On 07 Mar 2012, at 16:34, Stephen P. King wrote:
I am trying to be consistent and agree with your explanations
but it is difficult. It is not your fault, our natural languages are
biased inherently toward certain modalities of thinking to the
exclusion of others. I was commenting on your wording, semantics.
OK.
If matter is an appearance (and not a substance), does this not
allow a form of "mind acting on matter"?
[BM]
In a large sense of that expression.
[SPK]
OK, then does this not contradict what you wrote: " Indeed
Matter, but matter only, is what the mind cannot act on." I am
trying to understand what you where thinking... I think of matter in
terms of its best representation "that whose behavior is best
computationally emulated only by itself" - following S. Wolfram's
reasoning - it has a fixed point property in this way, but it is not
the same fixed point as that of Kleene, it is the fixed point of
Brouwer. It is "topological", not "logical". The relation between
them is the main feature or 'kernel" of the process dual aspect
monism that I advocate.
I still don't know what is your theory. Also the set theoretic
semantic of the S4 modal logic is toplogical, so it is not necessary
to oppose logic and topology, especially in context having non
classical meta logics, like with the intensional variant of self-
reference.
One only need to consider that the selection process whereby the
"next" state in time of a configuration of matter is done by a
computation.
[BM]
This does not really work. matter is a question of observable, by
machine, and the way you talk leads to the digital physics
confusion, with the idea that matter is generated by programs, when
matter is seen by programs, due to the first person indeterminacy,
which bears on infinities of computations, not just one. They might
be a winner program, but that's an open problem in the comp theory.
[SPK]
I am accepting as true the conjecture that there is no "winner
program" in any kind of global sense, there are only local optimal
winners.
It is an open problem in comp. Empirically, we might say that there
are evidence for universal quantum dovetailing, perhaps even made by
the "music of he primes", given the bizarre behavior of the zeta
functions, whose non trivial zero seems to emulate a form of quantum
chaotic repulsion, which to my knowledge might be a candidate for
quantum dovetailing. I don't know.
In this way I do not suffer from the measure problem.
But comp reduce the "belief in matter" to the measure problem. By not
having the "problem of matter", you miss the needed solution of it
which would justify the quanta and the qualia when we assume
computationalism.
The local optimal winner idea is the same as a "Strategy" that tends
to an equilibrium. My reasoning follows the same reasoning of what
occurs in the question of whether hypergames are finite or not.
A real example of this idea is implemented in the generation
of MMORPG games that are very popular. Consider the Bostrom-like
question: Since we cannot prove that our physical reality is not a
MMORPG virtual world, should we not bet that it actually is?
[BM]
?
[SPK]
Have you seen any virtual reality generating programs and
studied how they deal with concurrency problems? Do you understand
the concurrency problem?
Sure. I told you that the best work on that, imo, are the work of
Abramski, and Girard, Duncan, etc.
I already explained that we might use that some day. Sure. It is very
interesting. But to get both the qualia and the quanta, such logics
need to be extracted from self-reference.
It is basically that computations cannot effectively solve resource
allocation problems. You might be blind to this because of your
Platonist interpretation of computation and mathematics in
general... :-(
You could as well say that comp is blind on black holes, because we
have not yet derived their existence from comp. It makes no sense.
Comp precisely entails that we are in infinities of "video games".
So we can test if we are at the level zero, or if we are
simulated, just by comparing the physics then being infinity of
games, which is unique and well defined (the Z and X logics, and
their higher order extension) with what we observe.
[SPK]
This is inherently difficult because we can only access finite
computational resources to do that test in the physical world and
the test requires infinite repetition to yield non-trivial results.
This is the measure problem all over again!
It can't be the same measure problem, given that "physics" has to be
the solution of the measure problem.
Do you see how the test by falsification is almost impossible and
thus your thesis that COMP is falsifiable is very easy to argue
against with weak arguments?
