On 7/1/2012 11:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Jul 1, 2012 at 1:20 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    On 7/1/2012 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

        On 01 Jul 2012, at 09:41, meekerdb wrote:

            On 7/1/2012 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

                On 30 Jun 2012, at 22:31, meekerdb wrote:

                    On 6/30/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

                        On 30 Jun 2012, at 18:44, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

                            I think that you have mentioned that mechanism is
                            incompatible with materialism. How this follows 

                        Because concerning computation and emulation (exact 
                        all universal system are equivalent.

                        Turing machine and Fortran programs are completely 
                        you can emulate any Turing machine  by a fortran 
program, and
                        you can emulate any fortran program by a Turing machine.

                        More, you can write a fortran program emulating a 
                        Turing machine, and you can find a Turing machine 
running a
                        Fortran universal interpreter (or compiler). This means 
that not
                        only those system compute the same functions from N to 
N, but
                        also that they can compute those function in the same 
manner of
                        the other machine.

                    But the question is whether they 'compute' anything outside 
                    context of a physical realization?

                Which is addressed in the remaining of the post to Evgenii.  
                like you can emulate fortran with Turing, a little part of 
                emulate already all program fortran, Turing, etc. (see the post 
for more).

            Except neither fortran nor Turing machines exist apart from physical

        Of course they do. Turing machine and fortran program are mathematical,
        arithmetical actually, object. They exist in the same sense that the 
number 17

    Exactly, as ideas - patterns in brain processes.


What is the ontological difference between 17 and the chair you are sitting in? Both admit objective analysis, so how is either any more real than the other?

You might argue 17 is less real because we can't access it with our senses, but neither can we access the insides of stars with our senses. Yet no one disputes the reality of the insides of stars.

We access them indirectly via instruments and theories of those instruments.

You might argue the chair is more real because we can affect it, but then you would have to conclude the anything outside our light cone is not real, for we cannot affect anything outside our light cone.

You can kick it and it kicks back. Of course there are many events outside one's lightcones which one infers as part of a model of reality based on the events within one's lightcones, e.g. I suppose that the Sun continues to exist even though the photons I from which I infer it's existence are from it's past.

Also, how do you know the chair is anything more than a pattern in a brain 

How do you know you're not a brain in a vat?  or a pattern in arithmetic?


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