On 3/11/2012 4:44 PM, R AM wrote:
This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the
whole point of the exercise.
I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of
subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to
entail 100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct?
However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only
indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be
anything at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we
conclude that comp is false?
I think that you are considering the White Rabbit and Harry Potter
problems, these are the possible pathologies of COMP. Unless there is a
"natural" way to prevent their occurance, then yes, COMP is falsified.
One problem with your question is that it seems to assume that the
phrase "future experience" has a meaning the same way that "past
experience" has a meaning.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at