On 3/11/2012 4:44 PM, R AM wrote:

This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole point of the exercise.

I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to entail 100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct?

However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that comp is false?


Hi Ricardo,

I think that you are considering the White Rabbit and Harry Potter problems, these are the possible pathologies of COMP. Unless there is a "natural" way to prevent their occurance, then yes, COMP is falsified. One problem with your question is that it seems to assume that the phrase "future experience" has a meaning the same way that "past experience" has a meaning.



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