On 12 Jul 2012, at 00:44, meekerdb wrote:

On 7/11/2012 2:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Jul 2012, at 22:17, meekerdb wrote:

On 7/11/2012 6:23 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 11 July 2012 09:55, Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com> wrote:

Even the phisical TOE is part of this second world. there are no countries, no cars, no persons, no electrons outside of the world of the mind. Outside of the mind there is only mathematics. And this math has been anthropically selected by the mind.

Well put. Mind - the epistemological subject - is uniquely characterised by its irreducibly synthetic or compositional character, the reverse polarity of a maximally reduced, "objective" ontology.

But it isn't uniquely characterized by that. I don't even know what "irreducibly synthetic" means. I know what "synthetic" means; it means made (synthesized) of something else, it means artificial, not natural?? But in any case "the subject", the first-person, is also singular and persistent thru time.

There is certainly a tension between knowledge which is subjective and gained from perception and the model of the world based on it which is third-person communicable. When we bestow the property "exists" on the ontology of the third-person world model, we then take on the task of explaining the first-person subjective in terms of that model. Everyone on this list (except me) seems to assume this impossible.

Neither me. Just that if comp is true we got a simpler ontology.

This is just the flip side of Bruno's task of explaining the third- person world in terms of subjective knowledge

Not at all. I explain the *physical* world in term of first person plural world, themselves describe in third person arithmetic.

The 'first person plural world' is what I mean by knowledge on which there is intersubjective agreement.

OK. Those, when expressible, are belief, and if true (but we can't know that) they become knowledge (but not certainty).

Comp is not idealist.

Yes I understand that. But doesn't it derive ideas (conscious thoughts) from computation (arithmetic) and the physical world from coherent subsets of ideas.

Consciousness is not really derived. It is only assumed to be associated with relevant computations. We derive from that, but that is not derived from less.

which he models by computational relations like "provable".

Provable = objective (doubtful) belief

Why do you writer "doubtful". Why should one doubt what is provable?...because the axioms are dubious?

Yes. We cannot know that we are consistent, or correct.

Provable and true/satisfied-in-a-reality = Subjective knowledge (the communicable part).

But we can't know what is "satisfied-in-a-reality", we can only know what is provable from our premises

Making it into a belief. That might be wrong.

and what we experience directly.

That is true, and undoubtable.

Are you saying there are provable things that we can't communicate

As being proved, we can communicate them as belief, if we believe in the axioms.

or the there are provable things which are not true (not satisfied- in-a-reality)?

That can happen, even if nobody really doubt some simple theory, like arithmetic.



(Incompleteness forces us to make those nuances).



This is implicitly assumed by everyone, but explicitly acknowledged by hardly anybody. Consequently the typical response whenever I express this thought is blank incomprehension.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to