'Yes doctor' is merely an establishment of the assumption of comp. Saying yes means you are a computationalist. If you say no the you are not one, and one cannot proceed with the argument that follows - though then the onus will be on you to explain *why* you don't believe a computer can substitute for a brain. If you've said yes, then this of course entails that you believe that 'free choice' and 'personal value' (or the subjective experience of them) can be products of a computer program, so there's no contradiction. In fact the circularity is in your reasoning. You are merely reasserting your assumption that choice and personal value must be non-comp, but that is exactly what is at issue in the yes doctor question. That is precisely what we're betting on.
On Feb 22, 6:42 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: > Has someone already mentioned this? > > I woke up in the middle of the night with this, so it might not make > sense...or... > > The idea of saying yes to the doctor presumes that we, in the thought > experiment, bring to the thought experiment universe: > > 1. our sense of own significance (we have to be able to care about > ourselves and our fate in the first place) > 2. our perceptual capacity to jump to conclusions without logic (we > have to be able feel what it seems like rather than know what it > simply is.) > > Because of 1, it is assumed that the thought experiment universe > includes the subjective experience of personal value - that the > patient has a stake, or 'money to bet'. Because of 2, it is assumed > that libertarian free will exists in the scenario - we have to be able > to 'bet' in the first place. As far as I know, comp can only answer > 'True, doctor', 'False, doctor', or 'I don't know, or I can't answer, > doctor.' > > So, what this means is that in the scenario, while not precluding that > a form of comp based consciousness could exist, does preclude that it > is the only form of consciousness that exists, so therefore does not > prove that in comp consciousness must arise from comp since it relies > on non-comp to prove it. The same goes for the Turing Test, which > after all is only about betting on imitation. Does the robot seem real > to me? Bruno adds another layer to this by forcing our thought > experimenter to care whether they are or not. > > What say ye, mighty logicians? Both of these tests succeed > unintentionally at revealing the essentials of consciousness, not in > front of our eyes with the thought experiment, but behind our backs. > The sleight of hand is hidden innocently in the assumption of free > will (and significance). In any universe where consciousness arises > from comp, consciousness may be able to pass or fail the test as the > tested object, but it cannot receive the test as a testing subject > unless free will and significance are already presumed to be comp. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.