Then such arguments should be used as a clue to find a logical flaw in
the reasoning. But when you did try this, you did not succeed in
making clear your assumption, but it seems it begged the question by
assuming a primitive physical reality, contradicting your neutral
monist hypothesis.
All the test are statistical, once a physical reality is implied.
I believe that COMP is correct but that it is incomplete, not as a
theory per se but in its interpretation. Incompleteness is an
inherent property of non-trivial finite theories. We also have to
account for the appearance of interactions between the "stuff" of
physics! The so-called psycho-physical parallelism.
It is incomplete like any theory on "reality". Even its basic formal 3-
realm, like (N,+,*), is not completely axiomatizable. And the
epistemology is incommensurably bigger.
It should be obvious that we have to explain the apparent interaction
between the stuff of physics, and where that come from. Comp explains
precisely where that come from, and if someone can prove that there is
no interaction there, I agree that comp is refute.
How do we represent interactions between the games? I conjecture
that physics is the interaction between games and all interactions
occur as bisimulations between them. (Each game is associated with
an infinite number of computations that can implement them as you
point out and the "players of the games" and the games themselves
are interchangeable.)
It is up to you to see if this fit with comp, in case you are
interested in that question.
One test for this question is to consider the upper bounds on the
ability to detect differences in features at smaller and smaller
scales. If, for example, space-time is "granular" then this would
almost certainly prove that our physical world is isomorphic to a
MMORPG.
[BM]
The contrary. Comp a priori makes matter into a continuum. You
confuse, like many, comp and digital physics.
[SPK]
I was considering a test case in my example above and did not
state this explicitly. I agree with you but was trying to
demonstrate an idea with an obviously false example.
I agree that COMP makes matter a continuum, but only in the case
of the sum over many disjoint classes of games, similar to the
concept of a multiverse in Everett and Dewitt's interpretation of
QM. This is faithfully represented by considering orthocomplete
lattices as plenums of Boolean algebras. But we have to be cautious
in thinking of that idea because there does not exist an a priori
order (or pre-order as the truth values are not limited to [0,1}) on
the games (we see this explicitly in the case of hypergames and
Chu_k spaces).
This is like saying that the proof of the irrationality of sqrt(2)
should be reconsidered in term of the discovery of the real numbers,
and the complex numbers, and the octonions.
You seem to ignore what I said in my preceding post, which is that
comp is not a solution, but a problem. I problem that I find
interesting, and work hard to make more precise.
Within each virtual reality game there is a discrete pixelation
which is the substitution level for the generated content of the
game. This is what generates the "appearance" of substance. Digital
physics does not take the relativity of this into account as it
tacitly assumes a lowest upper bound on the computational resources
of the "physics", i.e. it only considers one "physics" that is
implemented digitally, we see this in Zuse , Schmidhuber and Lloyd's
work.
OK.
COMP assumes the relativity and accounts for it in terms of the
substitution level in Yes Doctor, but suffers from problems induced
by "classical physics" thinking. (My complaints about teleportation
are a reference to this.)
It transforms the mind body problem into a body problem in arithmetic/
computer-science.
That is a modest success. Even f radical with respect to the current
"theology".
It shows also a path for the solution, which is cute, given that it
consists mainly in just asking the mathematically correct machines.
This idea would be compatible with COMP if we can identify the
"players of the MMORPG" with the individual Löbian machines.
Given that some very resent observations of ultra-high energy
gamma photons indicate that space-time is not granular,
we need a more sophisticated theory to get the idea to work.
Not at all. Comp implies high plausibility of the existence of a
physical continuum, given that physics becomes an infinite
sum of infinite computations, including infinite dovetailing on
infinities of fields, including the reals. You are not yet taking
into account the role of the first person indeterminacy in the
translation of the comp body problem into a measure problem on the
whole UD*, I think.
[SPK]
Maybe we have completely different ideas of what "physics" is.
For me, "physics" is the content and dynamics of a "common world of
experience" that is invariant with respect to transformations (copy
and paste operations in and between observers!) of 1p plural
"content",
Not bad!
aka "diffeomorphisms".
