On 03 Mar 2012, at 18:27, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> "I" (first person) is rather easy, in that situation. If you agree
that there is no problem surviving the drinking coffee experience,
you have already grasp it.
I agree that drinking a cup a coffee changes me but in my opinion I
still survive, drinking a cup of cyanide would change me even more
than the coffee did and it would change me so much that in my
opinion I would not survive;
I understand that seems possible. That is why I avoid in the thought
experience, both amnesia, death, or anything which would prevent the
persons, before he opens the reconstitution box, in W and M, to feel
any different from the person in Helsinki, apart from finding
themselves in a box, and not knowing where they are. In such case, to
believe that you don't survive would prevent you to believe that you
can survive teleportation, and comp would be refuted. So what you say
might be correct, but is not relevant in the reasoning.
however this is all a matter of degree not of kind. This does not
mean there can not be a huge difference between the two, there is no
sharp dividing line between day and night either but the difference
between the two is as big as, well , day and night.
> Arithmetic is about me, my consciousness, my body, the matter
which seems to constitute me, all apparent matter, the laws of
physics. Comp makes arithmetic a theory of consciousness including
matter's appearance, without ontological matter.
Do you think the moon exists when you are not looking at it?
This is a very ambiguous question, which is far to premature at this
stage of the reasoning.
If your answer is "yes" then comp is not a theory of everything.
If by moon you mean a primitively physical object, then the anwer WILL
be "no". It does not exist even when we look at it.
But discussing this before understanding the reversal between physics
and numbers' bio-psych-theo-logy would make no sense.
> It is not "if you change then you are not the same", It is "if you
do that experience, what is the probability you feel to get this or
The probability is 100% that if you receive sights and sounds from
Moscow and not Washington you will become the Moscow man and not the
But the question which was asked is avoided here. What if you know in
advance that 3-you will be both in M and in W, knowing that with comp
the 1-you will not feel to be at both place.
> when assuming comp so that you agree already that the probability
of surviving with a digital brain is 1, despite the big change.
And that's another problem if you're trying to construct a rigorous
proof as you are; there is no clear procedure for determining if a
change is so large it is incompatible with survival.
Most may agree at the extreme ends of the spectrum just as we agree
that a 80 pound man is thin and a 800 pound man is fat, but exactly
where a thin man turns into a fat man is a matter of opinion. In the
real world nature rarely draws a sharp line between things, she
draws a grey blob.
This is avoided in the reasoning, because, by construction we make the
reconstituted persons at the right level. When just reconsituted in W
and M, they are numerically 3-identifical to the person in Helsinki,
at the right level.
> So you do agree with the first person indeterminacy.
I neither agree nor disagree, the concept is not well formed.
Then defend the case of deterlinacy, and tell me how to dtermine with
certainty the experience that you will live when doing the experiences
in any of the protocols given.
In UDA the first person is defined (partially) by the content of the
diary which is taken by the person in the teleportation box. Basically
it is the personal memory, in that protocol. If you disagree with
indeterminacy, it is up to you to give an algorithm of prediction.
To say, when imagining yourself in Helsinki, that you neither agree or
disagree with the indeterminacy illustrates that you are indeterminate
on the outcome you will live. That's the indeterminacy.
In AUDA, the first person will be defined by the knower, and
implemented by the Theaetetus' idea, which works in the arithmetical
setting. But you don't need that to understand the necessity of the
reversal. But AUDA helps to see how comp will make everything precise
at some stage, and it illustrates how to proceed for the derivation of
physics from arithmetic. Including a tiny part. UDA just shows that
*we have to* derive physics from arithmetic.
> as a logician, and in the fundamental matter, it remains
important to understand that we, the comp people, does not know the
truth of comp.
comp can never be proved
False. By UDA.
so there is no point in worrying about it. I just assume it's true
because I could not function otherwise
Which is a nonsense. Nobody use the hypothesis that the brain is a
machine in their everyday life.
If tomorrow comp is refuted, you will not feel a difference. Just that
both matter and mind will be more mysterious.
and it gives me time to think about other things; as I said comp
Comp provides a scheme of toe, among them is elementary axiomatic
(first order arithmetic, without induction).
That's what UDA shows, or is supposed to show.
> By using the word God, we show respect to our predecessor
But that's another problem, you're giving the word "God" and the
people who think the word is sacred far more respect than they
Yes, but it is the good kind of respect. To show that someone is wrong
is a mark of respect, and usually in those fundamental fields it hard
to quickly categorical on persons by putting them a label.
Also, it helps a lot for the understanding that atheism is really a
variant of christianism, with the same belief in a primary or quasi-
primary physical reality, and the same conception of God.
Comp illustrate that the more genuine theological debate is not
between GOD and ~GOD, but between the Aristotelian conception of
reality or the Platonist conception of reality.
Wen the word "reality" is involved, we are doing *religion*, so why
resist the attempt toward rigorous deductive reasoning from assumption
that we can share.
You did agree that we might define GOD by whatever is responsible of
Then with comp it can be shown that it will already be a theorem that
it has no description, an axiom accepted also by some religion, etc.
> Unlike Everett QM, we must justifies BOTH the Born rule AND the SWE,
If somebody could derive either of those things starting from
nothing but pure numbers and prove that nothing else would be
logically consistent it would be the greatest discovery in the
history of science, but unfortunately I don't see anything like that
happening very soon.
UDA is a more modest result: it shows only that IF comp is correct,
then physics is derivABLE from arithmetic, or anything recursively
AUDA is a bit less modest: it derives already the logic of the measure
one, which corresponds to the logic of the machine's possible
observable, and its explains the splitting between qualia (unsharable)
and the quanta (sharable).
But I don't want to anticipate. Once I have more time I will
(re)submit a different experience which illustrates the 1-indeterminacy.
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