On 08 Jan 2012, at 06:06, John Clark wrote:

## Advertising

On Sat, Jan 7, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > You confuse naturalism (nature exists I hope we don't have to debate if nature exists or not.

Of course, nature exists (very plausibly).

`But naturalism want to explain things by reducing it to nature or`

`natural law, and consider that such laws are the explanations.`

`Computationalism asks for an explanation for the natural laws, or for`

`the beliefs in them, without using them. And it explains them from`

`computation and self-reference (with "computation" used in the`

`mathematical sense).`

> and is fundamental/primitive) Correct me if I'm wrong but you seem to dislike naturalism

`Not at all. I just think that naturalism is simply incompatible with`

`mechanism.`

so you think there is no such thing as afundamental/primitive so it is always meaningful to ask "what isthat made of?". You could be right, or maybe not, nobody knows

`We know (or should know) that metaphysical naturalism is refutable,`

`and the evidences are for mechanism, against naturalism.`

`This does not mean it is always meaningful to ask "what is that made`

`of?". There are no thing made of something. The idea of things being`

`made of something is still Aristotelian. If mechanism is true, there`

`are only true number *relations*. Some represent machine's dreams, and`

`the physical reality supervene on infinities of dreams, as seen from`

`some point of view.`

> and rationalism (things works by and for a reason). I don't demand that, things can be random.

`I was just using your definition. Now, I am not sure things can be`

`random, nor what that would mean. But a measurement result, like self-`

`localization after a self-duplication (à-la Washington/Moscow) can be`

`random.`

> if you are willing to believe that your consciousness would remainunchanged for a digital functional substitution of your parts madeat some description level of your body,I do think that is true.

OK. That's my main working hypothesis.

> then physics can no more be the fundamental science of realityWe already knew that because we can at least so far sill explainphysics, thus obviously we haven't gotten to the fundamental levelyet, assuming there is a fundamental level, and you could be rightand there might not be one.

`If mechanism is correct, physics becomes independent of the choice of`

`the fundamental level, and any first order logical specification of a`

`universal system (in Turing sense) can be chosen as being the`

`primitive level. I use numbers+addition+multiplication as universal`

`system because it is the simplest and best known one.`

> and the physical universe has to be explained in term of cohesivedigital machine dreams/computation.If you want a explanation then you can't believe that's thefundamental level either and a way must be found to explainthat ,and there is no end to the matter.

`Except that for the numbers (or the first order specification of a`

`universal system) I can prove we cannot derive it from something`

`simpler. Thus we have to postulate it. We cannot explain anything from`

`an empty theory. Now, actual QM (à-la Everett/Deutsch) assumes`

`computationalism and the SWE. But computationalism has to explain the`

`SWE. Physics becomes derivable from non physical concepts (like`

`Everett explains the appearance of the collapse of the wave, comp`

`explains the appearance of the wave itself). So it provides a deeper`

`explanations, and comp explains also the difference between qualia and`

`quanta.`

> to believe that nature and matter is primitive gives a sort ofsupernatural conception of matter, of the kind "don't ask for moreexplanation". I am not satisfied by that type of quasi-magicalexplanationIf you're right then reality is like a enormous onion with ainfinite number of layers and no first level, no fundamental levelbecause you can always find a level even more fundamental.

`Not really. I can't find something more fundamental than the natural`

`numbers (or combinators, fortran programs, etc.).`

`basically, digital mechanism (comp) makes elementary arithmetic the`

`theory of everything. Physics becomes a branch of elementary arithmetic.`

On the other hand the universe could be constructed in such a waythat you will forever be unsatisfied and there is a first/fundamental level and when we reach it we come to the end of thephilosophy game, and there is nothing more to be said.

`But with mechanism the question of the existence of the universe is an`

`open problem. There are only partial numbers dreams, and we still`

`don't know if those dreams are sharable enough to provide a well`

`defined notion of physical reality. Anyway, the whole mind-body`

`problem is transformed into a purely arithmetical problem, in the`

`shape of numbers' or digital machine's theology. This announce the`

`end of the Aristotelian theology (used by atheists and christians) and`

`the coming back to Plato's type of conception of reality. God created`

`the natural numbers, all the rest are (sharable) dreams by and among`

`relative numbers.`

`I am not saying that this is true, but that it follows from the belief`

`that consciousness is invariant for digital functional substitution`

`made at some self-description level. The interest is that it makes`

`physics a theorem in machine's theology, and it makes such a theology`

`testable, in a way smoother than just dying (or smoking salvia, which`

`is about the same).`

`By "theology of a machine" I just mean the truth *about* that machine`

`(including its possible points of view), as opposed to what the`

`machine can rationally justify about herself. By incompleteness there`

`is a big gap between truth and proof, and ideally sound machines can`

`be proved to be able to handle a part of it. They have a rich and non`

`trivial self-reference theory.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.