On 10 Mar 2012, at 06:22, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Mar 8, 2012 at 1:47 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> You persist in ignoring the difference between the 1-view from the 1-view pov, which is what I usually mean by 1-views, and the 1-views that an outsider can attribute to other people

So after you have been duplicated there is still a difference between "1-view pov" and "1-views that an outsider can attribute to other people". However you never make clear exactly why it can not be duplicated,

You are supposed to do the thought experiment, and this by assuming comp, and it is just very simple, for all people up to now, that the 1- views on their own 1-view is not duplicated. If the 3p description are numerically identical, like in your symmetrical room thought experiment, then there is only one 1-view, and once they differentiate, there are two different 1-view, but they feel like not having been duplicated (they know only intellectually the possible existence of the other), and that feeling is the 1-view.

and in my symmetrical room thought experiment I make it crystal clear that the first person personal subjective perspective CAN be duplicated just like everything else can be.

Crystal clear? It only shows that the 1-view is duplicated from a 3- view pov, not from the 1-view perspective.

>> I think there is a thought experiment that can resolve this issue: You are a copy of Bruno Marshal made as precisely as Heisenberg's law allows and you are now facing the original Bruno Marshal in a symmetrical room, thus the two of you are receiving identical sensory input and thus act identically. I now use a Star Trek brand transporter to instantly exchange your position with the original, or if you prefer I leave your bodies alone and just exchange the two brains. There is no way subjectively you or the original Bruno Marshal would notice that anything had happened, and objective outside observers would not notice anything had happened either. There would not even be a way to tell if the machine was actually working, I could even be lying about having a transporter. Who knows who cares?

> OK. And?

And I'm delighted you said "OK", so you agree that subjectively it makes no difference which one is the copy and which one is the original, and objectively it makes no difference which one is the copy and which one is the original; and being a man of logic you must therefore conclude that there is simply no difference between the two in any way whatsoever, including the point of view.

Yes, and that is why before the differentiation, there is only one 1- view-on-the 1-view. This just means that the duplication/ differentiation did not yet occur. But the probability/uncertainty question bears on the output of the self--localization experience after the differentiation has occurred from a 3p view.

>> Of course if there were a unsymmetrical change in the environment or there was a random quantum fluctuation that made the people different then things would evolve, well, differently, but at the instant of duplication they would still be identical. So if subjectively it makes no difference and objectively it makes no difference and even the very universe itself isn't sure if a switch had actually been made or not then I make the very reasonable assumption that it just makes no difference, and although there are two bodies and two brains in that symmetrical room there is only one intelligence and only one consciousness and only one point of view.

> OK. And?

No "and" is necessary this time because that pretty much covers it all. I'm delighted you said "OK", so you agree the point of view can be duplicated just like anything else,

The 1-view attributed by an outsider, not the 1-view from its own pov. You continue to talk like if that was the same thing.

you agree that it does not matter how many bodies or brains there are in that symmetrical room because there is only one mind,

... which mean there have not been duplicated. So you contradict what you say yourself above.

there is only one intelligence and only one consciousness and only one point of view. If we agree on all that I don't see why more needs to be said, but apparently you do.

It is just the beginning of a long reasoning. You have to come back to the original thought experiment.

> You tell me "you are duplicated" without precising if you talk on the 1-view, 3-view, 3-view of 1-view".

Yes, if subjectively and objectively there is no difference between various points of view then I refuse to pretend that there is a distinction.

But there will be a difference after the copies diverge, and the probability question bears on the future 1-views once they have differentiated.

> That would be like aa duplication W W, or M M, not W, M.

Bruno, tell the truth, when you wrote the above cryptic sentence did you honestly think it would make anything clear to any conscious entity on this planet?

It was only a way to described concisely the duplication before a differentiation is made, like in your thought experiment.

> Do you agree with this principle: if today I can be sure that tomorrow I will be uncertain about the outcome of some experience, then I am today uncertain about the outcome of that future experience.

Obviously I agree. The future is not predictable in theory and even less so in practice, but I don't think that fact tells us much about personal identity.

> Let consider again the guy in Helsinki. He will be read and annihilate [...]

I'm sorry but before I can get any further in your thought experiment, you're going to have to explain just what you mean by "annihilated". I'm confused because you go on to say that just before he was "annihilated" the information on the position and momentum of all the atoms in his body was measured and that information and generic atoms were used to make the bodies and brains of the Helsinki man in Washington and in Moscow; but all that is just equivalent to saying that the source of his external stimuli was switched from Helsinki to Washington and Moscow. Information was not annihilated, matter was not annihilated, energy was not annihilated, so just what was "annihilated" in Helsinki?

Its body. If your prefer, the local information which was available in Helsinki is erased after having been read and sent to W and to M. In step 5 we will see that if he is not erased in Helsinki, the it is a multiplication by three, and the probability related to the 1- indeterminacy, have to be 1/3, if we accept 1/2 for the duplication.

> The guy in Helsinky knew this in advance, and can apply the principle above to say that he is uncertain today, before the split, what he will see when opening

Yeah but you don't need elaborate thought experiments involving duplicating chambers to realize that you can never know for sure what you will see when you open a door, surprises are always possible.

We are in the course of a reasoning. As you illustrate, nothing is obvious, so in this case we have to explain why this particular form of "surprise" is guarantied by the comp hypothesis. And the comp explanation is trivial. This duplication is really the Colomb-Egg of indeterminacy, because it shows that the comp 3- determinacy is the reason of a necessary comp 1-indeterminacy. And here you illustrate that you get the point, so we should go to step 4.

> when both realize that there are in the reconstitution boxes, they can't know yet if they are in W or in M.

