On 7/11/2012 2:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Jul 2012, at 22:17, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/11/2012 6:23 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 July 2012 09:55, Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com
<mailto:agocor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Even the phisical TOE is part of this second world. there are no countries,
no
cars, no persons, no electrons outside of the world of the mind. Outside
of the
mind there is only mathematics. And this math has been anthropically
selected by
the mind.
Well put. Mind - the epistemological subject - is uniquely characterised by its
irreducibly synthetic or compositional character, the reverse polarity of a maximally
reduced, "objective" ontology.
But it isn't uniquely characterized by that. I don't even know what "irreducibly
synthetic" means. I know what "synthetic" means; it means made (synthesized) of
something else, it means artificial, not natural?? But in any case "the subject", the
first-person, is also singular and persistent thru time.
There is certainly a tension between knowledge which is subjective and gained from
perception and the model of the world based on it which is third-person communicable.
When we bestow the property "exists" on the ontology of the third-person world model,
we then take on the task of explaining the first-person subjective in terms of that
model. Everyone on this list (except me) seems to assume this impossible.
Neither me. Just that if comp is true we got a simpler ontology.
This is just the flip side of Bruno's task of explaining the third-person world in
terms of subjective knowledge
Not at all. I explain the *physical* world in term of first person plural world,
themselves describe in third person arithmetic.
The 'first person plural world' is what I mean by knowledge on which there is
intersubjective agreement.
Comp is not idealist.
Yes I understand that. But doesn't it derive ideas (conscious thoughts) from computation
(arithmetic) and the physical world from coherent subsets of ideas.
which he models by computational relations like "provable".
Provable = objective (doubtful) belief
Why do you writer "doubtful". Why should one doubt what is provable?...because the axioms
are dubious?
Provable and true/satisfied-in-a-reality = Subjective knowledge (the
communicable part).
But we can't know what is "satisfied-in-a-reality", we can only know what is provable from
our premises and what we experience directly. Are you saying there are provable things
that we can't communicate or the there are provable things which are not true (not
satisfied-in-a-reality)?
Brent
(Incompleteness forces us to make those nuances).
Bruno
Brent
This is implicitly assumed by everyone, but explicitly acknowledged by hardly anybody.
Consequently the typical response whenever I express this thought is blank
incomprehension.
David
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