On Tue, Feb 21, 2012 at 12:05 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 2/21/2012 8:32 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>> So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a
>> zombie. The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to
>> insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level.
>>
>> If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p
>> indeterminacy.
>
>
> But is it really either-or?  Isn't it likely there are different kinds and
> degrees of consciousness.  I'm not clear on what Bruno's theory says about
> this.  On the one hand he says all Lobian machines are (equally?) conscious,
> but then he says it depends on the program they are executing.
>
> Brent

I'm not too keen on 'partial zombies'. Partial zombies admit full
zombies, as far as I'm concerned.

The idea that consciousness depends on the program a UM executes is
the point of this thought experiment. The idea that consciousness
itself depends on a multiplicity of computational paths going through
the current computational state is what I'm questioning.

Terren

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to