On 16 Feb 2012, at 20:26, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/16/2012 10:16 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 17:58, Stephen P. King wrote:
The assumption in COMP is that a subst. level exists, it's the main
assumption! What does that practically mean? That you can
eventually implement the brain (or a partial version of it) in a
(modified) TM-equivalent machine (by CTT). It does not deny the
quantum reality, merely says that the brain's functionality
required for consciousness is classical (and turing-emulable).
On 2/16/2012 11:54 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 15:59, Stephen P. King wrote:
There is a problem with this way of thinking in that it assumes
of the properties of objects are inherent in the objects
have no relation or dependence on anything else. This is is wrong.
know from our study of QM and the experiments that have been done,
the properties of objects are definite because of interdependence
interconnections (via entanglement) between all things within our
horizon. You seem to be laboring under the classical Newtonian
have a consistent and real idea of teleportation one has to
for example, the requirements of quantum teleportation
But it assumes that the classical brain/TM interacts with a quantum
world, so that one's state of consciousness can become entangled
with Schrodinger's cat. So the external quantum world may still be
But QM is Turing emulable, so this would only make the level low
without changing the comp reversal consequences.
In fact I tend to think that if we extract QM from comp, exactly (with
the same quantitative Heisenberg uncertainty), then we might argue
that the Heisenberg uncertainty defined some 3-sharable common comp
substitution level. More progress in AUDA is needed to analyse that
notion of level (in AUDA we reason on machine being correct, by
constriction, on their subst level).
Mrs. Schrodinger: "Irwin, what have to done to that cat? It looks
Schrodinger: "I don't know. Ask Wigner."
Mrs. Schroedinger: That does not help Irwin, Wigner looks half saying
the cat is dead.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at