# Re: what is mechanism?

```On 7/1/2012 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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On 30 Jun 2012, at 22:31, meekerdb wrote:

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```On 6/30/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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On 30 Jun 2012, at 18:44, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

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I think that you have mentioned that mechanism is incompatible with materialism. How this follows then?
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Because concerning computation and emulation (exact simulation) all universal system are equivalent.
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Turing machine and Fortran programs are completely equivalent, you can emulate any Turing machine by a fortran program, and you can emulate any fortran program by a Turing machine.
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More, you can write a fortran program emulating a universal Turing machine, and you can find a Turing machine running a Fortran universal interpreter (or compiler). This means that not only those system compute the same functions from N to N, but also that they can compute those function in the same manner of the other machine.
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But the question is whether they 'compute' anything outside the context of a physical realization?
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Which is addressed in the remaining of the post to Evgenii. Exactly like you can emulate fortran with Turing, a little part of arithmetic emulate already all program fortran, Turing, etc. (see the post for more).
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Except neither fortran nor Turing machines exist apart from physical realizations. They are abstractions.
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There is no need of step 8, here. It is just a mathematical fact that arithmetic emulates all programs, in the mathematical sense of "emulate".
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That's a metaphorical sense. "Arithmetic" doesn't act or perform anything, it's concept and a static, timeless one at that.
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Brent

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Step 8 just show that adding a substantial matter cannot make a difference from the machines' points of view, without adding a non Turing emulable ability to the mind.
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Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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