On 7/1/2012 5:21 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Jul 1, 2012, at 6:27 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:On 7/1/2012 2:46 PM, Jason Resch wrote:On Jul 1, 2012, at 2:07 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:On 7/1/2012 11:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:On Sun, Jul 1, 2012 at 1:20 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:On 7/1/2012 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Jul 2012, at 09:41, meekerdb wrote: On 7/1/2012 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Jun 2012, at 22:31, meekerdb wrote: On 6/30/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Jun 2012, at 18:44, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: I think that you have mentioned that mechanism is incompatible with materialism. How this follows then? Because concerning computation and emulation (exact simulation) all universal system are equivalent. Turing machine and Fortran programs are completely equivalent, you can emulate any Turing machine by a fortran program, and you can emulate any fortran program by a Turing machine. More, you can write a fortran program emulating a universal Turing machine, and you can find a Turing machine running a Fortran universal interpreter (or compiler). This means that not only those system compute the same functions from N to N, but also that they can compute those function in the same manner of the other machine. But the question is whether they 'compute' anything outside the context of a physical realization? Which is addressed in the remaining of the post to Evgenii. Exactly like you can emulate fortran with Turing, a little part of arithmetic emulate already all program fortran, Turing, etc. (see the post for more). Except neither fortran nor Turing machines exist apart from physical realizations. Of course they do. Turing machine and fortran program are mathematical, arithmetical actually, object. They exist in the same sense that the number 17 exists. Exactly, as ideas - patterns in brain processes. Brent,What is the ontological difference between 17 and the chair you are sitting in?Both admit objective analysis, so how is either any more real than the other?You might argue 17 is less real because we can't access it with our senses, butneither can we access the insides of stars with our senses. Yet no one disputes thereality of the insides of stars.We access them indirectly via instruments and theories of those instruments.Are numbers not also inferred from theories of our instruments?But not perceived. They are part of the theory, i.e. the language.Other branches of the wave function are not perceived either. They are part of thetheory though, so can be considered real.

`Or not. They are part of a theory that has great predictive power, which is why we think`

`the theory is a good one - not necessarily *really real*. Being 'considered real' is just`

`a sort of provisional assumption for purposes of calculation. The wave function that is`

`written down is just a way of summarizing an experimental preparation. Whether there is`

`also a *really real* wave function of the universe (or even of the laboratory) is moot.`

Numbers and Turing machines are part of Bruno's theory. I don't see the difference.Why can't Turing machines exist?

Sure they can. I can program this computer to be one - except it might run out of 'tape'.

For example, computers are instruments that let us observe and study the properties ofvarious Turing machines, which themselves are mathematical objects.You might argue the chair is more real because we can affect it, but then you wouldhave to conclude the anything outside our light cone is not real, for we cannotaffect anything outside our light cone.You can kick it and it kicks back.Math kicks back too. If you come up with a proposition, it kicks back with eithertrue or false.Only metaphorically.The whole "it's real if it kicks back" idea is a metaphor. I think the point of themetaphor is that to be real something needs to have its own properties which we havelimited or no control over. It is not malleable to our whims or will, but resistsattempts to change it.

But we can interact with it and potentially change it.

Of course there are many events outside one's lightcones which one infers as part ofa model of reality based on the events within one's lightcones, e.g. I suppose thatthe Sun continues to exist even though the photons I from which I infer it'sexistence are from it's past.Explain then why one is mistaken in supposing mathematical objects exist, when theycan be inferred according to some models of reality.Explain why Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist according to Conan Doyle's model of reality.Sherlock holmes does exist, but then what is Sherlock holmes? A character described insome books.Conan could have changed anything he wanted about Sherlock holmes, and therefore hedoesn't "kick back".

You forget how he was forced to revive Holmes by the public after he killed him off.

If you asked two people what properties Sherlock holmes has that were not answered inthe book there would be no agreement, and no way to study Sherlock holmes as anobjectively real object. Only the texts can be studied.

`That's right. We can discover properties of real things that are not part of their`

`defining description - unlike say the number 17.`

This is not true of mathematical objects. Properties are not enumerated in some text.They are not subject to be defined or changed by some authority. Two mathematicians,whether on earth or on different planets can make the same discoveries about the sameobjects.Further, mathematical realism is a useful scientific theory. It provides explanationsfor scientific questions. Why you don't see it as a legitimate theory is a mystery to me.

`I see arithmetic as a legitimate theory of things you can count, i.e. it describes the`

`results of some operations with them, provided you map the theory to the things in a valid`

`way. But the same it true of say the theory of elastic bodies.`

If you don't support the theory, that is fine, but it seems like you discount it'spossibility altogether because only "real physical things" can be real.

`I don't discount the possibility that Bruno's 'everything is arithmetic' might be a good`

`model, I just haven't seen any predictive power yet. My metaphysical view is that only`

`some things are real. When you start from premises like 'everything exists' you've just`

`set yourself the task of saying why we have only the experiences we do, the ones for which`

`we invented the word 'real'. If you can't satisfy that task, then you haven't gotten`

`anywhere.`

Also, how do you know the chair is anything more than a pattern in a brain process?How do you know you're not a brain in a vat? or a pattern in arithmetic?This was my point. You say math exists only in our minds. But an immaterialist couldsay the same of the chair.He could say it, but he would be redefining what 'exists' means.What is your definition?

`Of course we could all be deluded and living the Matrix, but that idea has no predictive`

`power. I already gave a definition of exists, that which we can interact with; although`

`it's more than that since we interact with things in our dreams. Have you ever read one`

`of those adventure novels written for kids in which at various points you make a choice`

`and it says go to page xx, so that the continuation of the story depends on your choice?`

`That's the way math textbooks are. You start with axioms and you deduce things from them`

`or a while, then you introduce a new axiom and see where it leads, then you consider a`

`contrary axiom and consider what it implies.`

`Bruno says digital computation is unique because all the different models of computation`

`seem equivalent. That makes his theory interesting, but it doesn't make it true. After`

`all it was invented to model what people can do by rote using pencil and paper - and`

`finite resources; the infinite tape is just a theoretical convenience, just like the`

`assumption of infinitely many integers. If you're going to elevate mathematics to`

`ontology then there's no reason it has to be constrained by human understanding. We could`

`take geometry, or set theory, or hypercomputers to be fundamental.`

Brent

To escape this we need some model of reality which postulates more exists "out there"than can be found in one's mind.Materialism generally postulates more than what exists in your mind. That's how itexplains the intersubjective agreement of perceptions.Right.Your model seems to assume an external world exists, but it stops exactly where ourinstruments and inferences from their observations end.Not at all. That's whole point of having a model and not just an encyclopedia ofdata. A model makes predictions beyond the data on which it was based.I agree.Humanity's model of reality has over the centuries, been repeatedly extended.Therefore I think it is more conservative to believe there is more "out there" thanwe can see or imagine.I'm not a conservative.Good to know. JasonBrent --You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "EverythingList" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com<mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>.To unsubscribe from this group, send email toeverything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.--You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "EverythingList" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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