On 3/3/2012 12:43 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I understand that seems possible. That is why I avoid in the thought experience, both amnesia, death, or anything which would prevent the persons, before he opens the reconstitution box, in W and M, to feel any different from the person in Helsinki, apart from finding themselves in a box, and not knowing where they are. In such case, to believe that you don't survive would prevent you to believe that you can survive teleportation, and comp would be refuted.

But that seems to be equivocation on 'you'. 'I' have a certain continuity of thought and more distant memories. The hypothetical teleportation would necessarily (nomologically) produce a discontinuity in thought, so my identity would depend on my memories. Small changes in memory would still allow 'me' to identify myself with the Helsinki person, but large ones, e.g. I remember living in Brussels not Helsinki, would make 'me' a different person. 'I' am an inference, or a construct, from my memory (including unconscious habit/memory). So the question as to which probability I have finding myself in M or W is ill posed; it assumes that there is one 'I' and we can ask where this 'I' finds himself. But there is no 'I' in this sense.

I don't think that affects the idea of 1p uncertainty though. If you believe QM is correct you already believe there is 1p uncertainty; even if you like Copenhagen.


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to