On 07 Mar 2012, at 16:34, Stephen P. King wrote:

I am trying to be consistent and agree with your explanations but it is difficult. It is not your fault, our natural languages are biased inherently toward certain modalities of thinking to the exclusion of others. I was commenting on your wording, semantics.


If matter is an appearance (and not a substance), does this not allow a form of "mind acting on matter"?
In a large sense of that expression.

OK, then does this not contradict what you wrote: " Indeed Matter, but matter only, is what the mind cannot act on." I am trying to understand what you where thinking... I think of matter in terms of its best representation "that whose behavior is best computationally emulated only by itself" - following S. Wolfram's reasoning - it has a fixed point property in this way, but it is not the same fixed point as that of Kleene, it is the fixed point of Brouwer. It is "topological", not "logical". The relation between them is the main feature or 'kernel" of the process dual aspect monism that I advocate.

I still don't know what is your theory. Also the set theoretic semantic of the S4 modal logic is toplogical, so it is not necessary to oppose logic and topology, especially in context having non classical meta logics, like with the intensional variant of self- reference.

One only need to consider that the selection process whereby the "next" state in time of a configuration of matter is done by a computation.
This does not really work. matter is a question of observable, by machine, and the way you talk leads to the digital physics confusion, with the idea that matter is generated by programs, when matter is seen by programs, due to the first person indeterminacy, which bears on infinities of computations, not just one. They might be a winner program, but that's an open problem in the comp theory.

I am accepting as true the conjecture that there is no "winner program" in any kind of global sense, there are only local optimal winners.

It is an open problem in comp. Empirically, we might say that there are evidence for universal quantum dovetailing, perhaps even made by the "music of he primes", given the bizarre behavior of the zeta functions, whose non trivial zero seems to emulate a form of quantum chaotic repulsion, which to my knowledge might be a candidate for quantum dovetailing. I don't know.

In this way I do not suffer from the measure problem.

But comp reduce the "belief in matter" to the measure problem. By not having the "problem of matter", you miss the needed solution of it which would justify the quanta and the qualia when we assume computationalism.

The local optimal winner idea is the same as a "Strategy" that tends to an equilibrium. My reasoning follows the same reasoning of what occurs in the question of whether hypergames are finite or not.

A real example of this idea is implemented in the generation of MMORPG games that are very popular. Consider the Bostrom-like question: Since we cannot prove that our physical reality is not a MMORPG virtual world, should we not bet that it actually is?

Have you seen any virtual reality generating programs and studied how they deal with concurrency problems? Do you understand the concurrency problem?

Sure. I told you that the best work on that, imo, are the work of Abramski, and Girard, Duncan, etc. I already explained that we might use that some day. Sure. It is very interesting. But to get both the qualia and the quanta, such logics need to be extracted from self-reference.

It is basically that computations cannot effectively solve resource allocation problems. You might be blind to this because of your Platonist interpretation of computation and mathematics in general... :-(

You could as well say that comp is blind on black holes, because we have not yet derived their existence from comp. It makes no sense.

Comp precisely entails that we are in infinities of "video games". So we can test if we are at the level zero, or if we are simulated, just by comparing the physics then being infinity of games, which is unique and well defined (the Z and X logics, and their higher order extension) with what we observe.

This is inherently difficult because we can only access finite computational resources to do that test in the physical world and the test requires infinite repetition to yield non-trivial results. This is the measure problem all over again!

It can't be the same measure problem, given that "physics" has to be the solution of the measure problem.

Do you see how the test by falsification is almost impossible and thus your thesis that COMP is falsifiable is very easy to argue against with weak arguments?

Then such arguments should be used as a clue to find a logical flaw in the reasoning. But when you did try this, you did not succeed in making clear your assumption, but it seems it begged the question by assuming a primitive physical reality, contradicting your neutral monist hypothesis.

All the test are statistical, once a physical reality is implied.

I believe that COMP is correct but that it is incomplete, not as a theory per se but in its interpretation. Incompleteness is an inherent property of non-trivial finite theories. We also have to account for the appearance of interactions between the "stuff" of physics! The so-called psycho-physical parallelism.

It is incomplete like any theory on "reality". Even its basic formal 3- realm, like (N,+,*), is not completely axiomatizable. And the epistemology is incommensurably bigger.

It should be obvious that we have to explain the apparent interaction between the stuff of physics, and where that come from. Comp explains precisely where that come from, and if someone can prove that there is no interaction there, I agree that comp is refute.

How do we represent interactions between the games? I conjecture that physics is the interaction between games and all interactions occur as bisimulations between them. (Each game is associated with an infinite number of computations that can implement them as you point out and the "players of the games" and the games themselves are interchangeable.)

It is up to you to see if this fit with comp, in case you are interested in that question.

One test for this question is to consider the upper bounds on the ability to detect differences in features at smaller and smaller scales. If, for example, space-time is "granular" then this would almost certainly prove that our physical world is isomorphic to a MMORPG.
The contrary. Comp a priori makes matter into a continuum. You confuse, like many, comp and digital physics.
I was considering a test case in my example above and did not state this explicitly. I agree with you but was trying to demonstrate an idea with an obviously false example.

I agree that COMP makes matter a continuum, but only in the case of the sum over many disjoint classes of games, similar to the concept of a multiverse in Everett and Dewitt's interpretation of QM. This is faithfully represented by considering orthocomplete lattices as plenums of Boolean algebras. But we have to be cautious in thinking of that idea because there does not exist an a priori order (or pre-order as the truth values are not limited to [0,1}) on the games (we see this explicitly in the case of hypergames and Chu_k spaces).

