On 06 Mar 2012, at 00:14, acw wrote:

John Clark, it seems to me that you're intentionally ignoring the 1p (first person) point of view (qualia or subjective experience) and one's expectations from that point of view.

I think that John Clark does not miss the 1p and 3p distinction, but he misses the expectations from that point of view *about* that point of view.

To follow UDA and get COMP's conclusions you need these assumptions: Mind (1p), Mechanism (surviving a digital substitution), Church Turing Thesis(CTT) and an interpretation of arithmetic to give CTT sense (such as the existence of the standard model of arithmetic).

If you take a eliminative materialist position, that is, saying the mind doesn't exist and thus also no subjective experience, you cannot even begin to follow the UDA - you've already assumed that the mind doesn't exist and only the physical universe does. Of course that's a bit problematic because you've only learned of this physical universe through your own subjective experiences.

But John is more subtle than most materialist eliminativist. He is willing to ascribe consciousness, even to the two reconstituted persons after a duplication, but he does not take their account into account. He does not listen to the guy with the sequence WWWMWWWMMMWWWWW who does acknowledge that this particular string was not precisely expected, and that he has no clue of what comes next for its next feeling in the duplication experience.

If you take 1p seriously, UDA asks you to predict what your *experiences* will be in a variety of situations.

By neglecting each particular account, and identifying himself (intellectually) with all the copies, he will claim that he can easily makes the prediction: he will experience all the situations. This might be true from some God pov, or from a complete outsider view, but of course that is not what we were asking.

You can look at the 3p bodies/brains and assign/correlate certain 1p's to them, but one can consider duplication scenarios which don't disturb continuity at all - if the mind survived a digital substitution it is already a program that can be duplicated/merged/ instantiated/... in a variety of ways - that program could even change substrates or be computed in all kinds of fragmented and strange ways and still maintain internal continuity. This may seem strange to you, so you might try to resolve it by only looking at the bodies instead of asking what *is experienced*, but that's a mistake and you will miss the point of the UDA that way because you're making the negation of the mind assumption or merely ignoring it.

He ignores only the 1-views on the 1-views, but does not ignore the existence of the 1-views. This makes possible for him to accept the existence of the mind, but also to trivialize its possible role, and to block at the start the reasoning.

Also in QM MWI, you have the same splitting/duplication all the time as you do with COMP, and the splitting time is likely much shorter (at plank time or less), while subjective experience is at much slower scales relative to that (likely a variable rate of 1-120Hz due to neuron spiking times, although hard to confirm this practically).

So I repeat again: UDA is about what is experienced from the first person of a conscious SIM(Substrate Independent Mind)/AGI and its implications for the ontology and physics and mostly about what would such a mind experience. Looking only at the body of such a SIM is completely missing the point or just assuming physicalism with hidden assumption that subjective experience does not exist and is a delusion.

He probably want to save physicalism, but he is not eliminativist. He just ignore the 1-view of the 1-view, he attribute mind to body, but fails to see that the mind, from the point of view of the mind, "does not feel nor live any split in the duplication experience, and feel always to be a singular person, living what is an undoubtable personal random experience.

I'm afraid I will have to explain the betting approach, or the "optimization of the life" of the reconstituted person. This is enough to get the reversal physics/arithmetic, but is more tedious and long to show.

Let me try to explain this first to someone who seem to be rather lucid on all this (you).

Let us take again the "multiplication-movie" experience. But instead of multiplying only John Clark, into the 2^((16180 x 10000) x (60 x 90) x 24, we have to multiply the couple [John Clark + a banker], and John, at the start, when still unique, is asked to choose the between the following bet:

"I bet a billion$ that I will see the movie "Monty Python Flying circus" "


"I bet a billion$ that I will see white noise."

The bet is done with the banker, which is multiplied together with John. (it is the comp first person plural case).

In this case it is clear that if John bet that he will see ""Monty Python Flying circus"", then only one of his descendent will see exactly that movie (or a bunch of them, if you allow slight different version of it, let us be large) will win the bet, and that almost all the 2^((16180 x 10000) x (60 x 90) x 24 will have to pay the bank. The quasi contrary occurs if he bet that they (him + the banker) will see white noise.

Then you can use this to re-explain, in longer term avoiding the label "indeterminacy" why, if you want to optimize maximally your profits, you have to extract the physical laws from arithmetic, once assuming comp.

I did this to avoid the term "probability" in early version of UDA, but in my opinion, it is simpler to use "indeterminacy" when people agree that the notion of probability makes sense (which was not the case of my PhD thesis at the beginning of the work---He got the point, eventually, and asked me to reintroduce the term "probability" because UDA was explaining them actually.

Later I discovered that Hilary Heargrave did something similar for Wallace account (and defense) of the way Deutsch derive the Born rule from Everett. In fact it is a general truth that you can always eliminate probability in term of a locally or globally decision theoretic frame (like I think Wei Dai, the kind and patient owner of the everything list, was up to too).


On 3/5/2012 21:30, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Mar 5, 2012  Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be>  wrote:

What is the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from
Moscow turning him into the Moscow man? 100%.

That's ambiguous.

