Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> The point is that successor and 0 become meaningless, or just mere
>>>> symbols,
>>>> when removed from that context.
>>> What context are you talking about. The theory is interpretation
>>> independent. The interpretations themselves are part of model theory.
>>> For using the axiom you need only the inference rules.
>> But just rules give just rules.
>> The context I am talking about are particular measurements, or  
>> particular
>> countable things. COMP uses it outside of this context, making it
>> meaningless.
> What context?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Also, if you were right here, all theories, especially the first order  
> theory, would be meaningless.
Why? All physical theories relate to particular measurements.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> I don't agree with these axioms removed from any context, as without
>>>> it,
>>>> they are meaningless. I don't necessarily disagree with them,
>>>> either, I just
>>>> treat them as mere symbols then.
>>> They are much more than that. There are symbols + finitist rule of
>>> manipulation.
>> Which are just symols as well. The rules are just more then symbols  
>> with
>> unspecified meaning if they represent something.
> The rules are algorithmic. They make the theorem checkable by machine.
That's true. So, machines can handle symbols with unspecified meaning,...?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> You are arguing against all theories.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> The difference is as big as the difference between what
>>> you can feel looking at the string "z_n+1 = (z_n)^2 + c" and what you
>>> can feel looking at a rendering of what it describes, like this:
>> This just works if we give the rules meaning in terms of particular  
>> objects,
>> namely pixels on the screen. In this context they aren't removed from
>> context, because an image of a screen with measureable distance is an
>> obvious context for numbers.
>> The equation without an geometrical context means very little to an  
>> average
>> human (of course to mathematician it means a lot in terms of other
>> mathematical things, which is no valid context for the average human).
>> COMP doesn't give an adequate context. If it would, you could give
>> particular predictions of what COMP entails in term of measureable or
>> countable objects.
> Comp just do that in the extreme, given that it gives the physical  
> laws. That is what the UDA proves. (And AUDA confirms partially, and  
> shows it consistent, also).
You have not given any physical law. Predicting that some quantum stuff is
going on is not "giving the physical laws".
The UDA may simply not work, if COMP is false. You can't use the hypothesis
that COMP is true to defend that it is refutable!
In order for it to refutable you have to make actual predictions.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Of course we can still use them in a meta-sense by using .. = "2"  
>>>> as a
>>>> representation for, say a nose, and ... = "3" as a representation
>>>> for a rose
>>>> and succesor= "+1" as a representation for smelling, and then 2+1=3
>>>> means
>>>> that a nose smells a rose. But then we could just as well use any
>>>> other
>>>> symbol, like ß or more meaningfully ":o) o-".
>>> I am not sure that you are serious.
>> I am serious, I just presented it in a ";)"-manner.
> Well, if you are serious, you have to study a bit about numbers,  
> addition and multiplication. You are confusing the symbol "2", which  
> can indeed represent a nose, and the number 2, which does not  
> represent anything a priori, but is the number 2 that you are supposed  
> to be acquainted with since high school.
No, I am not confusing "2" and 2. "2" can represent a nose, but so can 2 (or
II or ..), just as the word "apple" can represent a nose and an actual apple
can represent a nose (OK, both are quite stupid, but we could do it).
You are supposed  to be acquainted with numbers fundamentally representing
things, since kindergarten. There is no meaning in numbers if they don't
represent anything.
You confuse numbers and what they describe, the numerically describable part
of reality. Numbers are conceptual, and a concept that doesn't represent
anything is empty, meaningless. That's my criticism all along.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> There are intented meaning, and logics is a science which study the
>>> departure between intended meaning and a mathematical study of  
>>> meaning.
>>> Logic studied both the
>>> syntactical transformation (a bit like neurophysiologist study the
>>> neuronal firings) and the space of the possible interpretations.
>>> Interesting things happen for the machine doing that on themselves.
>> This is a lot of talk of how meaningful it is without presenting any  
>> actual
>> relevant meaning.
> What is missing?
Any thing that is concretely applicable to the observable world.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> Personally, I might prefer to use the combinators. But we have to
>>>>> agree on some principle about some initial universal system to see
>>>>> how
>>>>> they reflect UDA, in such a way that we can explain the quanta and
>>>>> the
>>>>> qualia, with the comp assumption in the background, and in the  
>>>>> theory
>>>>> itself.
>>>> Yes, you can use any universal system, which is going to be just as
>>>> meaningless as numbers.
>>> That is like saying that a brain, which only manipulate finite
>>> meaningless information pattern (assuming comp) is useless.
>> No, because it is an actual existing real object, you can interact  
>> with,
>> therefore it is not useless.
> I thought only consciousness was real, and now you are telling me that  
> there are actual existing real object?
> It is hard to follow you.
Actual existing relatively speaking. Ultimately you are right, what we
really interact with is consciousness itself, only in the form of an apple.
Maybe saying "actual, existing object" was saying too much, and I should
have written "concrete material object".

