On 23 Feb 2012, at 06:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 22, 6:10 pm, Pierz <[email protected]> wrote:
'Yes doctor' is merely an establishment of the assumption of comp.
Saying yes means you are a computationalist. If you say no the you
are
not one, and one cannot proceed with the argument that follows -
though then the onus will be on you to explain *why* you don't
believe
a computer can substitute for a brain.
That's what is circular. The question cheats by using the notion of a
bet to put the onus on us to take comp for granted in the first place
when there is no reason to presume that bets can exist in a universe
where comp is true. It's a loaded question, but in a sneaky way. It is
to say 'if you don't think the computer is happy, that's fine, but you
have to explain why'.
It is circular only if we said that "saying yes" was an argument for
comp, which nobody claims.
I agree with Stathis and Pierz comment.
You do seem to have some difficulties in the understanding of what is
an assumption or an hypothesis.
We defend comp against non valid refutation, this does not mean that
we conclude that comp is true. it is our working hypothesis.
If you've said yes, then this
of course entails that you believe that 'free choice' and 'personal
value' (or the subjective experience of them) can be products of a
computer program, so there's no contradiction.
Right, so why ask the question? Why not just ask 'do you believe a
computer program can be happy'?
A machine could think (Strong AI thesis) does not entail comp (that we
are machine).
The fact that a computer program can be happy does not logically
entail that we are ourself computer program. may be angels and Gods
(non machine) can be happy too. To sum up:
COMP implies STRONG-AI
but
STRONG-AI does not imply COMP.
When it is posed as a logical
consequence instead of a decision, it implicitly privileges the
passive voice. We are invited to believe that we have chosen to agree
to comp because there is a logical argument for it rather than an
arbitrary preference committed to in advance. It is persuasion by
rhetoric, not by science.
Nobody tries to advocate comp. We assume it. So if we get a
contradiction we can abandon it. But we find only weirdness, even
testable weirdness.
In fact the circularity
is in your reasoning. You are merely reasserting your assumption that
choice and personal value must be non-comp,
No, the scenario asserts that by relying on the device of choice and
personal value as the engine of the thought experiment. My objection
is not based on any prejudice against comp I may have, it is based on
the prejudice of the way the question is posed.
The question is used to give a quasi-operational definition of
computationalism, by its acceptance of a digital brain transplant.
This makes possible to reason without solving the hard task to define
consciousness or thinking. This belongs to the axiomatic method
usually favored by mathematicians.
but that is exactly what
is at issue in the yes doctor question. That is precisely what we're
betting on.
If we are betting on anything then we are in a universe which has not
been proved to be supported by comp alone.
That is exactly what we try to make precise enough so that it can be
tested. Up to now, comp is 'saved' by the quantum weirdness it implies
(MW, indeterminacy, non locality, non-cloning), without mentioning the
candidate for consciousness, qualia, ... that is, the many things that
a machine can produce as 1p-true without any 3p-means to justify them.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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