On 07 Mar 2012, at 16:34, Stephen P. King wrote:

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I am trying to be consistent and agree with your explanationsbut it is difficult. It is not your fault, our natural languages arebiased inherently toward certain modalities of thinking to theexclusion of others. I was commenting on your wording, semantics.

OK.

If matter is an appearance (and not a substance), does this notallow a form of "mind acting on matter"?[BM] In a large sense of that expression.[SPK]OK, then does this not contradict what you wrote: " IndeedMatter, but matter only, is what the mind cannot act on." I amtrying to understand what you where thinking... I think of matter interms of its best representation "that whose behavior is bestcomputationally emulated only by itself" - following S. Wolfram'sreasoning - it has a fixed point property in this way, but it is notthe same fixed point as that of Kleene, it is the fixed point ofBrouwer. It is "topological", not "logical". The relation betweenthem is the main feature or 'kernel" of the process dual aspectmonism that I advocate.

`I still don't know what is your theory. Also the set theoretic`

`semantic of the S4 modal logic is toplogical, so it is not necessary`

`to oppose logic and topology, especially in context having non`

`classical meta logics, like with the intensional variant of self-`

`reference.`

One only need to consider that the selection process whereby the"next" state in time of a configuration of matter is done by acomputation.[BM]This does not really work. matter is a question of observable, bymachine, and the way you talk leads to the digital physicsconfusion, with the idea that matter is generated by programs, whenmatter is seen by programs, due to the first person indeterminacy,which bears on infinities of computations, not just one. They mightbe a winner program, but that's an open problem in the comp theory.[SPK]I am accepting as true the conjecture that there is no "winnerprogram" in any kind of global sense, there are only local optimalwinners.

`It is an open problem in comp. Empirically, we might say that there`

`are evidence for universal quantum dovetailing, perhaps even made by`

`the "music of he primes", given the bizarre behavior of the zeta`

`functions, whose non trivial zero seems to emulate a form of quantum`

`chaotic repulsion, which to my knowledge might be a candidate for`

`quantum dovetailing. I don't know.`

In this way I do not suffer from the measure problem.

`But comp reduce the "belief in matter" to the measure problem. By not`

`having the "problem of matter", you miss the needed solution of it`

`which would justify the quanta and the qualia when we assume`

`computationalism.`

The local optimal winner idea is the same as a "Strategy" that tendsto an equilibrium. My reasoning follows the same reasoning of whatoccurs in the question of whether hypergames are finite or not.A real example of this idea is implemented in the generationof MMORPG games that are very popular. Consider the Bostrom-likequestion: Since we cannot prove that our physical reality is not aMMORPG virtual world, should we not bet that it actually is?[BM] ?[SPK]Have you seen any virtual reality generating programs andstudied how they deal with concurrency problems? Do you understandthe concurrency problem?

`Sure. I told you that the best work on that, imo, are the work of`

`Abramski, and Girard, Duncan, etc.`

`I already explained that we might use that some day. Sure. It is very`

`interesting. But to get both the qualia and the quanta, such logics`

`need to be extracted from self-reference.`

It is basically that computations cannot effectively solve resourceallocation problems. You might be blind to this because of yourPlatonist interpretation of computation and mathematics ingeneral... :-(

`You could as well say that comp is blind on black holes, because we`

`have not yet derived their existence from comp. It makes no sense.`

Comp precisely entails that we are in infinities of "video games".So we can test if we are at the level zero, or if we aresimulated, just by comparing the physics then being infinity ofgames, which is unique and well defined (the Z and X logics, andtheir higher order extension) with what we observe.[SPK]This is inherently difficult because we can only access finitecomputational resources to do that test in the physical world andthe test requires infinite repetition to yield non-trivial results.This is the measure problem all over again!

`It can't be the same measure problem, given that "physics" has to be`

`the solution of the measure problem.`

Do you see how the test by falsification is almost impossible andthus your thesis that COMP is falsifiable is very easy to argueagainst with weak arguments?

