'Yes doctor' is merely an establishment of the assumption of comp.
Saying yes means you are a computationalist. If you say no the you are
not one, and one cannot proceed with the argument that follows -
though then the onus will be on you to explain *why* you don't believe
a computer can substitute for a brain. If you've said yes, then this
of course entails that you believe that 'free choice' and 'personal
value' (or the subjective experience of them) can be products of a
computer program, so there's no contradiction. In fact the circularity
is in your reasoning. You are merely reasserting your assumption that
choice and personal value must be non-comp, but that is exactly what
is at issue in the yes doctor question. That is precisely what we're
betting on.

On Feb 22, 6:42 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Has someone already mentioned this?
>
> I woke up in the middle of the night with this, so it might not make
> sense...or...
>
> The idea of saying yes to the doctor presumes that we, in the thought
> experiment, bring to the thought experiment universe:
>
> 1. our sense of own significance (we have to be able to care about
> ourselves and our fate in the first place)
> 2. our perceptual capacity to jump to conclusions without logic (we
> have to be able feel what it seems like rather than know what it
> simply is.)
>
> Because of 1, it is assumed that the thought experiment universe
> includes the subjective experience of personal value - that the
> patient has a stake, or 'money to bet'. Because of 2, it is assumed
> that libertarian free will exists in the scenario - we have to be able
> to 'bet' in the first place. As far as I know, comp can only answer
> 'True, doctor', 'False, doctor', or 'I don't know, or I can't answer,
> doctor.'
>
> So, what this means is that in the scenario, while not precluding that
> a form of comp based consciousness could exist, does preclude that it
> is the only form of consciousness that exists, so therefore does not
> prove that in comp consciousness must arise from comp since it relies
> on non-comp to prove it. The same goes for the Turing Test, which
> after all is only about betting on imitation. Does the robot seem real
> to me? Bruno adds another layer to this by forcing our thought
> experimenter to care whether they are or not.
>
> What say ye, mighty logicians? Both of these tests succeed
> unintentionally at revealing the essentials of consciousness, not in
> front of our eyes with the thought experiment, but behind our backs.
> The sleight of hand is hidden innocently in the assumption of free
> will (and significance). In any universe where consciousness arises
> from comp, consciousness may be able to pass or fail the test as the
> tested object, but it cannot receive the test as a testing subject
> unless free will and significance are already presumed to be comp.

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