Bruno and others, Here's a thought experiment that for me casts doubt on the notion that consciousness requires 1p indeterminacy.
Imagine that we have scanned my friend Mary so that we have a complete functional description of her brain (down to some substitution level that we are betting on). We run the scan in a simulated classical physics. The simulation is completely closed, which is to say, deterministic. In other words, we can run the simulation a million times for a million years each time, and the state of all them will be identical. Now, when we run the simulation, we can ask her (within the context of the simulation) "Are you conscious, Mary? Are you aware of your thoughts?" She replies yes. Next, we tweak the simulation in the following way. We plug in a source of quantum randomness (random numbers from a quantum random number generator) into a simulated water fountain. Now, the simulation is no longer deterministic. A million runs of the simulation will result in a million different computational states after a million years. We ask the same questions of Mary and she replies "yes". In the deterministic scenario, Mary's computational state is traced an infinite number of times in the UD*, but only because of the infinite number of ways a particular computational state can be instantiated in the UD* (different levels, UD implementing other UDs recursively, iteration along the reals, etc). It's a stretch however to say that there is 1p indeterminacy, because her computational state as implemented in the simulation is deterministic. In the second scenario, her computational state is traced in the UD* and it is clear there is 1p indeterminacy, as the splitting entailed by the quantum number generator "brings Mary along", so to speak. So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a zombie. The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level. If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p indeterminacy. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