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Also, numbers are of course not useless in general, just in the  
>> context you
>> are using it.
> Numbers are not useful in computer science?
Of course they are. Rather both numbers and computer science are not useful
in the context of explaining fundamental reality.
This is obvious, really. No computer program makes any sense in terms of our
experience (beyond programing and understanding programs) without something
that converts it output into something experiencable, that can't be itself a
program (a screen, a speaker,...).
As you have programed a lot, you should have noticed that all programs can
be interpreted in many different way if you output them (output something
that is supposed to be sound as a picture, or a text file). The programing
language itself may contain words like "sound", but still this is not
necessarily how the hardware interprets it. 
COMP has the same problem, computations don't unambigously define any
experience at all (really every [infinite sheet of] computation could be any
experience when it comes down to it, you can just associate all computations
to the non-numerically describable aspect of the experience), and therefore
it is quite meaningless. Yes, maybe quantum logic can be derived from the
fact that computations don't unambigously define experience , but this
solves no hard problem that isn't already solved, which is expected from a
theory like COMP. Especially as it claims to be able to derive physics.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Obviously, it has nothing to do with rose and smell. But both
>>> mechanist cogniticians and reseracher in AI are not *that* naive.
>>> Smell and rose require deeper loops, like the LUMs can manage (but  
>>> not
>>> a two line program).
>> Smell and rose can't arise out of mechanical loops.
> Assuming non-comp.
There is no assumption needed. Smells and roses arise in and out of
consciousness, as you can plainly observe for yourself. If you make a loop
on your computer, nothing will happen in terms of smells and roses. You try
it. Maybe you are convinced after the 100000x try.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Are you telling me that a human having got an artificial digital  
>>> brain
>>> is a zombie?
>> There are no humans with artificial digital brains, and I don't  
>> think there
>> will ever be, so the question is meaningless.
> We work in theory, in which the question is meaningful. To say that  
> successful artificial digital brain are not possible is a very strong  
> statement for which you need to argue, like Craig tries to do  
> (unsuccessfully).
It is not a strong statement, since no purely digital brain is possible,
because there are no purely digital things at all. All actual device have an
analog component to them, which is non-turing emulable - simply because they
are not computational. 
You could say this is the assumption of something non-turing emulable, and
indeed it is. You simply can't emulate something that is not definable at
all in terms of emulations. It is too fuzzy, there aren't any rules to
describe it. Reality is fundamentally fuzzy, quantum mechanics' "precise
fuzziness" (which can be emulated because it is precise, in terms of
probabilities) is just an approximation (we already know quantum mechanics
can't be completely correct).
What is you argument that reality is not fundamentally non-turing-emulably

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  It means that you have to find in the brain a  
> process which is both relevant for consciousness to be attributable to  
> a person with that brain, and which is not Turing emulable.
No process in the brain is turing emulable, so I can't find a particular

