Has someone already mentioned this? I woke up in the middle of the night with this, so it might not make sense...or...
The idea of saying yes to the doctor presumes that we, in the thought experiment, bring to the thought experiment universe: 1. our sense of own significance (we have to be able to care about ourselves and our fate in the first place) 2. our perceptual capacity to jump to conclusions without logic (we have to be able feel what it seems like rather than know what it simply is.) Because of 1, it is assumed that the thought experiment universe includes the subjective experience of personal value - that the patient has a stake, or 'money to bet'. Because of 2, it is assumed that libertarian free will exists in the scenario - we have to be able to 'bet' in the first place. As far as I know, comp can only answer 'True, doctor', 'False, doctor', or 'I don't know, or I can't answer, doctor.' So, what this means is that in the scenario, while not precluding that a form of comp based consciousness could exist, does preclude that it is the only form of consciousness that exists, so therefore does not prove that in comp consciousness must arise from comp since it relies on non-comp to prove it. The same goes for the Turing Test, which after all is only about betting on imitation. Does the robot seem real to me? Bruno adds another layer to this by forcing our thought experimenter to care whether they are or not. What say ye, mighty logicians? Both of these tests succeed unintentionally at revealing the essentials of consciousness, not in front of our eyes with the thought experiment, but behind our backs. The sleight of hand is hidden innocently in the assumption of free will (and significance). In any universe where consciousness arises from comp, consciousness may be able to pass or fail the test as the tested object, but it cannot receive the test as a testing subject unless free will and significance are already presumed to be comp. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
