOE is nonsense, as it has no (fixed) context, since
"everything" is not a fixed context.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> but this doesn't mean they have any
>>>> independent aspect.
>>> You said yourself that the question is well defined.
>> So? Why does that entail that they are independent?
> It means that once we agree *enough* on what are the natural numbers,  
> the truth on the twin prime numbers is independent of us. It is the  
> same with the electron or any stable patterns we can approximate.
> Then with comp even a proposition like "Mister X suffer from headache  
> during a major part of its life" will be independent of you (and of  
> the big bang, electron, etc.).
So? Even when they are not dependent on us, it doesn't mean they are real in
any sense other than everything else you can think of is real.  Without comp
a proposition like "Mister X suffer from headache during a major part of its
life" will also be independent of you (and of  the big bang, electron, etc.)
(if you think of big bang and electron as independent material entities, if
you don't then the statement doesn't make sense as Mister X requires
electrons and the big bang to exist, as he can think of electrons and the
big bang if he couldn't he wouldn't be himself anymore).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> but let's just call the regularities laws, even if they can't be
>> written down). This choice can be an abitrary thing whatsoever. If I  
>> decide
>> to explain everything with the word "Kartoffelbrei" the universe  
>> will still
>> be the same.
> Not exactly. If the commandant of a plane you are in asks an  
> explanation on the climate, an justification like "Kartoffelbrei"  
> might just end your terrestrial life, making in change in that  
> universe. Explantion have to be as much as possible referentially  
> correct for species to develop (instead of disappearing).
Yes, but COMP explains not much more than "Kartoffelbrei". At least
Kartoffelbrei is a concrete thing that we can eat (mashed potatoes), while
COMP is just an insanely complicated way of stating the obvious fact that we
are non-material, and includes the unfounded assumption that we are
machines. It obfuscates more than it explains.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Of course you can use numbers (or other computations), the point is  
>> rather
>> that this is pointless, even if "theoretically possible". Using some
>> convoluted way of reprenting things beyond numbers with numbers is  
>> just
>> useless, as we can more easily represent these things with concepts in
>> language (you have to resort to that anyway, as examplified by your   
>> heavy
>> use of words in critical points).
> The question is not can we think. The question is can a machine think?  
> Can we continue to think when we got a digital body? is there a  
> physical primary universe or are we in a video game, etc.
There is no such thing as a digital body. Bodies by their very nature are
We are not in a video game, since video games are something we invented to
If a machine can think or not depends on what you mean with thinking. Of
course it can think if you count mechanistic thought, it can't if you mean
truly creative thought. Machines can't be truly creative, because they can't
handle direct, infinite self-reference, which is required for creativity (if
you give a computer an infinite loop or an infinite recursion he won't be
very creative, he will just give you an error massage).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Some universal system can play some more important role to figure out
>>> some aspect of reality, but that has to be deduced from a theory
>>> independent approach to computation if we want to extract and
>>> distinguish the quanta and the qualia (like trough the logics of  
>>> self-
>>> reference).
>> Why make it so complicated?
> We have no choice, when we tackle a complex question.
But it isn't a complex question. Qualia are obviously here already, and they
don't need a theory, as they are self-explanatory and quanta are content of
qualia, which science has made sense of pretty well already (and explained
as far as it can).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Ulitamtely, logic can't capture self-reference
>> anyway,
> That is what logic handles the better. That's "Cantor Post Gödel  
> Turing revolution".
It isn't much use to say "I can't capture that". It is precisely a statement
of the fact that it can't handle it.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> so why not skip that stage and just go to the source of
>> self-reference, the self itself (yourself).
> I agree the main point relies there. But then it is fun to see that  
> the numbers can go there too.
Numbers can go nowhere. They are tools to express measurements. Or weird
symbols that weird people use to express obvious things in a terrible
complex way.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  It is deep also, and it makes us more  
> modest, and it changes the world around us.
Thinking that numbers can be conscious is very immodest. The only thing that
is conscious s consciousness and it is modest to accept that. It is immodest
to want something more than everything, or something more than the unlimited
freedom of existence. Or more accurately, is is just stupid to want more
(not to say the people that want more are necessarily stupid), as there is
nothing more.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> My deepest goal is humanitarian. I sincerely believe that the more we  
> will be rigorous (and thus modest to begin with) in theology (as  
> opposed to centuries of dogma), the most we will be happy and  
> peaceful.
I like very much that you want all of us to be happy and peaceful (indeed I
think if you truly sincerely want this as your *highest priority*, and see
that this depends on your own happiness and peace, you are on the best way
to your own peace), and I like that you want to be modest.
What I don't like so much is that you want to be rigorous with something
that is completely beyond rigor, namely consciousness itself. You will just
fail in that endavour, I am sorry.
Rigor is just another dogma when it comes to this. Are you dogmatic about
rigor? If yes, why is this better than other dogma, if no, why should we be
rigorous when it comes to this?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  Possible truth might be a bit frightening, for the  
> unprepared, but hiding them is worst in the mid run, and fatal in the  
> long run.
Hm, I think hiding is impossible, but the attempt is inevitable, and indeed
fatal in the long run. It will lead to the death of "I", since at some point
you just can't stand to hide anymore from the fact that there is no "I" that
is somehow not equal to God, and at some point God will just awaken and thus
dismantle the "I".
But there is nothing bad about that honestly. Yes, it leads to suffering,
but suffering also plays a part in realizing enlightenment. It is just
temporary, and honestly no big deal for God. It just appears to be a big
deal because we think we are the sufferer, and we think we are somethin that
can be hurt. Suffering is finite (and based on an illusion), so it is
basically nothing at all for the infinite being. It is so strong that
bearing all the suffering in the world is its easiest task. Of course, it
has no choice but to bear whatever comes up.

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