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  You  already need to grasp well the notion of Turing emulability to find  
> example of non Turing emulable process.
Nope, I just need to realize that something that is not at all definable
can't be emulated. In order to emulate anything one needs are reference
point that can in some way be described. This is not the case with reality,
even though there are many *approximate* reference points.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  Actually,  we don't have found in nature something not Turing emulable,
> except except the collapse,  which is a first person indteerminacy notion
> and so is very well  
> explainable by comp, despite the non-Turing emulability.
You want something that can be mechanically/scientifically describable in
nature which is not turing emulable, which of course will never happen.
Nothing in nature is turing emulable, there is simply no reference point
that could define how to emulate it.
If you restrict your own view to that which is allowed by your own view
(just precisely describable things count), of course no one can show the
What is emulable are the numerical rules that we found out it, but this is
just obvious, since all (provable) number relations can be expressed with
every programming language.
But we can't emulate plants or brains as such, as it not even definable what
plants or brains precisely are, so how could one emulate them?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> If you are asking if someone who is stupid enough to replace his  
>> brain with
>> a computer is a zombie? Well he isn't, he is just dead.
> Big statement needs serious argument. You are just saying that it is  
> obvious our bodies (3-I) are not machines, that is, you are saying  
> that it is obvious that comp is false.
Yes. Bodies are bodies, and therefore not machines in the COMP sense. Even
COMP entails that as far as I understand it (from the 1-p perspective), but
still claims bodies to be turing-emulable for all intents and purpose, which
is a near contradiction, or at least very implausible. It simply wishes away
all non-turing-emulable components (claims them to be just 1-p phenomena).
Why would nature make bodies 1-p non-turing emulable if all relevant aspects
are emulable?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> But you remove it from that context also, leaving no meaning
>>>> left, except empty symbol manipulation which could mean anything
>>> So a brain in a vat would be unable to make a person feeling like
>>> living a dream?
>> I believe dreams are more primary than brains,
> Me too, but that is part of the non triviality of comp, and it remains  
> possible to use a brain to manifest a consciousn experience, and it  
> that sense, the brain in the vat belongs to a dreaming person, and we  
> can (adding the interface) get entagled with the life of that person.
I doubt that this is possible. I think brain in the vats will just appear in
dreams and imagination, and there interaction / entaglement is quite

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> I get more and more the feeling that you are assuming non-comp.
>> I am not assuming non-comp, I am observing that non-comp is  the case.
> You said yourself that we can only observe consciousness, and now you  
> assert that you can observe that I am not a machine?
Right, because I is consciousness and is not a machine. Of course strictly
speaking direct experience does not contain a statement that I am not
machine, it is simply that I don't call my observation as such "machine",
because that would just be totally confusing.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Here you could as well say that "God told me that comp is false".
I simply observe that God is not a theory, and therefore any theory is
insufficient to capture "him", all theories are merely reflection of some
aspect of God. That COMP is more false than other theories is pretty much
just a subjective statement of this person, in that COMP is quite useless in
predicting things. Frankly I think for God every theory is equally false, as
he can't even understand any theory (he doesn't understand, he is aware).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> This is what COMP&C (this means comp and conlusion) does. It makes a
>>>> lot of
>>>> complicated assumption and long-winded explantions and
>>>> interpretation of
>>>> symbols, just to conclude that the 1-p (which is practically the  
>>>> only
>>>> perspective there is) cannot be captured by any rational means  
>>>> anyway.
>>> But it get good formal approximation at the metalevel. Indeed, it can
>>> even explain why it has to jump from a level to another to understand
>>> its non formal nature.
>> Not really. The explanation is just intelligible with a lot of words
>> additional words to explain the explanation, so the actual  
>> explanation uses
>> something beyond numbers, which can't even be formalized (natural  
>> language).
> Where? It is so vague that it seems like any theory is impossible.
What? You never provided any argument without natural language. Of course,
since no one could understand such an argument.
Other theories don't claim to rely solely on something axiomatly definable
like numbers. All valid physical theories admit that they stem from
observation, which is not definable.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> You just believe that computationalist are mad, because  
> apparently you know the truth.
I don't believe that the truth can be known at all, so no, I don't. I think
COMP is a bit mad, but "meaningless" is more of a correct word probably.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Then
>>>> it claims to be a refutable theory, but without making any  
>>>> particular
>>>> prediction that is not obvious already.
>>> This is a gratuitous false assumption showing you don't take the time
>>> to study the work, as you have already confess.
>> Instead of making these assertions, just give a concrete prediction  
>> of some
>> physical measurement,
> The Z1* logic is a machine producing a countable of experiment capable  
> of refuting comp. Of course, comp is recent, and up to know the one  
> having been verify are the usual quantum theorem of the usual quantum  
> logic. Science is slow, and contingencies don't always accelerate the  
> research.
This is not a concrete prediction. This is just a statement that a
prediction and a experiment is possible.
I could as well say "my theory of the ??=/-logic produces uncountable of
experiments,... I just yet have no clue what they predict and what the
experiment looks like. But it will be some quantum stuff, as my theory is so
fuzzy, so up to now it is confirmed".