`Then such arguments should be used as a clue to find a logical flaw in`

`the reasoning. But when you did try this, you did not succeed in`

`making clear your assumption, but it seems it begged the question by`

`assuming a primitive physical reality, contradicting your neutral`

`monist hypothesis.`

All the test are statistical, once a physical reality is implied.

I believe that COMP is correct but that it is incomplete, not as atheory per se but in its interpretation. Incompleteness is aninherent property of non-trivial finite theories. We also have toaccount for the appearance of interactions between the "stuff" ofphysics! The so-called psycho-physical parallelism.

`It is incomplete like any theory on "reality". Even its basic formal 3-`

`realm, like (N,+,*), is not completely axiomatizable. And the`

`epistemology is incommensurably bigger.`

`It should be obvious that we have to explain the apparent interaction`

`between the stuff of physics, and where that come from. Comp explains`

`precisely where that come from, and if someone can prove that there is`

`no interaction there, I agree that comp is refute.`

How do we represent interactions between the games? I conjecturethat physics is the interaction between games and all interactionsoccur as bisimulations between them. (Each game is associated withan infinite number of computations that can implement them as youpoint out and the "players of the games" and the games themselvesare interchangeable.)

`It is up to you to see if this fit with comp, in case you are`

`interested in that question.`

One test for this question is to consider the upper bounds on theability to detect differences in features at smaller and smallerscales. If, for example, space-time is "granular" then this wouldalmost certainly prove that our physical world is isomorphic to aMMORPG.[BM]The contrary. Comp a priori makes matter into a continuum. Youconfuse, like many, comp and digital physics.[SPK]I was considering a test case in my example above and did notstate this explicitly. I agree with you but was trying todemonstrate an idea with an obviously false example.I agree that COMP makes matter a continuum, but only in the caseof the sum over many disjoint classes of games, similar to theconcept of a multiverse in Everett and Dewitt's interpretation ofQM. This is faithfully represented by considering orthocompletelattices as plenums of Boolean algebras. But we have to be cautiousin thinking of that idea because there does not exist an a prioriorder (or pre-order as the truth values are not limited to [0,1}) onthe games (we see this explicitly in the case of hypergames andChu_k spaces).

`This is like saying that the proof of the irrationality of sqrt(2)`

`should be reconsidered in term of the discovery of the real numbers,`

`and the complex numbers, and the octonions.`

`You seem to ignore what I said in my preceding post, which is that`

`comp is not a solution, but a problem. I problem that I find`

`interesting, and work hard to make more precise.`

Within each virtual reality game there is a discrete pixelationwhich is the substitution level for the generated content of thegame. This is what generates the "appearance" of substance. Digitalphysics does not take the relativity of this into account as ittacitly assumes a lowest upper bound on the computational resourcesof the "physics", i.e. it only considers one "physics" that isimplemented digitally, we see this in Zuse , Schmidhuber and Lloyd'swork.

OK.

COMP assumes the relativity and accounts for it in terms of thesubstitution level in Yes Doctor, but suffers from problems inducedby "classical physics" thinking. (My complaints about teleportationare a reference to this.)

`It transforms the mind body problem into a body problem in arithmetic/`

`computer-science.`

`That is a modest success. Even f radical with respect to the current`

`"theology".`

`It shows also a path for the solution, which is cute, given that it`

`consists mainly in just asking the mathematically correct machines.`

This idea would be compatible with COMP if we can identify the"players of the MMORPG" with the individual Löbian machines.Given that some very resent observations of ultra-high energygamma photons indicate that space-time is not granular,we need a more sophisticated theory to get the idea to work.Not at all. Comp implies high plausibility of the existence of aphysical continuum, given that physics becomes an infinitesum of infinite computations, including infinite dovetailing oninfinities of fields, including the reals. You are not yet takinginto account the role of the first person indeterminacy in thetranslation of the comp body problem into a measure problem on thewhole UD*, I think.[SPK]Maybe we have completely different ideas of what "physics" is.For me, "physics" is the content and dynamics of a "common world ofexperience" that is invariant with respect to transformations (copyand paste operations in and between observers!) of 1p plural"content",

Not bad!

aka "diffeomorphisms".

