On 21 Feb 2012, at 21:34, Terren Suydam wrote:
On Tue, Feb 21, 2012 at 12:05 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 2/21/2012 8:32 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a
zombie. The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to
insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level.
If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p
indeterminacy.
But is it really either-or? Isn't it likely there are different
kinds and
degrees of consciousness. I'm not clear on what Bruno's theory
says about
this. On the one hand he says all Lobian machines are (equally?)
conscious,
but then he says it depends on the program they are executing.
Brent
I'm not too keen on 'partial zombies'. Partial zombies admit full
zombies, as far as I'm concerned.
The idea that consciousness depends on the program a UM executes is
the point of this thought experiment. The idea that consciousness
itself depends on a multiplicity of computational paths going through
the current computational state is what I'm questioning.
But this is not assumed. Even just one emulation can be said involving
consciousness. The first person indeterminacy is just a consequence,
and the thought experiment just show that MATTER, not consciousness,
requires them to stabilize under the substitution level. So
consciousness does not depend on the first person indeterminacy, but
it comes from the "usual" comp-attribution of mind to computations,
and is used only to determine my most probable next first states on
which the 1-indeterminacy bears on , like in the WM duplication. OK?
Bruno
PS I hope you will get this answer, because it looks like my server
has some trouble in sending mail. More comments later.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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