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> or predict the contents of my dreams, or something.
> You have to understand that the theory of everything (Robinson  
> arithmetic) is a TOE as an unavoidable consequence of saying yes to  
> the doctor (to put it very succinctly).
COMP is so fuzzy and meaningless that you can derive anything from it (as
long as it adheres to us being digital machine), so this is no wonder. See,
you even derive that we are no machine, but that this is "only" the 1-p. You
flatly derive a contradiction, and then justify it by making the
contradiction "just" appear from the 1-p of view, as if there is any other
view that matters.
Really this is what the COMP conclusion is: From the 1-p of view, COMP is
false (since I am not a machine from the 1-p of view). So you can only
rescue it by pretending there is fundamentally 3-p of view. I wonder why I,
as having a 1-p of view, should give a damn about what a supposed 3-p of
view says.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Maybe I have missed these in your work, in this case I am apologizing,
> It is in the *second part* of sane. The material hypostases gives the  
> logic of "measure one" for the observable.
Part 2 of sane is a mish mash of vague (eg what exactly is a true belief?) 
and incredibly complicated statements. Or, I could say, there is no way I
can understand this stuff, and I doubt anyone really does (you admit
yourself that there are many many big open problems, which really means you
don't understand it in depth, either).
But mainly, you just end with as many open questions as you start with. At
the end, there are no conrete predictions, or even equations, just the
statement "qualia are themselves described by sorts of quantum logics".
Fine, but what do these predict? How do I know they don't just say "Whatever
the qualia is, is the qualia. Whatever is measured will be the measurement.
There are lots of possibilities for both."

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> and I
>> will begin to take COMP seriously, but please point to them to make it
>> easier for me.
> If you understand the UDA, you understand that a physical laws must be  
> given by a relative measure on the computations extending your current  
> 3-computational states. The measure one will be given by Bp & ~B~t &  
> p, for each sigma_1 arithmetical proposition. The sigma_1 proposition  
> correspond to accessible states by a UD written in the arithmetical  
> language (using only "s", "0", "+" and "*", obeying the axiom I gave  
> in the preceding posts.
This jargon could as well mean "The physical laws are whatever they are.".
If you want me to convince it is more than this, just give a prediction.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> If comp is true the first order extension of those logic leads to a  
> "von Neuman" quantum logic reich enough to have dimension, the right  
> tensor product, and a unique probability measure defining the whole  
> physics: that is rules for predicting the result of any observable.
Then just use that to make any prediction. How do I know that the result of
these logics are not something entirely trivial, which is for all intents
and purposes a total non-prediction? Even if the logics seem non-trivial,
how do I know that they don't collapse either way, in the end result?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> I just take a unbiased look at reality,
> The word reality is like the word "God", you cannot talk publicly like  
> if, beyond mere consciousness, you know anything about it.
Right, when we are talking about intellectual knowledge I really am
infinitely ignorant about reality. Nevertheless I can take a look at it.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> one doesn't find any machines in ones consciousness that somehow give
>> rise to it. The only place I find machines are when I use my  
>> rational mind
>> and apply it to this quite abstract concept.
> ?
What is your question?
I can't find abstract digital machines outside of my intellect, it is as
simply as that. So I doubt they exist outside of the intellect.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>> If you just have a bunch of words without being able to make sense
>>>>>> of them,
>>>>>> everything you "derive" from it will just be whatever you happen  
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> interpret in a bunch of non-sensical words.
>>>>> The axioms above are used by all scientists everyday, implicitly or
>>>>> explicitly.
>>>> Of course they are! I say nothing to the contrary. The axioms are
>>>> used as
>>>> *tools* because they reflect some aspect of reality.
>>> This contradicts what you said above.
>> What exactly?
> That out of context the axioms and theorems are meaningless. If you  
> can recognize just one situation where they can be used as tool, you  
> give them at least one meaning, that situation. You can take that  
> situation as a meaning, even if later you realize that there are other  
> situation, well described by that theory, and this add just more  
> meaning.
But I can't take that situation as meaning, when I then proceed to apply it
to another situation where that meaning doesn't apply.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Saying physics is non-boolean and follows quantum logic is not
>> a concrete prediction, it is neither concrete, nor a prediction.
> Of course it is concrete. If QM did not violate Bell's inequality, and  
> if nature could not doing that, comp would be refuted.
That's like saying if reality would be other than it is COMP would be
refuted. With this logic every theory is refutable, just by saying "If
100^100 pink unicorns would live in my garden then my XY-theory would be

