On Feb 22, 6:10 pm, Pierz <pier...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 'Yes doctor' is merely an establishment of the assumption of comp.
> Saying yes means you are a computationalist. If you say no the you are
> not one, and one cannot proceed with the argument that follows -
> though then the onus will be on you to explain *why* you don't believe
> a computer can substitute for a brain.
That's what is circular. The question cheats by using the notion of a
bet to put the onus on us to take comp for granted in the first place
when there is no reason to presume that bets can exist in a universe
where comp is true. It's a loaded question, but in a sneaky way. It is
to say 'if you don't think the computer is happy, that's fine, but you
have to explain why'.
> If you've said yes, then this
> of course entails that you believe that 'free choice' and 'personal
> value' (or the subjective experience of them) can be products of a
> computer program, so there's no contradiction.
Right, so why ask the question? Why not just ask 'do you believe a
computer program can be happy'? When it is posed as a logical
consequence instead of a decision, it implicitly privileges the
passive voice. We are invited to believe that we have chosen to agree
to comp because there is a logical argument for it rather than an
arbitrary preference committed to in advance. It is persuasion by
rhetoric, not by science.
> In fact the circularity
> is in your reasoning. You are merely reasserting your assumption that
> choice and personal value must be non-comp,
No, the scenario asserts that by relying on the device of choice and
personal value as the engine of the thought experiment. My objection
is not based on any prejudice against comp I may have, it is based on
the prejudice of the way the question is posed.
> but that is exactly what
> is at issue in the yes doctor question. That is precisely what we're
> betting on.
If we are betting on anything then we are in a universe which has not
been proved to be supported by comp alone.
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