On 7/1/2012 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

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On 30 Jun 2012, at 22:31, meekerdb wrote:On 6/30/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 30 Jun 2012, at 18:44, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:I think that you have mentioned that mechanism is incompatible with materialism. Howthis follows then?Because concerning computation and emulation (exact simulation) all universal systemare equivalent.Turing machine and Fortran programs are completely equivalent, you can emulate anyTuring machine by a fortran program, and you can emulate any fortran program by aTuring machine.More, you can write a fortran program emulating a universal Turing machine, and youcan find a Turing machine running a Fortran universal interpreter (or compiler). Thismeans that not only those system compute the same functions from N to N, but also thatthey can compute those function in the same manner of the other machine.But the question is whether they 'compute' anything outside the context of a physicalrealization?Which is addressed in the remaining of the post to Evgenii. Exactly like you canemulate fortran with Turing, a little part of arithmetic emulate already all programfortran, Turing, etc. (see the post for more).

`Except neither fortran nor Turing machines exist apart from physical realizations. They`

`are abstractions.`

There is no need of step 8, here. It is just a mathematical fact that arithmeticemulates all programs, in the mathematical sense of "emulate".

`That's a metaphorical sense. "Arithmetic" doesn't act or perform anything, it's concept`

`and a static, timeless one at that.`

Brent

Step 8 just show that adding a substantial matter cannot make a difference from themachines' points of view, without adding a non Turing emulable ability to the mind.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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