On 17 Feb 2012, at 00:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/16/2012 3:02 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 22:37, meekerdb wrote:
Probably, otherwise, the nature of consciousness is really fickle
and doesn't match our introspection ( http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html
On 2/16/2012 1:00 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 20:40, Stephen P. King wrote:
Surely they must be related. If not, you do indeed get the p.
problem: someone who acts in all respects like a different person
On 2/16/2012 2:32 PM, meekerdb wrote:
So is intelligence and consciousness, ala having 1p, qualia and
On 2/16/2012 11:09 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the
that the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing Machine. It
would be helpful if we first established that a Turing Machine
capable of what we are assuming it do be able to do. I am
convinced that it cannot based on all that I have studied of
This where the paradox of the philosophical zombie arises. It
pretty certain that a TM, given the right program, can exhibit
intelligence. So can we then deny that it is conscious based on
unobservable quantum entanglements (i.e. those that make its
subjective experience stuff, the same thing in your mind?
(assumed) consciousness, indistinguishable in behavior, yet without
consciousness. The question boils down to: let's say you knew some
person well, they one day got a digital brain transplant, they
behave more or less as you remember them, do you think they are now
without consciousness or merely that their consciousness is a bit
changed due to different quantum entanglements?
I think substituting for neurons or even groups of neurons in the
brain would preserve consciousness with perhaps minor changes.
it comes to the question of whether an intelligent behaving robot is
necessarily conscious, I'm not so sure. I think it would depend on
structure and programming. It would have *some kind* or
but it might be rather different from human consciousness.
It would depend on the cognitive architecture and structures
involved. If the cognitive architecture is something really
different from ours, it might be hard to fathom a guess. I can also
imagine some optimizers which are capable of giving intelligent
answers, but I have trouble attributing it any meaningful
consciousness (for example an AI which just brute-forces the
problem and performs no induction or anything similar to how we
think), while I'd potentially attribute similar consciousness to
ours to some neuromorphic AI, and something stranger/not directly
comprehensible to me to an AI which is based on our high-level
psychology, but different in most other ways in implementation. I
suppose if/when we do crack the AGI problem, there will be a lot of
interesting things to investigate about the nature of such foreign
Which is why I think we'll solve the artificial *intelligence*
problems and we'll learn to create different intelligent and emotive
behaviors, different personalities, and how they depend on
and questions about 'consciousness' will become otiose.
This does not follow from what you say above. On the contrary, if by
chance or reason, we build "intelligent machine", we will have new
opportunities to study consciousness and its role in mind and matter.
I don't think it would ever be nice that consciousness and first
person become otiose. You could say that one day the machines will be
able to do our jobs and the humans will become otiose.
Forgetting person and consciousness for the right functionality is
like a confusion of means and goal.
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