On 2/21/2012 12:34 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
On Tue, Feb 21, 2012 at 12:05 PM, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>  wrote:
On 2/21/2012 8:32 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a
zombie. The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to
insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level.

If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p

But is it really either-or?  Isn't it likely there are different kinds and
degrees of consciousness.  I'm not clear on what Bruno's theory says about
this.  On the one hand he says all Lobian machines are (equally?) conscious,
but then he says it depends on the program they are executing.

I'm not too keen on 'partial zombies'. Partial zombies admit full
zombies, as far as I'm concerned.

When I refer to degrees of consciousness I'm not talking about partial zombies (beings that act exactly like humans but are not fully conscious). I'm talking about dogs and chimpanzees and Watson and spiders.

The idea that consciousness depends on the program a UM executes is
the point of this thought experiment. The idea that consciousness
itself depends on a multiplicity of computational paths going through
the current computational state is what I'm questioning.

Yes, I think that's a dubious proposition. Although brains no doubt have some degree of inherent quantum randomness it's clear that intelligent behavior need not depend on that.

But I'm not sure your thought experiment proves its point. It's about simulated Mary. Suppose consciousness depended on quantum entanglements of brain structures with the environment (and they must in order for the brain to quasi-classical). Then in your simulation Mary would be a zombie (because your computation is purely classical and you're not simulating the quantum entanglements). But an actual macroscopic device substituted for part of real Mary's brain would be quantum entangled with the environment even if were at the neuron level. So consciousness would, ex hypothesi, still occur - although it might be different in some way.



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