`But here you jump too muck quickly. I can understand an analogy, but`

`in the technical context, you have to be clear if it is an analogy or`

`not.`

`For most, it *looks* like a 1004 fallacy, of using a technical term`

`more precise than we can derived precisely from what we currently know.`

It is the "sharable" content in the sense that all observers thatbelieve that they "communicate with each other" (withoutcontradictions!) and their belief is true (in the Bp&p sense) withintheir shared content. But this only is considering the dynamics,there is also the "stuff" that undergoes these dynamics and theappearences of such must be accounted for.

`No. That's where in, AUDA (alias machine's interview, the second part`

`of sane04) comes the Bp & Dt modal nuances, again making sense by`

`incompleteness and the fact that machine's "knows" that they are`

`incomplete.`

`But this is just a translation of the idea that if you duplicate`

`yourself in Washington and Moscow, and IF you want to be sure that you`

`will drink coffee, then you will need that`

Washington (or Moscow) exist, render basically by the Dt

`coffee exists in Moscow and coffee exists in Washington, that is`

`coffee exists in all your extension, which by Gödel's completeness`

`(which applies to ideal machines talking in first order logic or in`

`effective correct extensions) can be rendred by Bp.`

`So the "measure one" appearance (the hope in coffee) of the stuff has`

`to be accounted by the logic "Bp & Dt" obeys, with p accessible in UD*`

`(modeled by the restriction of p on the sigma_1 arithmetical sentences).`

I conjecture (with Vaughan Pratt) that the "stuff" (particles,atoms, electrons, photons, etc.) is faithfully representable astopological spaces (not just as number theoretical relations) andthus the relation between logics and topologies is the same relationas that between minds and bodies. So yes, the mind-body problem doesreduce to a body problem in COMP. Pratt points this out in hispapers when he mentioned that interactions between minds and bodiesis trivial, but interactions between minds (or bodies) is not. Thisis the concurrency problem (and the measure problem!) that I keepmentioning.I see "sharing" not as an a priori relation, like setintersection, only but also as the collection of equivalencesbetween observers - which I am considering in terms of games astheir 1p content - is it more like an equivalence class as aCategory but with natural transformations in addition toendomorphisms. There is a version of this idea in the study of"quantum games" where it has been shown that entanglement generatesbehavior that, in some limit, is identical to classical "substanceexchange" models of interaction without any actual "substanceexchange". A similar notion is found in Leibniz' notion of monadsbut an error in reasoning prevented any progress there.Consideration of this kind of idea is important if we are tofinally disabuse ourselves of the Aristotelian notion of substance.

Sure.

No. The reason why "my consciousness" can predict, as opposed to"must predict", is the first person indeterminacy. It is the factthat I cannot know which machine I am, nor which computationsexecutes the relevant states.We can have partial information set, like, assuming bla-bla-bla,if I am duplicate in {W, M}, I will feel to be in M or in W. Thatis disjuncts. But by UDA-(step 8 included), I have to say at eachinstant I will be in u1, u2, u3, u4, ... that is the infinitesequence of programs generating my current state. They allcompete in the measure, and "we" can only see the result of thatfrom inside. Here the 1p and its invariance for the delaysexplains that such "results" never appear in the UD, but is onthe border of UD*.Does not first person indeterminacy also occur in any kind ofdisplacement of relative position, no matter how smallthat displacement might be? But we have to consider more than onekind of change. We have to consider relative changes for allpossible observables such that the canonical conjugate rule ispreserved.[BM]We don't have yet any notion of position, so your problem is notyet formalizable in the comp frame. It is premature.[SPK]Yes, it may be premature, but conjecture we must or the openproblems will never be solved.

`Sure. But some post you send can look like given an hundred PhD`

`subjects.`

I wish you would discuss with me the Tennebaum issue that I havementioned previously. It is part of the reasoning of my conjecture.My main difficulty is that my thinking on this is not in a verbal orsymbolic format and so my ability to coherently communicate it ishobbled. It is more a "picture in my head" that I am struggling tocommunicate...

Communicating is part of the job when you want share the fun. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.