Right, they will not know if their external stimuli will come from Washington or Moscow, but there is nothing unusual or exotic about that, we can never totally predict our environment.

That is the reason why I decompose the reasoning in simple steps, to make them as usual and non exotic as possible. If not, it will be like I am asserting directly the conclusion, which you have already described as delirious or self-contradictory. But that's unclear because you did not mentioned what was self- contradictory.

> In this case, betting with the banker that they will see "Flying Circus" makes the vast majority of diary containing the sentence "shit I lost the bet".

The bet was not that "they" would see anything, the bet was that John K Clark would see Flying Circus, so the vast majority of the diaries will be "Hurray I won the bet and now I'm rich! I John K Clark saw nothing but white noise but John K Clark saw Flying Circus so I get the money". The one fellow who saw Flying Circus had every bit as much right to call himself John K Clark as the many who saw white noise. However if the bet had stipulated that only the fellow who saw Flying Circus would get the money then the vast majority of the diaries would read " I won the bet, John K Clark saw Flying Circus, but shit, I John K Clark didn't get any money because I John K Clark just saw white noise.".

If the prediction is "I will see Flying Circus", then only one exemplar of John K Clark will say "I win the bet", and the majority of all other examplars will lost it. You can use this to define the 1- indeterminacy in a 3p way, by making voting all the examplars on the best theory to predict they future 1-view in case the experience continue. The majority have seen white noise, so the majority will bet that they cannot predict their next movie-image.

>> he's the Washington guy because he received sensory information from Washington not Moscow, if he had not he would not be the Washington guy.

> The fact that he is in Washington explains this.

No, by itself it explains nothing. If his brain was in Washington but all his external stimuli came from Moscow then he'd be identical to the Moscow guy, that is to say he'd be the Moscow guy. Except when things are very far apart and signal transmission time becomes a factor the position of the brain is not important.

You add something which is just not relevant for the point into consideration. We assume the protocol is given to the guy in Helsinki, and that he trust the protocol and that the protocol is rigorously followed. You are changing the experiment.

> The guy in washington is singular. he is not even sure the guy in Moscow has been reconstituted.

That's OK, If they are identical then another way of stating the above that is exactly the same would be saying "The guy in Moscow is not even sure he is the guy in Moscow"; when one of them figures out he is the Moscow guy and the other figures out he is the Washington guy then the two are different and will have diverged. And it does not even matter if the process used to reach these conclusions were erroneous or not because it doesn't matter who if anybody is right, it only matters that the Washington guy and the Moscow guy are now no longer identical. Right or wrong the two now have different beliefs and so are different people.

Right. The point is that they were not able to predict in advance the precise localization where they feel now (after the duplication and opening the door).

> You seem to deny the very experience of each of the duplicates, when walking in their new environment.

If they wake in different environments then they immediately start generating new memories that are different from each other so obviously they differentiate from that point on,


but in my thought experiment about the symmetrical room the external stimuli are identical so you and the original Bruno Marshal are identical, so until random quantum fluctuations become significant you will not diverge, and from NOBODY'S point of view is there any difference between the original and the copy.

Sure. But the probability question bears on the self-localization result after they open the door.

> Which self-contradictory nonsense? You betray that you are not willing to change your opinion, before reading the argument, apparently.

Before reading the argument? Bruno I am not new to this, this ain't my first time at the rodeo, I have been arguing this point

Which point?

for 20 years and I always get ridiculous stuff like: There is no difference subjectively and there is no difference objectively but there is still a enormous difference,


or, the difference is not in matter or energy or information but the difference is still there, or, we don't do things for a reason and we don't not do things for a reason either. And all of that, every bit of it, is self-contradictory nonsense.

You are quite unclear. I have no idea what you are talking about. What are the precise self-contradictory statements? Are you saying that comp is self-contradictory, which would contradict your point that comp is obviously true.

> If you can predict the personally felt outcome of a duplication experience, give me the algorithm.

OK, the algorithm is not complex: I predict that if a mind is receiving external stimuli that originated in Washington then the personally felt outcome will be a feeling of being in Washington, and if a mind is receiving external stimuli that originated in Moscow then the personally felt outcome will be a feeling of being in Moscow.

Here it seems you miss again, or abstract from, the 1-views on the 1- views, which will exist in all case, for all people, in all situations, and the probability bears on 'next 1-views, as seen from the 1-view perspective".

You were just not answering the question asked.

In the W-M duplication experience, you can predict with certainty (assuming comp) that 1) you will feel to survive, and you will survive as one integral, entire, non duplicated person, from the 1-view on the 1-view. 2) you will feel having survived in either W or in M, and not in both (the symmetry is broken, because from the 1-view on itself, the consciousness of the doppelganger has to be attributed intellectually) 3) Neither the guy in W, or in M, could have predicted with certainty that he would have feel that precise W, or M self-localization result. 4) that all this remains the case for the iterated WM duplication, so that most resulting 1-view will have algorithmic incompressible stories (of the kind WMWMMWWMWWWWMM ...), but all remember surviving each time as an entire person, and so they will admit being unable to predict the next self-localization, from the 1-view points on the 1- view. The duplications give numerically identical copies, so all people are totally ignorant about their next 1-experience, but they all believe that they will have one. The winning bet, (with a banker duplicated with him) would be P = 1/2. That's the first person indeterminacy (with this protocol).

OK? Can we move on to step 4? If not I will wait for your answer to David, and others. It is not clear if you have seen the point, and notably the difference between the 1-view as seen by the 1-view, and the 1-views that we can attribute to all copies (= the 3-views on the 1-views).



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