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> We get the measure one for the observable, so we can test them and  
> compare with nature.
Just give some actual tests. What does "measure one for the observable"

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> COMP claims to explain quanta and qualia, which as such are not
>>>> measurable and countable (of course particular quanta can be
>>>> measured, but
>>>> not quanta as such), therefore it uses a tool that is useless in  
>>>> this
>>>> endavour (and useless here means meaningless).
>>> Hmm... What can I say. from this I can only encourage you to study  
>>> the
>>> theory.
>> This is just not possible if you can't explain what even only the  
>> axioms
>> mean, except giving definitions that explain nothing at all, or  
>> refer to
>> numbers in their usual sense, that makes no sense, as you don't  
>> refer to
>> anything in particular that is countable or measurable.
> I refer to the computational state captured by the doctor when you  
> have accept the digital brain substitution.
But a actual digital brain substitution is not a precisely defined
computational state, so it doesn't apply either.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Now study the theory, and ask when you don't understand. Better to get  
> well UDA before AUDA (unless you have already study Mendelson and  
> Boolos' books in logic and self-reference).
Honestly, I won't bother to study a theory in much depth that I hold to be
utterly implausible at the start.
You really show a bad sort of professor mentality here. You give me a bunch
of complicated semi-nonsense, which is really impossible to understand (one
may understand technicalities, but these really solve no question at all)
and as long as I don't understand it (forever), you will say I must study
more until I am really able to critisize what you say. But you are unwilling
to discuss the very fundament of your theory (then you claim I don't even
understand stuff from high school or primary school, or maybe at some point,
That's a nice strategy to be "right", that's for sure. "You just don't
understand it, study more".

A good theory, in my opinion, is open to criticism if you just know the
basics. That's why our good old physical theories are so good. You just need
to know their predictions, and can verify that they have been tested, and
mostly confirmed. And they make no claim to completeness, making criticism
that they are not completely accurate invalid (except someone claims they
are exactly accurate). If I critizise their ontological fundament, one can
simply say that they just make predicitions, and the ontology they use is
just describing what is relatively phenomenological real/significant in
regards to the theory - their ontology is limited to some part of reality
and does not constitute a fundamental ontological claim.

So if your theory is good, you should make predictions (not retrodictions!)
that can be confirmed and you should make no claim that it is a TOE, as this
claim is an implausible claim for every theory (why should it be?).
Especially bad is if you make no predictions and then claim it to be TOE, as
than it is not even falsifiable that it is a TOE (and even worse, you claim
to make predictions which turn out to be non-predictions for all usual
standards of prediction). Also you postulate an ontological fundament that
is very questionable.
Due to all of this, you will face a lot of criticism (or outright
disregard), and that's totally justified in my opinion.
Sorry, I like that you want to rigorously go beyond materialsm, but your
theoretical framework is just not convincing at all.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> What you say does not make sense.
>>>> Then just explain what numbers mean.
>>> The numbers are the object of discussion. They *are* the meaning,  
>>> when
>>> I talk about them.
>> If they are the meaning, what is the meaning?
> They are discrete finite quantity that you can add and multiplies, and  
> have many possible properties.
This is something I can understand. It just doesn't make sense in the
context of qualia as such.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Or do you mean numbers are
>> meaning itself? If this is the case, what's the evidence for that?
> ?
> You lost me completely here. You are still confusing symbols and what  
> they are used to refer to.
You are confusing concepts and what they refer to.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> If I talk to you about the sun, you might  
> as well ask  me "and what are the evidence that you are not talking  
> about Saturn".
No, I am asking "You talk about the sun as if it were God, what's the
evidence it is actually God?".

