On Jan 9, 12:56 am, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 8, 2012 at 3:36 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > But naturalism want to explain things by reducing it to nature or natural
> > law,
> If you want to explain X you say that X exists because of Y. It's true that
> Y can be nothing and thus the existence of X is random, but let's assume
> that Y is something;in that case if you don't want to call Y "natural law"
> what do you want to call it?
> > Computationalism asks for an explanation for the natural laws,
> And if found those explanations would be yet more natural laws; however we
> don't know that there is a explanation for everything, some things might be
> fundamental. I have a hunch that consciousness is fundamental and it's just
> the way data feels like when it's being processed;
If that were the case than having multiple senses would be redundant.
What we find instead is that plugging data from a piano note into a
visual graphic does not yield any sensory parity. A deaf person cannot
understand sound this way.
If you turn it around so that feeling is fundamental and data is just
the idea our cortex has when it is analyzing experiences, then it
makes sense that there would be arithmetic patterns common to many
experiences that the cortex can consider - and that those patterns
could be used effectively to control phenomena on other frames (so
long as we have physical devices to control them).
> the trouble is that even
> if consciousness is fundamental a proof of that fact probably does not
That's not a problem if it's fundamental. The problem is presuming
that a sense of 'proof' is fundamental.
>so people will continue to invent consciousness theories trying to
> explain it till the end of time but none of those theories will be worth a
> bucket of warm spit.
I think consciousness is easy to explain if you stop looking so hard
and forcing it into a box. It's telling us what it is every day.
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