On 3/7/2012 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Mar 2012, at 19:43, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 3/6/2012 12:52 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Mar 2012, at 17:53, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/6/2012 5:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
That specific retrodiction came from Bruno's hypothesis which is that universes are generated by computation. What is computable is much less than all mathematics.

This is not my hypothesis. It might be Fredkin or Schmidhuber hypothesis, but not mine. My hypothesis is the hypothesis that "I am a machine", which is ambiguous, so I put it in the form of "yes doctor", which means that there exist a level such that my consciousness remains unchanged for a digital functional substitution done at that level.

And then the reasoning shows that the physical universe(s), are not generated by any computation. Computations generated my consciousness, and the physical universe is what my consciousness can predict from the mixing of determinacy and 1-indterminacy in the UD* (or sigma_1 part of arithmetic).

If I had written universes are indirectly generated by computation, would that have reflected your view?

But the presence of the word "generated" might still lead to confusion in this setting. Universe(s) are only observed, It is, or they are the 'natural solution' of the comp diophantine measure problem, which bear on the first person.

The only catch I see is that you wrote "can predict" instead of "must predict". Are you allowing for some agency here? m
I allow for agency, but not at that level. Indeed Matter, but matter only, is what the mind cannot act on. But the mind can act on the mind, and agency emerges at higher levels.

Dear Bruno,

Why does it seem that you are tacitly accepting the definition of matter as a "substance" as Descartes did in his substance dualism?
I precisely don't do that. That's when I use the word "primitive matter" for the aristotelian conception of matter, which is more primary than substantial, but is still primary.

Dear Bruno,

I am trying to be consistent and agree with your explanations but it is difficult. It is not your fault, our natural languages are biased inherently toward certain modalities of thinking to the exclusion of others. I was commenting on your wording, semantics.

If matter is an appearance (and not a substance), does this not allow a form of "mind acting on matter"?
In a large sense of that expression.

OK, then does this not contradict what you wrote: " Indeed Matter, but matter only, is what the mind cannot act on." I am trying to understand what you where thinking... I think of matter in terms of its best representation "that whose behavior is best computationally emulated only by itself" - following S. Wolfram's reasoning - it has a fixed point property in this way, but it is not the same fixed point as that of Kleene, it is the fixed point of Brouwer. It is "topological", not "logical". The relation between them is the main feature or 'kernel" of the process dual aspect monism that I advocate.

One only need to consider that the selection process whereby the "next" state in time of a configuration of matter is done by a computation.
This does not really work. matter is a question of observable, by machine, and the way you talk leads to the digital physics confusion, with the idea that matter is generated by programs, when matter is seen by programs, due to the first person indeterminacy, which bears on infinities of computations, not just one. They might be a winner program, but that's an open problem in the comp theory.

I am accepting as true the conjecture that there is no "winner program" in any kind of global sense, there are only local optimal winners. In this way I do not suffer from the measure problem. The local optimal winner idea is the same as a "Strategy <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategy_%28game_theory%29>" that tends to an equilibrium <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nash_equilibrium>. My reasoning follows the same reasoning of what occurs in the question of whether hypergames are finite or not.

A real example of this idea is implemented in the generation of MMORPG games <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massively_multiplayer_online_role-playing_game#System_architecture> that are very popular. Consider the Bostrom-like <http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html> question: Since we cannot prove that our physical reality is not a MMORPG virtual world, should we not bet that it actually is?

Have you seen any virtual reality generating programs and studied how they deal with concurrency problems? Do you understand the concurrency problem? It is basically that computations cannot effectively solve resource allocation problems. You might be blind to this because of your Platonist interpretation of computation and mathematics in general... :-(

Comp precisely entails that we are in infinities of "video games". So we can test if we are at the level zero, or if we are simulated, just by comparing the physics then being infinity of games, which is unique and well defined (the Z and X logics, and their higher order extension) with what we observe.

This is inherently difficult because we can only access finite computational resources to do that test in the physical world and the test requires infinite repetition to yield non-trivial results. This is the measure problem all over again! Do you see how the test by falsification is almost impossible and thus your thesis that COMP is falsifiable is very easy to argue against with weak arguments? I believe that COMP is correct but that it is incomplete, not as a theory per se but in its interpretation. Incompleteness is an inherent property of non-trivial finite theories. We also have to account for the appearance of interactions between the "stuff" of physics! The so-called psycho-physical parallelism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychophysical_parallelism>.

How do we represent interactions between the games? I conjecture that physics is the interaction between games and all interactions occur as bisimulations between them. (Each game is associated with an infinite number of computations that can implement them as you point out and the "players of the games" and the games themselves are interchangeable.)

One test for this question is to consider the upper bounds on the ability to detect differences in features at smaller and smaller scales. If, for example, space-time is "granular" then this would almost certainly prove that our physical world is isomorphic to a MMORPG.
The contrary. Comp a priori makes matter into a continuum. You confuse, like many, comp and digital physics.
I was considering a test case in my example above and did not state this explicitly. I agree with you but was trying to demonstrate an idea with an obviously false example.