There is nothing ambiguous about it! Granted this thought experiment is odd but everything is crystal clear. According to the thought experiment you have been teleported to Moscow which means you will now be receiving sights and sounds and smells and tastes and feeling textures from Moscow instead of Helsinki. I say the probability of that happening is 100%, how can I
tell if my prediction is correct? If after the experiment I can find
something that says he is Bruno Marchal and that he feels like he is in one and only one place and that one place is Moscow then my prediction has been confirmed as being correct. After the experiment I CAN find such a thing so my prediction was correct. The fact that there is also a Bruno Marchal in Washington is irrelevant, it does not reduce the feeling that Bruno Marchal has that he is in one and only one place and that one place is Moscow by
even a infinitesimal amount.

If you say 100%, it means that you are talking on the first person that
you can attribute to different people.

Of course the first person can be attributed to different people because according to the thought experiment *YOU* have been duplicated, let me repeat that, YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. Although perfectly logical that is certainly a unusual situation, I've never been duplicated before and you probably haven't either, so it shouldn't be surprising that the results of such a unusual situation are odd, not illogical not self contradictory just

we get a paradox if you say that it is 100% for both Moscow and

There is not the slightest thing paradoxical about it, in fact if I had said anything else then that WOULD have been paradoxical. Why? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED, that means your first person perspective has been duplicated and will remain identical until differing environmental factors cause the two of YOU to diverge; and even then they would both be Bruno
Marchal they just wouldn't be each other.

What is the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from
neither Washington nor Moscow and thus leaving him as the Helsinki man?

In the protocol considered the Helsinki guy is annihilated.

Fine, if that's the thought experiment then the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from either Washington or Moscow is 100% so the probability he will remain the Helsinki man is 0%. Annihilate or don't,
either way the results are deterministic.

What is the probability the Helsinki man will feel like the Moscow man? 0% because if he felt like the Moscow man he wouldn't be the Helsinki man

In that case, the probability to survive, in the usual clinical sense, a
teleportation experience is 0

But "the usual clinical sense" is totally useless in this case because this case is about as far from "usual" as you can get and still remain logical.
Why do I say that? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.

What is the probability the Moscow man will feel like the Washington man? 0% because if he felt like the Washington man he wouldn't be the
Moscow man anymore.

I guess the last "Moscow" should be replaced by "Helsinki".

You can if you want to, either way its still true.

 What is the probability that a third party in all this will see a
person in Helsinki and Washington and Moscow with all 3 having a exactly
equal right to call themselves John K Clark? 100%.

The guy in Helsinki is annihilated

Then 2 have a exactly equal right to call themselves John K Clark, and although "annihilated" the guy in Helsinki didn't die because dying means
having a last thought and he didn't have one, he continued to feel
sensations only now they originated in Moscow and Washington not

Helsinki where the third party will see only ashes after the experiment

I don't care if a third party thinks I'm dead as long as I think I'm not.

You have avoided the question, asked in Helsinki to you: "where can you
expect to be from a personal, first person point of view, after the
duplication is done?".

I have not avoided the question at all, the answer is that the one and only one place you will feel to be after the experiment is Moscow and Washington and there is nothing paradoxical about that. I think your difficulty is
that when you blithely say you have been duplicated you don't really
understand that it means YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.

You cannot answer in W and in M, because you will not write, after the
experience, in your diary "I feel to be W and I feel to be in M"

In Washington you will write in your diary "I feel like I am in Washington and only in Washington" and in Moscow you will write in your diary "I feel like I am in Moscow and only in Moscow" because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.

The question is just hard, if not impossible, for the bat, which is very different from us. Yet it makes some sense to ask some question on qualia,
due to the bat peculiar use of sound.

That's irrelevant, we are of the same species but I can't even know what it's like to be you; I might know what it would be like for John Clark to
be Bruno Marchal but not what its like for Bruno Marchal to be Bruno
Marchal, only you can know that.

something akin to that first person indeterminacy is used implicitly in
the QM

The two are not even close. Quantum Mechanical indeterminacy is real and can be measured experimentally, "first person indeterminacy" not only can't be measured nobody can even clearly express exactly what it is that is
supposed to be indeterminate.

Consider a giant screen composed of 16180 x 10000 black and white pixels.
There are 2^(16180 x 10000) possible images that can be done on that
screen. OK? Now, here is the self-multiplying protocol. I multiply you in 2^(16180 x 10000) exemplar, in front of each of the possible screen image ...... and I iterate that experience, meaning that I re-multiply all the resulting persons again by 2^(16180 x 10000), putting them again in front of each possible screen, and this 24 times per second, during 1h30 hours (= 90 minutes). You can see that the number of people getting out of the lab will be 2^[(16180 x 10000) x (60 x 90) x 24], given that the candidate is multiplied 24 times per second, and that there is (60 x 90) seconds in
1h30. OK? Again the question is asked to the guy (you) before the
experiment begin. What question? This one: what experience do you expect to

As the number of John K Clark's is now equal to the number of ways a screen of that size changing 24 times a second can produce in 90 minutes I would expect that John K Clark would see every 90 minute 16180 x 10000 black and white videos that is possible to exist. To prove me wrong just produce a
video that John K Clark has not seen, but there is no such video.

If you want, I can still make everything 3p in that question, in the
following manner. I make a genuine sample of 1000 persons among the
2^[(16180 x 10000) x (60 x 90) x 24] resulting persons, by selecting them with a random coin, or whatever choice reasonable enough for not biasing the statistics. I ask them the same question, including "did you expect to
see the movie you did see?".

Yes. I John K Clark just saw a 90 minutes documentary on the history of asphalt, and as that is certainly one of the large but finite number of 90 minute movies I can see on that screen it is entirely consistent with my prediction that John K Clark will see every 90 minute movie that screen can

 John K Clark

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