On Tue, Jun 19, 2012 at 3:22 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> I don't see that as contrary to compatibilism which holds that 'free will'
> is compatible with determinism (but not that determinism is necessarily
> true). Of course an otherwise deterministic intelligence may make a random
> choice as part of a rational strategy. Does libertarian free will *require*
> that some actions be random?
These are the possibilities:
determinism true, free will true
determinism true, free will false
determinism false, free will true
determinism false, free will false
Now, I would say that if something is not determined, it is random.
You can think of unusual cases and they still fit into the determined
or random categories. For example, if my decisions depend on my brain
solving the halting program, I would say that is still determined,
even if it is not computable. I don't think invoking the spiritual
realm or exotic physics changes the dichotomy, although maybe the
argument comes down to semantics. In any case, the non-compatibilists
like Craig Weinberg won't be satisfied with *any* explanation of how
people make decisions: not antecedent cause, not retroactive
causation, not randomness, not manipulation by a spiritual force. It's
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