But here you jump too muck quickly. I can understand an analogy, but
in the technical context, you have to be clear if it is an analogy or
not.
For most, it *looks* like a 1004 fallacy, of using a technical term
more precise than we can derived precisely from what we currently know.
It is the "sharable" content in the sense that all observers that
believe that they "communicate with each other" (without
contradictions!) and their belief is true (in the Bp&p sense) within
their shared content. But this only is considering the dynamics,
there is also the "stuff" that undergoes these dynamics and the
appearences of such must be accounted for.
No. That's where in, AUDA (alias machine's interview, the second part
of sane04) comes the Bp & Dt modal nuances, again making sense by
incompleteness and the fact that machine's "knows" that they are
incomplete.
But this is just a translation of the idea that if you duplicate
yourself in Washington and Moscow, and IF you want to be sure that you
will drink coffee, then you will need that
Washington (or Moscow) exist, render basically by the Dt
coffee exists in Moscow and coffee exists in Washington, that is
coffee exists in all your extension, which by Gödel's completeness
(which applies to ideal machines talking in first order logic or in
effective correct extensions) can be rendred by Bp.
So the "measure one" appearance (the hope in coffee) of the stuff has
to be accounted by the logic "Bp & Dt" obeys, with p accessible in UD*
(modeled by the restriction of p on the sigma_1 arithmetical sentences).
I conjecture (with Vaughan Pratt) that the "stuff" (particles,
atoms, electrons, photons, etc.) is faithfully representable as
topological spaces (not just as number theoretical relations) and
thus the relation between logics and topologies is the same relation
as that between minds and bodies. So yes, the mind-body problem does
reduce to a body problem in COMP. Pratt points this out in his
papers when he mentioned that interactions between minds and bodies
is trivial, but interactions between minds (or bodies) is not. This
is the concurrency problem (and the measure problem!) that I keep
mentioning.
I see "sharing" not as an a priori relation, like set
intersection, only but also as the collection of equivalences
between observers - which I am considering in terms of games as
their 1p content - is it more like an equivalence class as a
Category but with natural transformations in addition to
endomorphisms. There is a version of this idea in the study of
"quantum games" where it has been shown that entanglement generates
behavior that, in some limit, is identical to classical "substance
exchange" models of interaction without any actual "substance
exchange". A similar notion is found in Leibniz' notion of monads
but an error in reasoning prevented any progress there.
Consideration of this kind of idea is important if we are to
finally disabuse ourselves of the Aristotelian notion of substance.
Sure.
No. The reason why "my consciousness" can predict, as opposed to
"must predict", is the first person indeterminacy. It is the fact
that I cannot know which machine I am, nor which computations
executes the relevant states.
We can have partial information set, like, assuming bla-bla-bla,
if I am duplicate in {W, M}, I will feel to be in M or in W. That
is disjuncts. But by UDA-(step 8 included), I have to say at each
instant I will be in u1, u2, u3, u4, ... that is the infinite
sequence of programs generating my current state. They all
compete in the measure, and "we" can only see the result of that
from inside. Here the 1p and its invariance for the delays
explains that such "results" never appear in the UD, but is on
the border of UD*.
Does not first person indeterminacy also occur in any kind of
displacement of relative position, no matter how small
that displacement might be? But we have to consider more than one
kind of change. We have to consider relative changes for all
possible observables such that the canonical conjugate rule is
preserved.
[BM]
We don't have yet any notion of position, so your problem is not
yet formalizable in the comp frame. It is premature.
[SPK]
Yes, it may be premature, but conjecture we must or the open
problems will never be solved.
Sure. But some post you send can look like given an hundred PhD
subjects.
I wish you would discuss with me the Tennebaum issue that I have
mentioned previously. It is part of the reasoning of my conjecture.
My main difficulty is that my thinking on this is not in a verbal or
symbolic format and so my ability to coherently communicate it is
hobbled. It is more a "picture in my head" that I am struggling to
communicate...
Communicating is part of the job when you want share the fun.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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