Le 24-juil.-12, à 19:07, Stephen P. King a écrit :

On 7/24/2012 7:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Le 23-juil.-12, à 20:30, Stephen P. King a écrit :On 7/23/2012 6:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:If this is relevant for UDA, you should show to me. You start froman assumption of some primitive physical reality.Could you please explain to me why it is that you make thisclaim in spite of repeated explanation that show the contrary?Because despite you repeat that physics is not primary, you arguethat something is invalid in UDA by mentioning physical interactions,and by referring to papers which assumes physicalism (implicitly orexplicitly). As I said you contradict yourself.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/It would be a contradiction if I where not qualifying thedefinition of "physical interactions". Have you noticed that I mentionthat I am putting the physical at the same level as the numbers, notby making the physical primitive but instead by making the numbers(the immaterial aspect as per your designation) occur (within myapproach) at the same level. Neither numbers nor physical objects areprimitive. Let me re-post something I wrote yesterday that you mayhave missed:

`The natural numbers, or something recursively equivalent, have to be`

`primitive (in my sense) by a theorem in logic. We cannot define the`

`natural numbers by assuming less.`

On 7/22/2012 2:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:Many (as implied by the word plural) is not just a number. Aplurality of 1p is a mapping function from some domain to someco-domain (or range), no? If there is no distinction between thedomain and co-domain, what kind of map is it? Maybe it is anautomorphism, but it is not something that allows us to extract aplurality over which variation can occur. You are talking as if thevariation was present but not allowing the means for that variationto occur! The use of the word "plurality" is thus meaningless as youare using it: "first person plural view of physical reality".You must show first how it is that the plurality obtains withoutthe use of a space if you are going to make claims that there is nospace and yet plurality (of 1p) is possible. In the explanation thatyou give there is discussion of Moscow, Helsinki and Washington.These are locations that exists and have meaning in a wider context.At least there is assumed to be a set of possible locations and thatthe set is not a singleton (such as {0}) nor does it collapse into asingleton.

`Just use the plurality of the number relative situation among each`

`other. That works fine for the multidreams, and that is enough to`

`understand how the illusion of space and time occur (but not to get the`

`measure, which needs the mathematical treatment of self-reference).`

and On 7/22/2012 2:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:[SPK] If the computer is defined as a closed system thensolipsism automatically follows.It is not define as a close system. that is even why it is natural(but conceptually wrong) to put the infinite tape in the definitionof the universal machine. But the universal numbers are open in alot of sense. Now, even a closed computer, with a finite nonextensible memory, can emulate a plurality of observers, defeatingsolipsim locally, if its memory is enough big.Ah! Exactly! "...even a closed computer, with a finite nonextensible memory, can emulate a plurality of observers, defeatingsolipsim locally, if its memory is enough big." YES! Defeatingsolipsism locally. That is exactly what I am trying to discuss withyou, that is what the verbosity about "local measures" is trying toconvey. The "memory" is a resource, it is the computer's version ofspace. It is where the plurality is necessary.

But those are purely arithmetical concepts.

Let us recap the idea so far: A Computer, defined abstractly, isa closed system.

`But it is not closed (except for diagonalization, but I guess that is`

`not in your sense).`

It must be closed if it has a fixed point identity (ala Kleenetheorems) ,

`That has nothing to do, or it is the closure for diagonalization, but`

`this makes the RE sets topologically open. You are quite confusing, and`

`I don't see your point of invalidity.`

but this closure causes it to be solipsist. It cannot name anythingor have knowledge of anything that is not within the span of itsbeing. How do we solve this problem? We first have to accept theproblem. Like the alcoholic that wants rehabilitation, we must acceptthat we are - as observers - solipsists, but there is a chance thatwe are not doomed to this misery. If the memory of the computer is"big enough" then there is a non-zero chance that the memory of aseparate and different computer has a state of its memory that isidentical. This allows for a partial bisimilarity to exist betweenthe two computers.My idea is that if there is sufficient bisimilarity between adisjoint pair of closed computational systems and if there is asmooth transformation that allows homomorphisms of arbitrary stateswithin a memory, then the appearance of plurality of computationalobservers is possible. The Stone duality then implies that if ahomomorphism between a pair of Boolean algebras exists then there isa transformation between a pair of Stone spaces that exists. Ifphysics can be defined in terms of Stone spaces and abstractcomputations in terms of Boolean algebras then the mind-body problemis solved. There is no need to "reduce" the mind-body problem to abody or a mind problem (in the singular sense). There is a reductionto a Minds (plural) or Bodies (plural) problem, and this is theinteraction problem that I am trying to explain. If you would onlyread that article on the Concurrency Problem in Wiki, this might havebeen an easier journey.The key is that I am considering the body problem (as you defineit in your discussion of UDA) to be the dual of the mind problem formaterialism.

`Too vague. AUDA shows the existence of such a dulaity, but the mind is`

`not just the dual of matter, for the mind reality is a priori vastly`

`bigger than the physical realm. How do you treat the first person`

`indeterminacy in that duality?`

Perhaps the only problem in our mutual understanding is vocabulary anddefinitions of words. What we are considering is very subtle and hard(almost impossible!) to define exactly. I need to be more patient inmy explanations.

`The problem is typical in the dialog between science and philosophy,`

`and more servere when a point of philosophy is tretated with the`

`scientific method. We can discuss only when you grasp the technical`

`point, really (or find a possible flaw).`

Do you understand the key isomorphism that is being postulated to"connect" the physical with the mental aspects?

`With comp it is not an isomorphism a priori. It might be, but that is`

`an open very hard problem (even to just formulate it).`

It is the identification of a physical object with its best possiblecomputational simulation.

`But we can't do that. If we do it for a mind person, its brain *is* an`

`emerging pattern on infinities of computations, interfering`

`statistically.`

`Keep in mind that comp makes both matter (apparent primitive matter)`

`and consciousness not Turing-emulable a priori.`

It for this reason that I insist that we cannot disconnect the mentalworld of mathematics (including any form of number or arithmetic -including {N, +, *} - from the physical world of objects.

`Logically you are right, for the first implies the second, but only at`

`the epistemological level.`

There must be at least one physical system that can implement a givencomputation for that computation to qualify for universality.

`That is plain wrong. I guess you are changing the sense of`

`universality. I use it in the usual Post-Turing-Church-Kleene-Markov`

`sense.`

`Given that ypou say "physical suystem are not primitive", I don't know`

`what you mean by physical.`

Of course universality demands that the computation can operate onany functionally equivalent system, so there is an invariance withrespect to function, but the equivalence class "pivots" on thenecessity that it can actually be run on a physical system.

`Which physical system? Where does it come from. What is it? What is`

`your theory?`

Otherwise computations (as per the abstract theory of UniversalTuring Machines) would have nothing at all to do with physicalcomputers and be a purely mental exercise of fantasy.

`You still evade to criticize UDA which shows that if we are machine`

`(even just physical machine) then physics is derivable from`

`aritthmetic. It is a theorem in applied logic, once you accept the`

`classical very wide definition of knowledge and belief.`

`Have you understand the step 7? It shows that comp + robust physical`

`universe already makes physics a branch of number theory. Then step 8`

`shows that the assumption of a robust physical universe (or any primary`

`physical universe) is a red herring: it simply cannot work, making`

`observable matter necessarily non primary (making primitive matter into`

`an epinoumenon).`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.