On 03 Mar 2012, at 18:27, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> "I" (first person) is rather easy, in that situation. If you agree that there is no problem surviving the drinking coffee experience, you have already grasp it.

I agree that drinking a cup a coffee changes me but in my opinion I still survive, drinking a cup of cyanide would change me even more than the coffee did and it would change me so much that in my opinion I would not survive;

I understand that seems possible. That is why I avoid in the thought experience, both amnesia, death, or anything which would prevent the persons, before he opens the reconstitution box, in W and M, to feel any different from the person in Helsinki, apart from finding themselves in a box, and not knowing where they are. In such case, to believe that you don't survive would prevent you to believe that you can survive teleportation, and comp would be refuted. So what you say might be correct, but is not relevant in the reasoning.

however this is all a matter of degree not of kind. This does not mean there can not be a huge difference between the two, there is no sharp dividing line between day and night either but the difference between the two is as big as, well , day and night.


> Arithmetic is about me, my consciousness, my body, the matter which seems to constitute me, all apparent matter, the laws of physics. Comp makes arithmetic a theory of consciousness including matter's appearance, without ontological matter.

Do you think the moon exists when you are not looking at it?

This is a very ambiguous question, which is far to premature at this stage of the reasoning.

If your answer is "yes" then comp is not a theory of everything.

If by moon you mean a primitively physical object, then the anwer WILL be "no". It does not exist even when we look at it. But discussing this before understanding the reversal between physics and numbers' bio-psych-theo-logy would make no sense.

> It is not "if you change then you are not the same", It is "if you do that experience, what is the probability you feel to get this or that result

The probability is 100% that if you receive sights and sounds from Moscow and not Washington you will become the Moscow man and not the Washington man.

But the question which was asked is avoided here. What if you know in advance that 3-you will be both in M and in W, knowing that with comp the 1-you will not feel to be at both place.

> when assuming comp so that you agree already that the probability of surviving with a digital brain is 1, despite the big change.

And that's another problem if you're trying to construct a rigorous proof as you are; there is no clear procedure for determining if a change is so large it is incompatible with survival. Most may agree at the extreme ends of the spectrum just as we agree that a 80 pound man is thin and a 800 pound man is fat, but exactly where a thin man turns into a fat man is a matter of opinion. In the real world nature rarely draws a sharp line between things, she draws a grey blob.

This is avoided in the reasoning, because, by construction we make the reconstituted persons at the right level. When just reconsituted in W and M, they are numerically 3-identifical to the person in Helsinki, at the right level.

> So you do agree with the first person indeterminacy.

I neither agree nor disagree, the concept is not well formed.

Then defend the case of deterlinacy, and tell me how to dtermine with certainty the experience that you will live when doing the experiences in any of the protocols given.

In UDA the first person is defined (partially) by the content of the diary which is taken by the person in the teleportation box. Basically it is the personal memory, in that protocol. If you disagree with indeterminacy, it is up to you to give an algorithm of prediction.

To say, when imagining yourself in Helsinki, that you neither agree or disagree with the indeterminacy illustrates that you are indeterminate on the outcome you will live. That's the indeterminacy.

In AUDA, the first person will be defined by the knower, and implemented by the Theaetetus' idea, which works in the arithmetical setting. But you don't need that to understand the necessity of the reversal. But AUDA helps to see how comp will make everything precise at some stage, and it illustrates how to proceed for the derivation of physics from arithmetic. Including a tiny part. UDA just shows that *we have to* derive physics from arithmetic.

> as a logician, and in the fundamental matter, it remains important to understand that we, the comp people, does not know the truth of comp.

I agree,


comp can never be proved


or disproved

False. By UDA.

so there is no point in worrying about it. I just assume it's true because I could not function otherwise

Which is a nonsense. Nobody use the hypothesis that the brain is a machine in their everyday life. If tomorrow comp is refuted, you will not feel a difference. Just that both matter and mind will be more mysterious.

and it gives me time to think about other things; as I said comp isn't everything.

Comp provides a scheme of toe, among them is elementary axiomatic (first order arithmetic, without induction).
That's what UDA shows, or is supposed to show.

> By using the word God, we show respect to our predecessor

But that's another problem, you're giving the word "God" and the people who think the word is sacred far more respect than they deserve.

Yes, but it is the good kind of respect. To show that someone is wrong is a mark of respect, and usually in those fundamental fields it hard to quickly categorical on persons by putting them a label.

Also, it helps a lot for the understanding that atheism is really a variant of christianism, with the same belief in a primary or quasi- primary physical reality, and the same conception of God.

Comp illustrate that the more genuine theological debate is not between GOD and ~GOD, but between the Aristotelian conception of reality or the Platonist conception of reality.

Wen the word "reality" is involved, we are doing *religion*, so why resist the attempt toward rigorous deductive reasoning from assumption that we can share.

You did agree that we might define GOD by whatever is responsible of our existence. Then with comp it can be shown that it will already be a theorem that it has no description, an axiom accepted also by some religion, etc.

> Unlike Everett QM, we must justifies BOTH the Born rule AND the SWE,

If somebody could derive either of those things starting from nothing but pure numbers and prove that nothing else would be logically consistent it would be the greatest discovery in the history of science, but unfortunately I don't see anything like that happening very soon.

UDA is a more modest result: it shows only that IF comp is correct, then physics is derivABLE from arithmetic, or anything recursively equivalent.

AUDA is a bit less modest: it derives already the logic of the measure one, which corresponds to the logic of the machine's possible observable, and its explains the splitting between qualia (unsharable) and the quanta (sharable).

But I don't want to anticipate. Once I have more time I will (re)submit a different experience which illustrates the 1-indeterminacy.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to