On 05 Mar 2012, at 19:23, meekerdb wrote:
I don't see that it's any different than taking a 3p view and
asking which body is the Helsinki one, the one in Moscow or the
one in Washington. Most people would say "Neither" and that
similarly one can say 'he' doesn't feel to be in either place, it
is some duplicates that feel they are in W or M. They are only
identified with the guy in Helsinki because they share many
attributes with him - i.e. similar body and memories.
But that would be an argulent for saying "No" to the doctor.
That depends on what you care about. Would you rather have children
or live forever?
The point here is that with the statement above, you die with an
artificial brain, which refute the comp assumption.
it assumes that there is one 'I' and we can ask where this 'I'
finds himself. But there is no 'I' in this sense.
Of course there is such an "I". Once your body has been
reconstituted in both place, they both knows very well where that
"I" feels to be, and this is known in advanced (believed and
true, given that we assume the candidate believe in comp and that
comp is true).
Known in advance by whom? Not by either of the I's in M or W.
That's why I said there is no "I" in the relevant sense of having
been in Helsinki.
Why? Both the one in M and in W knows perfectly well that they were in
Such an "I" is well defined. It is the owner of the memory
together with the fact that those memory are known true, by us.
But that "I" is not well defined because it can be duplicated and
hence the "owner of the memory" is indefinite.
Of course, that "I", the 1-I, is not well defined. In AUDA it is
even proved that it is not definable (accepting the classical
theory of knowledge).
But from his 1-I point of view, his *experience* is always well
defined, comp just makes it not predictable, like if he
look at the comp-multiplication movie (in my comment to JK Clark).
But you seem to infer from "experince is always well defined" to
"the experience is *his*".
Yes. When an 1-experience is well defined, then the 1-owner is well
defined too. He is the one having that experience.
As Bertrand Russell remarked, Descartes stopped one step short in
his exercise of doubt. "I think therefore I am." is dubious. He
should have taken one for step to find "There is thinking" is
indubitable. It's the "I" that is an inference.
The 1-I is not inferred. It is experienced, or lived.
So while the experience is well defined the meaning of "his" is
ambiguous. The experience of the man in Washington belongs to the
man in Washington, but not to the man in Helsinki.
The guy in Washington knows that he is the guy who was in Helsinki. He
has the same initial diary, plus "I am in W now".
The "owner of the diary/memory" *is* the definition (not a complete
one!) of the "1-I", in the UDA. That's work well enough to get the
first person indeterminacy, and the reversal.
In the iterated WM duplication, most resulting persons, which by
comp are still conscious rational people, will see that
their memory contains incompressible random strings.
I don't see how it is possible to remember an incompressible string
- since it must be of infinite length.
I don't know why you say that. Incompressible infinite string are
usually defined by an infinite string whose finite initial fragment
are incompressible. A finite string is incompressible if it is about
the same length to the shorter program generating it. The majority of
finite strings are incompressible, although the incompressibility of
almost all individual string is undecidable for a fixed machine.
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