I agree that COMP makes matter a continuum, but only in the case of the sum over many disjoint classes of games, similar to the concept of a multiverse in Everett and Dewitt's interpretation of QM. This is faithfully represented by considering orthocomplete lattices as plenums of Boolean algebras. But we have to be cautious in thinking of that idea because there does not exist an a priori order (or pre-order <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preorder> as the truth values are not limited to [0,1}) on the games (we see this explicitly in the case of hypergames <http://weblog.raganwald.com/2007/04/repost-hypergame-and-infinity.html> and Chu_k spaces <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chu_space>). Within each virtual reality game there is a discrete pixelation <http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,,sid9_gci844539,00.html> which is the substitution level for the generated content of the game. This is what generates the "appearance" of substance. Digital physics does not take the relativity of this into account as it tacitly assumes a lowest upper bound on the computational resources of the "physics", i.e. it only considers one "physics" that is implemented digitally, we see this in Zuse <http://www.americanscientist.org/bookshelf/pub/the-computational-universe> , Schmidhuber <http://www.americanscientist.org/authors/detail/juumlrgen-schmidhuber> and Lloyd's work. COMP assumes the relativity and accounts for it in terms of the substitution level in Yes Doctor, but suffers from problems induced by "classical physics" thinking. (My complaints about teleportation are a reference to this.)

This idea would be compatible with COMP if we can identify the "players of the MMORPG" with the individual Löbian machines. Given that some very resent observations of ultra-high energy gamma photons indicate that space-time is not granular, we need a more sophisticated theory to get the idea to work.

Not at all. Comp implies high plausibility of the existence of a physical continuum, given that physics becomes an infinite sum of infinite computations, including infinite dovetailing on infinities of fields, including the reals. You are not yet taking into account the role of the first person indeterminacy in the translation of the comp body problem into a measure problem on the whole UD*, I think.

Maybe we have completely different ideas of what "physics" is. For me, "physics" is the content and dynamics of a "common world of experience" that is invariant with respect to transformations (copy and paste operations in and between observers!) of 1p plural "content", aka "diffeomorphisms <http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Diffeomorphism.html>". It is the "sharable" content in the sense that all observers that believe that they "communicate with each other" (without contradictions!) and their belief is true (in the Bp&p sense) within their shared content. But this only is considering the dynamics, there is also the "stuff" that undergoes these dynamics and the appearences of such must be accounted for. I conjecture (with Vaughan Pratt) that the "stuff" (particles, atoms, electrons, photons, etc.) is faithfully representable as topological spaces (not just as number theoretical relations) and thus the relation between logics and topologies is the same relation as that between minds and bodies. So yes, the mind-body problem does reduce to a body problem in COMP. Pratt points this out in his papers when he mentioned that interactions between minds and bodies is trivial, but interactions between minds (or bodies) is not. This is the concurrency problem (and the measure problem!) that I keep mentioning. I see "sharing" not as an a priori relation, like set intersection, only but also as the collection of equivalences between observers - which I am considering in terms of games as their 1p content - is it more like an equivalence class as a Category but with natural transformations <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_transformation> in addition to endomorphisms. There is a version of this idea in the study of "quantum games" where it has been shown that entanglement generates behavior that, in some limit, is identical to classical "substance exchange" models of interaction without any actual "substance exchange". A similar notion is found in Leibniz' notion of monads but an error in reasoning prevented any progress there. Consideration of this kind of idea is important if we are to finally disabuse ourselves of the Aristotelian notion of substance.

No. The reason why "my consciousness" can predict, as opposed to "must predict", is the first person indeterminacy. It is the fact that I cannot know which machine I am, nor which computations executes the relevant states.

We can have partial information set, like, assuming bla-bla-bla, if I am duplicate in {W, M}, I will feel to be in M or in W. That is disjuncts. But by UDA-(step 8 included), I have to say at each instant I will be in u1, u2, u3, u4, ... that is the infinite sequence of programs generating my current state. They all compete in the measure, and "we" can only see the result of that from inside. Here the 1p and its invariance for the delays explains that such "results" never appear in the UD, but is on the border of UD*.

Does not first person indeterminacy also occur in any kind of displacement of relative position, no matter how small that displacement might be? But we have to consider more than one kind of change. We have to consider relative changes for all possible observables such that thecanonical conjugate rule <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canonical_conjugate> is preserved.
We don't have yet any notion of position, so your problem is not yet formalizable in the comp frame. It is premature.
Yes, it may be premature, but conjecture we must or the open problems will never be solved. I wish you would discuss with me the Tennebaum issue that I have mentioned previously. It is part of the reasoning of my conjecture. My main difficulty is that my thinking on this is not in a verbal or symbolic format and so my ability to coherently communicate it is hobbled. It is more a "picture in my head" that I am struggling to communicate...



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