On Tue, Feb 21, 2012 at 12:05 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 2/21/2012 8:32 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: >> So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a >> zombie. The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to >> insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level. >> >> If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p >> indeterminacy. > > > But is it really either-or? Isn't it likely there are different kinds and > degrees of consciousness. I'm not clear on what Bruno's theory says about > this. On the one hand he says all Lobian machines are (equally?) conscious, > but then he says it depends on the program they are executing. > > Brent
I'm not too keen on 'partial zombies'. Partial zombies admit full zombies, as far as I'm concerned. The idea that consciousness depends on the program a UM executes is the point of this thought experiment. The idea that consciousness itself depends on a multiplicity of computational paths going through the current computational state is what I'm questioning. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
