On 26 Feb 2012, at 20:37, Stephen P. King wrote:

## Advertising

On 2/26/2012 12:27 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 25 Feb 2012, at 20:01, Stephen P. King wrote:

<snip>

Likewize Bp & Dt, and Bp & Dt & p, are other important variants. Iwill say more when I get more time, but by searching 'S4Grz' or'hypostase' in the archive you might find the many explanations Ialready give. See my papers and the reference therein. Ask precisequestion when you don't understand, so I can help.Thank you for this brief set of remarks. I would like to see anelaboration of the Löbian entity such that we can see the means bywhich the 1p content is encoded.

`The first person content are not encoded, they are just true belief,`

`or correct inference with respect to plausible local universal numbers.`

`A brain does not create a person, it helps a person to manifest`

`herself with respect to other universal numbers (some being person`

`themselves, and others might be less clear).`

Can, for example, we include a free or atomic boolean algebra in aLöbian entity?

`Algebraically Löbian machines can be handled by diagonalizable algebra`

`(that is boolean algebra endowed with a transformation operator`

`verifying the Löbian axioms, the fixed point property.`

`But what the machine can observe is non boolean, and cannot, I presume`

`be extended in a Boolean reality. It is an open problem if all`

`coherent dreams could define a unique physical reality. I doubt it.`

I would also appreciate your comments on this paper by BarryCooper: http://www1.maths.leeds.ac.uk/~pmt6sbc/preprints/rome.paper.pdfHere is its Abstract:"Amongst the huge literature concerning emergence, reductionismand mech-anism, there is a role for analysis of the underlying mathematicalconstraints.Much of the speculation, confusion, controversy and descriptiveverbiage mightbe clarified via suitable modelling and theory. The keyingredients we bringto this project are the mathematical notions of definability andinvariance, acomputability theoretic framework in a real-world context, andwithin that,the modelling of basic causal environments via Turing's 1939notion of interac-tive computation over a structure described in terms of reals.Useful outcomesare: a refinement of what one understands to be a causalrelationship, includ-ing non-mechanistic, irreversible causal relationships; anappreciation of howthe mathematically simple origins of incomputability in definablehierarchiesare materialized in the real world; and an understanding of thepowerful ex-planatory role of current computability theoretic developments."Interesting, but still not taking into account the comp mind-bodyproblem, or the comp first person indeterminacy.Might say more on this later. It would have been nice I(re)discovered that paper soon, but many thanks :)Please also see http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/jrl/Research/laplace1.pdfwhich contains many of the same questions that I have been askingbut expressed in a more formal and erudite manner.

`You cannot ask to read 50 pages long technical pages at each`

`paragraph, and guess what are your non understing of the UDA is from`

`that.`

`It looks like not too bad material though, but does not really address`

`the question we are discussing here.`

I am still not seeing how you define the philosophical termsthat you are using, as the way that you are using words, such as"dualism" and "monism" are inconsistent with their usage by othersin philosophy.I use them in the sense of the wiki you did provide to me.Neutral monism, in the "philosophy of mind" consists in explainingmind and matter, and the relation between, in term of somethingelse.Yes, but I see numbers as belonging to the category of mentalcontent and thus not capable of forming a neutral "something else".

`But this is basically, with all my respect, a mistake. You confuse the`

`theory of numbers, with the meta and psychological theory (which`

`assumes much more things) of how humans mentally handle the numbers.`

`Unless you make clear your ontology, and what is your theory, or`

`initial theory, you might just beg the question.`

`It is not a question of true or false, but understanding a reasoning.`

`You have to go through the thought experiment until you have the aha!`

OTOH, if we stick to your consideration that minds are only the 1p

associated with true beliefs.

then your argument that COMP is a neutral monism is consistentmodulo finite considerations. I think that considerations of 3pspoils this neutrality (the Laplace draft paper above touches onthis), but let us see what happens in our discussions.

OK.

If your theory is scientific, the something else must be clearlyspecifiable, that is itself described by a reasonable theory, sothat the explanation of mind and body from it makes (sharable) sense.With comp, in short, a TOE is given by RA (ontological), and itsepistemological laws is given by the variants of relative self-reference of all the (Löbian) numbers. Physics consists in some ofthose variants (hypostases).Some believe that the numbers belongs to the mind, but with comp itis more natural to define the mind, in a large sense, by theuniversal numbers imagination.This is my prejudice and I am working hard to overcome it. Myresent comment that we have computations (as abstract logicalmachines) and physical processes as orthogonal intersections on 1pis an attempt in this direction. I am trying to remain consistentwith Pratt's idea of state transitions via chained residuation.The mind is, notably, what computer can explore, quasi bydefinition with comp.Local computers, like the one you are using right now, areuniversal number written in physical universal sublanguage ofphysics. And normally UDA should help you to convince yourself thatphysics becomes necessarily a sort of projective limit of the mind,with comp.I see physics, in the sense of groups and other relations, asthe mutually consistent sharable content of 1p, but this does notalone cover us to solve the problem of time. The only solution thatI have seen that is semi-congruent with COMP is Hitoshi Kitada'sproposal (http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0212092 ).

`No problem. I don't try to solve a problem, just to formulate it, in a`

`way such that humans, but also machine, can understand. AUDA is`

`machine's answer, somehow.`

With comp, the only way to singularize you or your neighborhoodconsists in layering down the substitution level in thetransfinite. Why not? The study of comp can help to build rigorousnon comp theory. Sets and hypersets can be helpful for this,indeed. For comp too, probably.Ben Goertzel has a very nice paper discussing the use ofhypersets and consciousness here. Craig's discussion of it is here.

`Yes. It is not bad, but I use combinators or lambda terms to handle`

`the non foundations, or the second recursion theorem, or the modal`

`logic (based on the use of those diagonalizations), which is natural`

`in the comp meta-theory.`

`Ben was a participant of this list years ago. We had good discussions.`

`It is also a not too bad material.`

`But polishing too much tools for solving a problem can distract from`

`solving the problem, or even from formulating it (or a subproblem of`

`it).`

`I already told I am skeptical on the notion of sets in general. I`

`like very much ZF, which I have studied in deep, but I see it just as`

`a sort of very imaginative Löbian machine. Jean-Louis Krivine, Jech,`

`and recently Smullyan and Fitting wrote very nice books on set theory.`

`They explain the Cohen forcing technic with a nice modal construction`

`in S4.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.