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> The numbers are not so important. I can take the combinators, or the  
> java programs.
The have the same problems.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> What is important are the relations that the number can have. If you  
> understand a proposition like
> "all the positive integers can be written as the sum of four squares  
> of integers", you know enough. This is actually true but not so easy  
> to prove.
This propositions have actually something to do with measurable qunatities,
while COMP doesn't.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> If not, then you are obliged to study computer science to get the
>>> point that numbers can at least behave (relatively to other numbers)
>>> in an intelligent way.
>> As it happens, I do study computer science full-time (well, full- 
>> time in
>> theory at least :D). There is nothing at all there that explains that
>> numbers behave in an intelligent way, except in the usual sense that  
>> they
>> are a useful structure, and in that sense "behave" "intelligently".
> Good news. It is not the numbers who think, nor the brain, but the  
> person. If you read enough theoretical computer science, you know that  
> machine can prove proposition on themselves at different levels. And  
> you will know that all this talks and behavior of machine can be  
> tranlated in arithmetic (which is Turing universal). I insist, if you  
> don't like the numbers take the combinators or the lambda terms, or  
> take my word for it. For the understanding of the reasoning, including  
> that it is not so trivial, you don't need much. To really prove of  
> addition and multiplication is enough for Turing universality needs  
> mainly the fundamental theorem in arithmetic that each numbers have a  
> unique multiplicative decomposition in prime factors (that is not  
> trivial at all to prove, but i well known).
I think the main point were I disagree is that anything in computer science
has any meaning at all without relation to concrete things. No machine can
prove anything on its own, it is only our interpretation of their
functioning that makes it possible that they "prove" something.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> What axioms are you disagreeing with?
>>>> All. They make little to no sense in the context you use them.
>>> You could say: Einstein theory of gravitation makes no sense at all.
>> Right, in the context of explaining the fundamental reality it  
>> doesn't. It
>> is just a useful theory, because it predicts useful, concrete  
>> things. COMP
>> doesn't, or if it does, I haven't yet seen it (then please mention  
>> it, with
>> precise numbers).
> Comp forces us to reduce the mind-body problem into a body problem.  
That's trivial, given that there is no body, if we are immaterial machine,
so the only possibilty is that it appears from them.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> That's the main result 1. (including first person indeterminacy).
First person indeterminacy will be a consequence of every sufficiently vague
theory, as it is more vague to say that the first person events are
indeterminate. This is far too trivial as to be a useful results of a such a
complicated theory, especially for refuting it.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> And the LUMs interview shows some pictures on the body apparition.
Yes, just like magic gives some picture on the body apparition, "well, it
just appear somehow",

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> But if you have better, please explain.
No, I don't, but at least I don't pretend having any intellectual answers.
When I talk as if I did I am just pointing to the obvious, which really
answers no question at all, in a sense that our intellects usually expect an
Just saying "It is obvious" doesn't satisfy our intellect, but that doesn't
make it false.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> The guy does not explain why 1+1=2, but is using all the time that  
>>> idea.
>> Yes and this makes perfect sense, as he deals with things that are  
>> actually
>> measurable, like time and space. In this context I know what 1+1=2  
>> means, as
>> I am not complete moron. ;)
> OK. So you can see that a number like 754 just measure the numlber of  
> time you have to iterate the successor operation to get it from zero.  
> And if you like concreteness, let us define zero by the number of  
> french which are exactly 42 km high, in the year 1998.
> OK. I have many concrete definition like that, but you have to be  
> careful by chosing not something too much instable. Good idea to use  
> past events, which are stable (modulo revisionism). You can define 0  
> by the amount of money in your bank account at this year and hour.
Fine, this just doesn't relate at all to the supposed results of COMP, where
no "french which are exactly 42 km high, in the year 1998" are mentioned,
neither my bank account.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> If for you something like " different natural numbers have different
>>> successors" makes no sense, I can hardly help you.
>> Of course it does make sense. I never pretended the opposite. It  
>> seems you
>> are just ignoring what I say. I am saying it makes no sense to use  
>> them out
>> of the context that they are describing, namely measurable or  
>> countable
>> things.
> No, they are use also as addresses, like with phone numbers.
Then we are using them as symbols, which have nothing to do with numbers in
particular, we could also have phone numbers made out of letters of the
The phone number 20042 is not 2*10021 or 20041+1.
It seems you are confusing symbols and what they represent. :P

