On 11 Jul 2012, at 15:23, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 July 2012 09:55, Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com> wrote:
Even the phisical TOE is part of this second world. there are no
countries, no cars, no persons, no electrons outside of the world
of the mind. Outside of the mind there is only mathematics. And
this math has been anthropically selected by the mind.
Well put. Mind - the epistemological subject - is uniquely
characterised by its irreducibly synthetic or compositional
character, the reverse polarity of a maximally reduced, "objective"
ontology. This is implicitly assumed by everyone, but explicitly
acknowledged by hardly anybody. Consequently the typical response
whenever I express this thought is blank incomprehension.
It is hard to explain. It seems to me that the thought experience
illustrate this.
But the incompleteness phenomenon justifies this by making the first
person of a machine a necessarily non formal object from the point of
view of view of the machine. The machine can describe in her language
its possible bodies, and its beliefs, (Bp) but no correct machine can
define its knowledge (Bp & p) in its language. The knower has no name
for itself, and its logic (S4Grz) does describe an epistemic sort of
solipisist.
We do agree on this, and I can only invite you take into account
computer science. The incompleteness makes the Theatetical definition
of knowledge working on machine, at the price of making the machine
firs person self not self-nameable. It makes it ways of reasoning
informal, for herself of similar neighbors. The first person is
irreducible to anything formal, which makes her bet on a level of
substitution into an act of faith.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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