On 31 Jul 2012, at 14:36, David Nyman wrote:

On 31 July 2012 11:05, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

With comp, I argue that arithmetical truth is simpler and can explain why the numbers (or better the person associated to those numbers) construct ideas of time and space, and why they can believe in some genuine way in them, and be deluded in believing that they are primitive.

So your view, expressed above, seems to be that the subject of the spatio-temporal illusion is the "person associated with those numbers".

Yes.



If this be the case, how can we categorise such a subject, as distinct from the numbers that locally encode its logic?

By the logics of its multiple points of view, I would say. Most of them arise from the (8) logics of self-reference.




Doesn't it rather naturally fit with Bitbol's sense of a generalised Mind, logically conditioned by - but not identical to - the specifics of an underlying "real system"?

But what is that "real system" and how does it select the observers? Comp answers this, but the price is that we have to abandon the idea that there is some primitive real system. Only the computations are real, and the rest is a statistically emergent pattern in the first person (singular and plural) view. The "real system" can exist, but it is more overlaying than underlying. It is not primitive.




And if so, does not this subjective intuition, generalised in such terms, seem ultimately to denote a universal, rather than an individual, category?

Comp gives or should give a very universal physics entirely based on arithmetic (or the universal system you wish). It comes from a competition between all universal numbers, and empirically we have some reason to believe that some type of universal numbers win the game, like quantum computers. So yes, but without any "real system" to postulate (which cannot work by step 8). The mind-body problem is reduced to the derivation of the "real system" from the number's "illusions". We must explain it (the qubits probably) from the bits as Wheeler suggested.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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