On 2/16/2012 1:00 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 20:40, Stephen P. King wrote:
Surely they must be related. If not, you do indeed get the p. zombie problem: someone
who acts in all respects like a different person with (assumed) consciousness,
indistinguishable in behavior, yet without consciousness. The question boils down to:
let's say you knew some person well, they one day got a digital brain transplant, they
still behave more or less as you remember them, do you think they are now without
consciousness or merely that their consciousness is a bit changed due to different
On 2/16/2012 2:32 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/16/2012 11:09 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibility
that the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing Machine. It
would be helpful if we first established that a Turing Machine is
capable of what we are assuming it do be able to do. I am pretty well
convinced that it cannot based on all that I have studied of QM and
This where the paradox of the philosophical zombie arises. It seems
pretty certain that a TM, given the right program, can exhibit
intelligence. So can we then deny that it is conscious based on
unobservable quantum entanglements (i.e. those that make its
So is intelligence and consciousness, ala having 1p, qualia and all that
subjective experience stuff, the same thing in your mind?
I think substituting for neurons or even groups of neurons in the human brain would
preserve consciousness with perhaps minor changes. But when it comes to the question of
whether an intelligent behaving robot is necessarily conscious, I'm not so sure. I think
it would depend on the structure and programming. It would have *some kind* or
consciousness, but it might be rather different from human consciousness.
Note that Bruno answers the concern that interaction/entanglement with the environment by
saying that the correct level of substitution may include arbitrarily large parts of the
environment. I think this is problematic because the substitution (and the computation)
are necessarily classical.
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