On 31 Jul 2012, at 14:36, David Nyman wrote:
On 31 July 2012 11:05, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
With comp, I argue that arithmetical truth is simpler and can
explain why the numbers (or better the person associated to those
numbers) construct ideas of time and space, and why they can believe
in some genuine way in them, and be deluded in believing that they
are primitive.
So your view, expressed above, seems to be that the subject of the
spatio-temporal illusion is the "person associated with those
numbers".
Yes.
If this be the case, how can we categorise such a subject, as
distinct from the numbers that locally encode its logic?
By the logics of its multiple points of view, I would say. Most of
them arise from the (8) logics of self-reference.
Doesn't it rather naturally fit with Bitbol's sense of a generalised
Mind, logically conditioned by - but not identical to - the
specifics of an underlying "real system"?
But what is that "real system" and how does it select the observers?
Comp answers this, but the price is that we have to abandon the idea
that there is some primitive real system. Only the computations are
real, and the rest is a statistically emergent pattern in the first
person (singular and plural) view.
The "real system" can exist, but it is more overlaying than
underlying. It is not primitive.
And if so, does not this subjective intuition, generalised in such
terms, seem ultimately to denote a universal, rather than an
individual, category?
Comp gives or should give a very universal physics entirely based on
arithmetic (or the universal system you wish). It comes from a
competition between all universal numbers, and empirically we have
some reason to believe that some type of universal numbers win the
game, like quantum computers. So yes, but without any "real system" to
postulate (which cannot work by step 8). The mind-body problem is
reduced to the derivation of the "real system" from the number's
"illusions". We must explain it (the qubits probably) from the bits as
Wheeler suggested.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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