This is like saying that the proof of the irrationality of sqrt(2) should be reconsidered in term of the discovery of the real numbers, and the complex numbers, and the octonions.

You seem to ignore what I said in my preceding post, which is that comp is not a solution, but a problem. I problem that I find interesting, and work hard to make more precise.

Within each virtual reality game there is a discrete pixelation which is the substitution level for the generated content of the game. This is what generates the "appearance" of substance. Digital physics does not take the relativity of this into account as it tacitly assumes a lowest upper bound on the computational resources of the "physics", i.e. it only considers one "physics" that is implemented digitally, we see this in Zuse , Schmidhuber and Lloyd's work.


COMP assumes the relativity and accounts for it in terms of the substitution level in Yes Doctor, but suffers from problems induced by "classical physics" thinking. (My complaints about teleportation are a reference to this.)

It transforms the mind body problem into a body problem in arithmetic/ computer-science.

That is a modest success. Even f radical with respect to the current "theology". It shows also a path for the solution, which is cute, given that it consists mainly in just asking the mathematically correct machines.

This idea would be compatible with COMP if we can identify the "players of the MMORPG" with the individual Löbian machines. Given that some very resent observations of ultra-high energy gamma photons indicate that space-time is not granular, we need a more sophisticated theory to get the idea to work.

Not at all. Comp implies high plausibility of the existence of a physical continuum, given that physics becomes an infinite sum of infinite computations, including infinite dovetailing on infinities of fields, including the reals. You are not yet taking into account the role of the first person indeterminacy in the translation of the comp body problem into a measure problem on the whole UD*, I think.

Maybe we have completely different ideas of what "physics" is. For me, "physics" is the content and dynamics of a "common world of experience" that is invariant with respect to transformations (copy and paste operations in and between observers!) of 1p plural "content",

Not bad!

aka "diffeomorphisms".

But here you jump too muck quickly. I can understand an analogy, but in the technical context, you have to be clear if it is an analogy or not. For most, it *looks* like a 1004 fallacy, of using a technical term more precise than we can derived precisely from what we currently know.

It is the "sharable" content in the sense that all observers that believe that they "communicate with each other" (without contradictions!) and their belief is true (in the Bp&p sense) within their shared content. But this only is considering the dynamics, there is also the "stuff" that undergoes these dynamics and the appearences of such must be accounted for.

No. That's where in, AUDA (alias machine's interview, the second part of sane04) comes the Bp & Dt modal nuances, again making sense by incompleteness and the fact that machine's "knows" that they are incomplete.

But this is just a translation of the idea that if you duplicate yourself in Washington and Moscow, and IF you want to be sure that you will drink coffee, then you will need that
Washington (or Moscow) exist, render basically by the Dt
coffee exists in Moscow and coffee exists in Washington, that is coffee exists in all your extension, which by Gödel's completeness (which applies to ideal machines talking in first order logic or in effective correct extensions) can be rendred by Bp. So the "measure one" appearance (the hope in coffee) of the stuff has to be accounted by the logic "Bp & Dt" obeys, with p accessible in UD* (modeled by the restriction of p on the sigma_1 arithmetical sentences).

I conjecture (with Vaughan Pratt) that the "stuff" (particles, atoms, electrons, photons, etc.) is faithfully representable as topological spaces (not just as number theoretical relations) and thus the relation between logics and topologies is the same relation as that between minds and bodies. So yes, the mind-body problem does reduce to a body problem in COMP. Pratt points this out in his papers when he mentioned that interactions between minds and bodies is trivial, but interactions between minds (or bodies) is not. This is the concurrency problem (and the measure problem!) that I keep mentioning. I see "sharing" not as an a priori relation, like set intersection, only but also as the collection of equivalences between observers - which I am considering in terms of games as their 1p content - is it more like an equivalence class as a Category but with natural transformations in addition to endomorphisms. There is a version of this idea in the study of "quantum games" where it has been shown that entanglement generates behavior that, in some limit, is identical to classical "substance exchange" models of interaction without any actual "substance exchange". A similar notion is found in Leibniz' notion of monads but an error in reasoning prevented any progress there. Consideration of this kind of idea is important if we are to finally disabuse ourselves of the Aristotelian notion of substance.


No. The reason why "my consciousness" can predict, as opposed to "must predict", is the first person indeterminacy. It is the fact that I cannot know which machine I am, nor which computations executes the relevant states.

We can have partial information set, like, assuming bla-bla-bla, if I am duplicate in {W, M}, I will feel to be in M or in W. That is disjuncts. But by UDA-(step 8 included), I have to say at each instant I will be in u1, u2, u3, u4, ... that is the infinite sequence of programs generating my current state. They all compete in the measure, and "we" can only see the result of that from inside. Here the 1p and its invariance for the delays explains that such "results" never appear in the UD, but is on the border of UD*.

Does not first person indeterminacy also occur in any kind of displacement of relative position, no matter how small that displacement might be? But we have to consider more than one kind of change. We have to consider relative changes for all possible observables such that the canonical conjugate rule is preserved.
We don't have yet any notion of position, so your problem is not yet formalizable in the comp frame. It is premature.
Yes, it may be premature, but conjecture we must or the open problems will never be solved.

Sure. But some post you send can look like given an hundred PhD subjects.

I wish you would discuss with me the Tennebaum issue that I have mentioned previously. It is part of the reasoning of my conjecture. My main difficulty is that my thinking on this is not in a verbal or symbolic format and so my ability to coherently communicate it is hobbled. It is more a "picture in my head" that I am struggling to communicate...

Communicating is part of the job when you want share the fun.



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