On 5 March 2012 21:30, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > Yes. I John K Clark just saw a 90 minutes documentary on the history of > asphalt, and as that is certainly one of the large but finite number of 90 > minute movies I can see on that screen it is entirely consistent with my > prediction that John K Clark will see every 90 minute movie that screen can > show.
For some reason that really puzzles me, you are systematically failing to answer the question as posed. It is equivalent to asking: if you knew that the entire stock of tickets in a lottery would be distributed among multiple 3-Johns, what is the probability that your future experience would be of poverty or wealth? Of course, you know in advance that one copy will end up rich, but the 3-situation is not at issue. The issue is only whether your next 1-experience will be of sudden wealth, or not. It can only be one or the other, not both, and which it will be is indeterminate in the usual sense of any lottery. The point being demonstrated is that, regardless of the 3-situation, you can never "sum" 1-experiences - they are always mutually exclusive. Isn't that clear? David > On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >>> >> What is the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from >>> >> Moscow turning him into the Moscow man? 100%. >> >> >> >That's ambiguous. > > > There is nothing ambiguous about it! Granted this thought experiment is odd > but everything is crystal clear. According to the thought experiment you > have been teleported to Moscow which means you will now be receiving sights > and sounds and smells and tastes and feeling textures from Moscow instead of > Helsinki. I say the probability of that happening is 100%, how can I tell if > my prediction is correct? If after the experiment I can find something that > says he is Bruno Marchal and that he feels like he is in one and only one > place and that one place is Moscow then my prediction has been confirmed as > being correct. After the experiment I CAN find such a thing so my prediction > was correct. The fact that there is also a Bruno Marchal in Washington is > irrelevant, it does not reduce the feeling that Bruno Marchal has that he is > in one and only one place and that one place is Moscow by even a > infinitesimal amount. > >> > If you say 100%, it means that you are talking on the first person that >> > you can attribute to different people. > > > Of course the first person can be attributed to different people because > according to the thought experiment *YOU* have been duplicated, let me > repeat that, YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. Although perfectly logical that is > certainly a unusual situation, I've never been duplicated before and you > probably haven't either, so it shouldn't be surprising that the results of > such a unusual situation are odd, not illogical not self contradictory just > odd. > >> > we get a paradox if you say that it is 100% for both Moscow and >> > Washington. > > > There is not the slightest thing paradoxical about it, in fact if I had said > anything else then that WOULD have been paradoxical. Why? Because YOU HAVE > BEEN DUPLICATED, that means your first person perspective has been > duplicated and will remain identical until differing environmental factors > cause the two of YOU to diverge; and even then they would both be Bruno > Marchal they just wouldn't be each other. > > >>> >> What is the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from >>> >> neither Washington nor Moscow and thus leaving him as the Helsinki man? >>> >> 100%. >> >> >> > In the protocol considered the Helsinki guy is annihilated. > > > Fine, if that's the thought experiment then the probability the Helsinki man > will receive signals from either Washington or Moscow is 100% so the > probability he will remain the Helsinki man is 0%. Annihilate or don't, > either way the results are deterministic. > > >>> >> What is the probability the Helsinki man will feel like the Moscow >>> >> man? 0% because if he felt like the Moscow man he wouldn't be the >>> >> Helsinki >>> >> man anymore. >> >> >> > In that case, the probability to survive, in the usual clinical sense, a >> > teleportation experience is 0 > > > But "the usual clinical sense" is totally useless in this case because this > case is about as far from "usual" as you can get and still remain logical. > Why do I say that? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. > >>> >> What is the probability the Moscow man will feel like the Washington >>> >> man? 0% because if he felt like the Washington man he wouldn't be the >>> >> Moscow >>> >> man anymore. >> >> >> > I guess the last "Moscow" should be replaced by "Helsinki". > > > You can if you want to, either way its still true. > > >>> >> What is the probability that a third party in all this will see a >>> >> person in Helsinki and Washington and Moscow with all 3 having a exactly >>> >> equal right to call themselves John K Clark? 100%. >> >> >> > The guy in Helsinki is annihilated > > > Then 2 have a exactly equal right to call themselves John K Clark, and > although "annihilated" the guy in Helsinki didn't die because dying means > having a last thought and he didn't have one, he continued to feel > sensations only now they originated in Moscow and Washington not Helsinki. > >> > Helsinki where the third party will see only ashes after the experiment > > > I don't care if a third party thinks I'm dead as long as I think I'm not. > > >> > You have avoided the question, asked in Helsinki to you: "where can you >> > expect to be from a personal, first person point of view, after the >> > duplication is done?". > > > I have not avoided the question at all, the answer is that the one and only > one place you will feel to be after the experiment is Moscow and Washington > and there is nothing paradoxical about that. I think your difficulty is that > when you blithely say you have been duplicated you don't really understand > that it means YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. > >> > You cannot answer in W and in M, because you will not write, after the >> > experience, in your diary "I feel to be W and I feel to be in M" > > > In Washington you will write in your diary "I feel like I am in Washington > and only in Washington" and in Moscow you will write in your diary "I feel > like I am in Moscow and only in Moscow" because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. > >> > The question is just hard, if not impossible, for the bat, which is very >> > different from us. Yet it makes some sense to ask some question on qualia, >> > due to the bat peculiar use of sound. > > > That's irrelevant, we are of the same species but I can't even know what > it's like to be you; I might know what it would be like for John Clark to be > Bruno Marchal but not what its like for Bruno Marchal to be Bruno Marchal, > only you can know that. > > >> > something akin to that first person indeterminacy is used implicitly in >> > the QM > > > The two are not even close. Quantum Mechanical indeterminacy is real and can > be measured experimentally, "first person indeterminacy" not only can't be > measured nobody can even clearly express exactly what it is that is supposed > to be indeterminate. > >> > Consider a giant screen composed of 16180 x 10000 black and white >> > pixels. There are 2^(16180 x 10000) possible images that can be done on >> > that >> > screen. OK? Now, here is the self-multiplying protocol. I multiply you in >> > 2^(16180 x 10000) exemplar, in front of each of the possible screen image >> > ...... and I iterate that experience, meaning that I re-multiply all the >> > resulting persons again by 2^(16180 x 10000), putting them again in front >> > of >> > each possible screen, and this 24 times per second, during 1h30 hours (= 90 >> > minutes). You can see that the number of people getting out of the lab will >> > be 2^[(16180 x 10000) x (60 x 90) x 24], given that the candidate is >> > multiplied 24 times per second, and that there is (60 x 90) seconds in >> > 1h30. >> > OK? Again the question is asked to the guy (you) before the experiment >> > begin. What question? This one: what experience do you expect to live. > > > As the number of John K Clark's is now equal to the number of ways a screen > of that size changing 24 times a second can produce in 90 minutes I would > expect that John K Clark would see every 90 minute 16180 x 10000 black and > white videos that is possible to exist. To prove me wrong just produce a > video that John K Clark has not seen, but there is no such video. > >> > If you want, I can still make everything 3p in that question, in the >> > following manner. I make a genuine sample of 1000 persons among the >> > 2^[(16180 x 10000) x (60 x 90) x 24] resulting persons, by selecting them >> > with a random coin, or whatever choice reasonable enough for not biasing >> > the >> > statistics. I ask them the same question, including "did you expect to see >> > the movie you did see?". > > > Yes. I John K Clark just saw a 90 minutes documentary on the history of > asphalt, and as that is certainly one of the large but finite number of 90 > minute movies I can see on that screen it is entirely consistent with my > prediction that John K Clark will see every 90 minute movie that screen can > show. > > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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