2012/2/21 Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com>
> Bruno and others,
> Here's a thought experiment that for me casts doubt on the notion that
> consciousness requires 1p indeterminacy.
> Imagine that we have scanned my friend Mary so that we have a complete
> functional description of her brain (down to some substitution level
> that we are betting on). We run the scan in a simulated classical
> physics. The simulation is completely closed, which is to say,
> deterministic. In other words, we can run the simulation a million
> times for a million years each time, and the state of all them will be
> identical. Now, when we run the simulation, we can ask her (within the
> context of the simulation) "Are you conscious, Mary? Are you aware of
> your thoughts?" She replies yes.
> Next, we tweak the simulation in the following way. We plug in a
> source of quantum randomness (random numbers from a quantum random
> number generator) into a simulated water fountain. Now, the simulation
> is no longer deterministic. A million runs of the simulation will
> result in a million different computational states after a million
> years. We ask the same questions of Mary and she replies "yes".
> In the deterministic scenario, Mary's computational state is traced an
> infinite number of times in the UD*, but only because of the infinite
> number of ways a particular computational state can be instantiated in
> the UD* (different levels, UD implementing other UDs recursively,
> iteration along the reals, etc). It's a stretch however to say that
> there is 1p indeterminacy, because her computational state as
> implemented in the simulation is deterministic.
> In the second scenario, her computational state is traced in the UD*
> and it is clear there is 1p indeterminacy, as the splitting entailed
> by the quantum number generator "brings Mary along", so to speak.
> So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a
> zombie. The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to
> insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level.
> If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p
Your determinstic scenario is never "alone"... there exists (other)
continuations (that you do not runs) in the UD deployment that account for
the counterfactuals (and hence 1p indeterminacy). You're not outside the
"UD" in the comp frame. It's not because your simulation is deterministic,
that it account for all the measure of mary from her POV. The simulation is
deterministic only relatively to you, from Mary's POV, all continuations
are "existing" at every point.
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All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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