On 3/3/2012 12:43 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I understand that seems possible. That is why I avoid in the thought experience, both
amnesia, death, or anything which would prevent the persons, before he opens the
reconstitution box, in W and M, to feel any different from the person in Helsinki,
apart from finding themselves in a box, and not knowing where they are. In such case, to
believe that you don't survive would prevent you to believe that you can survive
teleportation, and comp would be refuted.
But that seems to be equivocation on 'you'. 'I' have a certain continuity of thought and
more distant memories. The hypothetical teleportation would necessarily (nomologically)
produce a discontinuity in thought, so my identity would depend on my memories. Small
changes in memory would still allow 'me' to identify myself with the Helsinki person, but
large ones, e.g. I remember living in Brussels not Helsinki, would make 'me' a different
person. 'I' am an inference, or a construct, from my memory (including unconscious
habit/memory). So the question as to which probability I have finding myself in M or W is
ill posed; it assumes that there is one 'I' and we can ask where this 'I' finds himself.
But there is no 'I' in this sense.
I don't think that affects the idea of 1p uncertainty though. If you believe QM is
correct you already believe there is 1p uncertainty; even if you like Copenhagen.
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