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  And they  can be used on themselves at many different level. You can ask
> how  
> many divisors has a number, and thinks like that. All this can be  
> understood without mentioning "concrete things".
Yes, because we can abstract from that. But we can't *completely* abstract
from that, otherwise our numbers aren't numbers anymore, really.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> (of course *a
>> part of them in concrete instances* is measurable, I am not denying  
>> that),
>> which is just nonsense, as numbers don't relate to these things in a  
>> precise
>> way (as far as I can see). So I am asking you to make sense of the  
>> axioms of
>> numbers *with respect to this*.
> Take any of your concrete example, and verify the axioms by yourself.  
> The axioms are supposed to not depend on *their* interpretation, so if  
> you make sense of the axioms, for any of your own intuitive  
> understanding of 0 and the positive integers, then that is enough to  
> use them as a programming languages, and the whole first and second  
> order arithmetical language (no more necessarily computable) is  
> suitable to talk about the machine and their dreams, etc (assuming  
> comp, a local implemetation of a dream is just a computation done by a  
> local universal machine. The modalities (defined in or with respect to  
> arithmetic) distinguish the dream "computation", from the private  
> experience of the dreamer, etc.
I acknowledge that we can use integers as a programming language (even
though it is as useful as "whitespace"). The problem is that programming
language and their programs have just meaning relative to their particular
uses, like creating and output on the screen (even though some programs may
be of use in many particular cases, but still they need some particular
instantiation). You want to eliminate the output part, which doesn't make
sense to me.
Yes, in an abstract way we can use machine to talk about dreams, but not in
any very much other way than we could with the symbol "." (and then
explaining that "........" means "the dog in my dream", etc...).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I assume comp (which is a priori neutral on materiality, and all  
> that). The reversal occurs in all big physical universe.
I think COMP abstracts so much and is so vague that it becomes meaningless.
Maybe you could replace my "extended" brain with a digital substitution, but
then I am would bet on the substitution level being so low that we would
have to substitute all of my neighbourhood that is at all relevant to me
(including all visible stars, etc...). It would just work because then the
usual immortality of consciousness would make my experience invariant,
because the old world would just cease to exist in one history, being
replaced by a consistent one were no replacement happens. That is, if a
substitution at that level takes place, the requirement of consistency (and
immortality) would lead me into a history were no substitution took place,
and because this history is as consistent as the original the substitution
was "successful".
Isn't this a way to say "yes doctor" that avoids the conclusion? Because I
say "yes doctor" only because I know that actually no substitution takes
place for my future self, as I will be lead into another consistent history
were this didn't happen (even though my past self was being substituted).
And if the substitution actually is not determining at all what will happen
to me, because it *practically* does not happen, the conclusion of COMP does
not follow. I just say "yes" because I don't mind being substituted, not
because I believe it is successful in any way beyond that it doesn't matter
(just as it doesn't matter if I this whole universe ceases to exists, in
which case I will just find myself in another one). 
 So then I might grudgingly accept that COMP might be true, but won't accept
its conclusion for the reason above.
Uhm, as I think about it, it even has to be true according to my own
assumptions, since the digital substitution, if the level is low enough,
will necessarily end up being without any consequence :D Lol, so I actually
do accept COMP after all. Yet none of it conclusions follow, as they only
follow if I am actually a machine, and not if I just happen to survive being
substituted with a machine (or something arbitrarily else) even when I am
not a machine.

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